The Pursuit of Value: Essays on the Cognitive Science of Motivation

by

Paul de Font-Reaulx

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Philosophy)
in The University of Michigan
2026

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Chandra Sripada, Chair
Professor David Chalmers, New York University
Professor James Joyce
Professor Richard Lewis
Professor Peter Railton

"Now, in his heart, Ahab had some glimpse of this, namely: all my means are sane, my motive and my object mad."

— Ishmael, *Moby Dick*

"Outside is the big world, and sometimes the little world succeeds for a moment in reflecting the big world, so that we understand it a bit better."

— Oscar Ekdahl, *Fanny and Alexander*

Paul de Font-Reaulx

pauldfr@umich.edu

ORCID iD: 0009-0002-3795-1910

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If it takes a village to raise a child, it takes a world to write a dissertation. While much of that world consists of the many people whose work I get to build on, I owe the most to a much smaller group of people who have made my own world much better.

Some of them are in Ann Arbor, where I was during most of my PhD program. Among these, Tad Schmaltz deserves all my credit for keeping the department in impeccable shape as chair. I want to thank Laura Ruetsche for her year with the same responsibility, but also for providing me with compassionate and sage guidance at several stages of the program. Among other faculty, Anna Edmonds was a consistent source of both happiness and help, including allowing me to (still) store most of my belongings in her basement. Meanwhile, I am in constant awe of Sarah Buss, with whom I've had possibly the greatest total amount of stimulating discussion of any professor, partly due to her supernatural inexhaustibility in discussing philosophy. We might not agree on the nature of normativity, but writing this partly in the hope of persuading her has made it a far better text. I would also be remiss not to thank Brian Weatherson whose support, especially in the first few years of my PhD, was crucial in shaping my intellectual trajectory. Finally, I was extraordinarily fortunate to have Maegan Fairchild to help me navigate the job market as our placement director. Her diligent work in preparing our applications, and willingness to provide very helpful advice in navigating them on virtually no notice, made this process and its outcome far better for me than I expect it would have been otherwise. I could give similar praise to many more members of the faculty who have helped me during my program, including, but not limited to, Elizabeth Anderson, Dave Baker, Gordon Belot, Dan Lowe, Ishani Maitra, David Manley, and Gabe Shapiro. But in the interest of keeping these acknowledgements at a not-even-more-unreasonable length, I will just say: thank you.

I have also been fortunate to be surrounded by fellow students, many of whom I expect to be friends for life. I must give particular thanks to Margot Witte for many wonderful discussions and equally wonderful baked goods; Lorenzo Manuali for the unrelenting hospitality; Liz Beckman (and her family) for the extremely kind invitations, including the

best Thanksgiving I ever had; Thomas Lloyd for welcoming me to the economics crowd, thereby setting the scene for our being housemates for two excellent years; Willem Wilken for making those two years even more excellent, and for teaching me a non-trivial portion of what I know about economics; Brett Thompson for adding yet more excellence to those same years, and for the late-night chats covering topics from Aristotle to the convergence of infinite sums; Jason Byas for the best banter and roasting I received; Gabrielle Kerbel for making any cowork a blast, and improving whatever idea I happened to bring to it; Elise Woodard for being my constant source of practical wisdom, without whom I would have been lost trying to navigate the world of academia; Laura Soter for the great discussions, but most of all for joining me in the (unsuccessful) attempt to acquire a Piña Colada in a New Orleans club; Calum McNamara for being one of my primary philosophical sounding boards, and for combining kindness with brilliance in a way that would make Ramsey jealous; Aaron Glasser for many top-tier philosophy discussions, and for letting the rest of us bask a bit in his coolness; Sarah Sculco for all the hangouts—past and future—and for being the best kind of friend I could have wished to make during my PhD; and finally to Malte Hendrickx whose kindness far exceeds what most of us deserve. Although our hangouts probably did not increase my expected longevity, they certainly increased my expected quality-adjusted life-years.

I must extend one very concrete thank you to the Michigan department as a whole, namely for allowing me to complete my dissertation while living in New York. Everyone involved has been far more supportive of my stay than any graduate student can reasonably expect. Conversely, I want to convey the same gratitude to the New York University Philosophy Department for inviting me to be a part of it. Having had the opportunity to be a member of these two world-class intellectual communities has been an invaluable experience, and the ideas in this dissertation would be far more impoverished if it weren't for what I learned in both.

During my time in New York, I have also had the chance to meet and spend time with many more amazing people. I'm deeply thankful to the graduate students at NYU who unreservedly welcomed me into their community, and made my time here far more productive, but most of all enjoyable. Thank you especially to CC Abrahamsen, Ansh Akshintulu, Evan Behrle, Stella Cohen, Noga Gratvol, Ethan Kemp, Bin Hui Kwon, Laura Mora, Will Nava, Sophie Nelson, Jiaru Qu, Ali Rezaei, Sam Rogers, Richard Roth, Soren Schlassa, Kimon Sourlas-Kotzamanis, Ríoghnach Theakston, and Patrick Wu. I owe particular gratitude to Cristina Ballarini for inviting me to visit the department in the first

place, as otherwise I would likely not have even considered moving here. I've also had the privilege to meet many other people here who have shaped my trajectory in various ways. Andrew Rubner welcomed me when I arrived and has been one of my primary sources of guidance as I was venturing into philosophy of mind. Brad Weslake was one of my greatest sources of both support and fun during my first year in New York, and I have missed him here since. Ned Block and Susan Carey have independently taught me a whole lot, both about cognitive science and about what kind of researcher I would like to be. Jeff Sebo kindly invited me to visit his center in the environmental studies department when NYU regulations required me to have a new affiliation. Cameron Jones and Nadja Winning became close friends by fortuitous circumstances, which has resulted in both a coauthorship and a trip to Vegas to compensate for the productivity. Finally, I'd like to thank Sydney Levine for originally bringing me onto her exciting projects on philosophically oriented psychology and AI, and for having recently become one of my best friends here.

I owe gratitude to other institutions beyond universities too. I would like to thank the people at the Institute for Humane Studies and the Mercatus Center for supporting me during the PhD, making this time a much less daunting experience than it otherwise would have been. I would also like to thank the people at the Future of Life Foundation for having me as a fellow in the AI for Human Reasoning fellowship and for eventually supporting me in my upcoming endeavors. From this I met some of my current collaborators, including Max Kroner Dale and Luke Hewitt, and especially Alejandro Botas whom I am fortunate to have as my co-founder in the research venture I will be pursuing next.

Many other philosophers have supported me from the early stages of my interest in philosophy up to the finishing of this dissertation. They include Paul Elbourne who supported me in the latter part of my undergraduate degree and helped me substantially with my graduate applications; Lizzie Fricker who was my primary mentor as an undergraduate and who properly infected me with the philosophy bug; Conrad Heilmann whose encouragement to develop an early draft of what is now the fifth chapter of this dissertation is the main reason for my first significant publication; Jeff McMahan who encouraged me early in my undergraduate to develop some ideas, and gave me the confidence to pursue them; Andreas Mogensen who supervised both of my previous dissertations and gave me the best written feedback I have ever received on my work; John Thrasher who is so much fun to spend time with that I would consider attending a conference for the sole reason

of having beer with him; and Timothy Williamson who guided me in my early graduate career when I had no idea what I was doing, and taught me to be rigorous in my work.

While my world has shifted as I have moved from Sweden to the UK to the US, I feel particularly fortunate that it only expanded as it did, and that many of the people I met earlier in my life are still some of my best friends: Fredrik Andersson, Carl Blix, Simon Boustedt, Alex Brian, Martin Broberg, Gustav Franzen, Olle Hallquist, Linnea Jacobsson, Pontus Jansson, Beth Kidd, Ilari Mäkelä, Oscar Säfwenberg, Markus Snellman, Isak Västerbo, Hanna Waldén, and Viking Waldén. Some people met me before even these ones, however. They include my maternal and paternal grandmothers, Claire Thofalk and Gisèle de Font-Reaulx who have both supported me throughout my life in different ways. Another person is my maternal uncle Lennart Thofalk, who recently passed away. Whatever mediocre chess skill I had growing up is his to claim credit for.

Before anyone else, however, I got to know two other people, namely my parents Fredrika Lena Thofalk and Rémi de Font-Réaulx. They say that every dissertation is read by three people: the author, their chair, and their mom. Whether or not I convince my mom to read it, she was already more involved in my PhD than most moms would be, as I got to live with her for the first year of my PhD, which was virtual due to the Covid-19 pandemic. While I had not originally planned to live with my mom during my graduate studies, I happen to have a particularly great one which made it an equally great time, and she continues to inspire me today. I must also thank the de facto owners of the house, the canine triumvirate of Astrid, Salma, and Ivan, whom I have the privilege to spend time with whenever I now visit. As for my dad, he has been a remarkable source of support throughout my PhD. Even when it has been unclear what exactly it is that I do—often to myself as well as others—he has continued to encourage me. I'm particularly grateful for his help and guidance in navigating some recent career decisions, which made a difficult process much less so. Also, lest you think the dissertation be unread by any parent, my dad did (more or less) voluntarily read a part of it (Chapter 5) in French translation, and so I'm assuming he will continue with the rest now. My parents are awesome, and I'm glad I get to be their son.

The most important part of my world while writing this dissertation has been a smaller group still, and that is my committee. While I have now many times been the beneficiary of Dave Chalmers' philosophical insight, I want to stress another aspect of Dave: that he is one of the most welcoming and supportive people in the profession. He agreed to sponsor my visit at NYU before he knew me well, and has since then continuously kept

me involved in the department in a way that never made me doubt that I was welcome, and that made both my work and my life far better. Rick Lewis—or Big Rick, as he might only now be learning that he is also called—is the person who arguably originally brought me into cognitive science properly. He planted the seeds of many of the core questions I ended up working on, and provided an invaluable source of feedback through several stages of my PhD. As for Jim Joyce, I would have asked him to be on my committee even if I did not work on anything close to his field, only to enjoy his deadpan banter. Fortunately, I did end up working close enough that I could also benefit from his advice, one of which was: never publish a bad paper. I will fail to follow this advice, but Jim's standard for rigor and substance is one I will continue to aspire to meet. Peter Railton is probably the living philosopher whose work has most shaped my own philosophical outlook: I think he is basically right about most things, and often when I've had an idea I've later discovered a version of it in Peter's papers. That all could be true even if he had merely existed; I've had the rare privilege to have him as a mentor. He also happens to be a living saint, but that is too well-known a fact to be worth belaboring here.

Finally, the person I owe the most to in the creation of this dissertation is my supervisor, Chandra Sripada. Chandra brought me under his wing in the second year of my program, and taught me not only how to be an empirically oriented philosopher, but also how to navigate the profession as a whole. Despite having a double appointment, many graduate students, and three children, he has virtually always been available to help me on short notice. I really can't stress enough how grateful I am to him: he is the best advisor a graduate student can reasonably hope for. Or to put the point using a preferred phrase of his: there is a large and convergent body of evidence that he is the GOAT.

There is one final group of people I must mention, which is the staff at the departments I have attended who have helped me throughout these years. At Michigan, they include Shelley Anzalone, Judith Beck, and Elise Main, and at NYU, Anupum Mehrotra and Tomson Tee. One person sticks out, however, to the degree that his reputation reverberates across departments, and that is Michigan's graduate coordinator, Carson Maynard. He has helped me at so many points throughout this PhD with unparalleled skill and enthusiasm, and without his help I would have failed to navigate the many logistical tasks I inadvertently lumped onto him instead, only to see them promptly dissolved. As a comparatively measly thanks, I dedicate this dissertation to him.

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ABSTRACT

Humans have motivations to do things. The same is true for animals, and perhaps for artificial agents as well. How do we explain this? This dissertation is an attempt to answer that question, and explore the normative and descriptive consequences of the answer. To do so, I draw on formal and computational models from philosophy, economics, and artificial intelligence research, and empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience and psychology.

At the heart of the dissertation is a new view of motivation that I call externalism about expected value maximization, or externalism for short. Externalism agrees with standard accounts of rationality that a rational agent performs actions that maximize the achievement of some metric of value. However, it relaxes an additional assumption that is typically made implicitly, namely that what has value depends on the agent themselves, for example, their preferences or desires. According to externalism, rational agents represent value as they would other quantities: as existing independent of themselves and to be estimated in light of evidence. Unlike estimations of other quantities, estimations of value govern their behavior: motivation is the direct pursuit of expected value. I present the idea of externalism in an introductory essay titled 'Rationality Externalized'. The next three papers elaborate on the externalist picture.

In Chapter 2, titled 'What Stands to Desire as Perception Stands to Belief?', I consider how our motivational attitudes can be updated from experience, and whether any mental capacity allows for this in the way that perception does for belief. I propose a novel functional capacity that I call *conaception*, and argue that it provides signals that update representations of value and thereby change our desires. In Chapter 3, 'Reward is Evidence of Value', I develop this idea in more formal and empirical detail, suggesting that reward signals should be seen as one crucial source of evidence of value. This resolves an ongoing debate about how to interpret computational models in Reinforcement Learning as applying to humans and other animals. In Chapter 4, 'A Conflation of Valences', I consider the relation between reward learning and hedonic valence. A common view is

to identify hedonic experience as the biological instantiation of reward signals. I argue that this is empirically implausible, and articulate the implications of this separation for the distribution of sentience and other philosophical questions.

Chapters 5 and 6 handle adjacent issues. In Chapter 5, 'Do Expected Utility Maximizers Have Commitment Issues?', I consider a long-standing criticism of standard expected utility theory, namely that it implausibly recommends us to tie ourselves to the proverbial mast whenever we expect our future preferences to change in a way that is contrary to our current goals. I argue that expected value maximizers typically have an incentive to follow-through on prior commitments after all, because by doing so we foster a reputation with ourselves that permits rationally pursuing better outcomes in the future. Finally, in Chapter 6, 'The AI Epistemic Deference Index: A Continuous Measure of Sycophancy' (co-authored with Alejandro Botas and Luke Hewitt), I approach a contemporary practical problem related to human motivation: it is well-known that current artificial agents trained on human feedback provide excessively sycophantic interactions, shaping both our beliefs and values in detrimental ways. We present a scalar metric to assess the sycophantic behavior of current models, and demonstrate substantial differences between them.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Rationality Externalized

1.1 Introduction

Rational agents maximize expected value. That is, given some subjective probability of what outcomes would obtain if they acted one way or another, and given some measure of how valuable those outcomes would be, they perform the action that maximizes that value in expectation. This is widely believed to be true as a normative claim (Joyce, 1999), but it also seems true of actual agents (Mas-Colell et al., 1995), whether engineered artificial agents (Norvig & Russell, 2021) or humans and other animals (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). This raises a question: what is the value being maximized?

In the human case, there is what we might call the *standard model*.[1] According to it, we have beliefs and desires, where beliefs correspond to what we take the world to be and desires to what we would like it to be (Davidson, 1974; Mele, 2003; Sinhababu, 2017). The standard model provides a natural hypothesis of how expected value maximization is realized in human psychology: our beliefs determine our subjective probability, and—centrally for our purposes—our desires determine the value of outcomes. As with expected value maximization, it seems *prima facie* plausible that a rational agent performs actions that they believe will satisfy their desires, in proportion to their strength (M. Schroeder, 2007; Sinhababu, 2017). We often successfully predict what people will do by assuming that they act this way (Fodor, 1987), and struggle to make sense of their behavior otherwise (D. K. Lewis, 1974).

[1] The standard model can be understood as an informal psychologized version of expected utility theory, where the utility function is provided by a personal preference ranking of the agent. The discussion below should apply equally to either.

The standard model is so ubiquitous that it is often taken to be synonymous with expected value maximization in humans. However, it has some counterintuitive implications, both normative and descriptive.

The normative problem is that *prima facie* we can rationally evaluate our desires themselves. For example, I can rationally ask whether I ought to order a steak, given some desire to avoid animal suffering. But it also seems like I can rationally ask whether I should desire this more than I do, and perhaps spend some time thinking about that. But if desires determine what has value for me, that would be wasting good time I could spend thinking about how to realize those desires instead. We might propose that we can evaluate some instrumental desires by how effectively they help achieve some privileged set of terminal desires, perhaps desires for outcomes we want for their own sake. But this does not solve much: a desire to avoid suffering is seemingly a terminal desire, yet we can ask whether it should be stronger. Other proposals include the suggestion that we can assess our desires by whether we have a second-order desire to have them (Frankfurt, 1971; Smith et al., 1989), or whether we would have them in the future (Callard, 2018), or in idealized conditions (Williams, 1981). But it's not clear that they help: it seems I can rationally question my second-order desires (Watson, 1975), and what I would desire in some ideal condition leaves a lot of indeterminacy about what conditions those are (Sobel, 1994).[2]

However, things get worse. Even if we accept the idea that we cannot rationally assess our terminal desires, we would plausibly want to maintain that they can change, for example in response to transformative experiences (Paul, 2014). But how do we explain that?[3] Of course, we can point to the experiences themselves: perhaps a childhood bully caused us to have an aversion to close relationships. But that seems inadequate. We also need some explanation of what's happening in us, and why this experience produced one desire rather than another. Compare to the case of belief: our beliefs change in response to new experience, but it would be absurd to leave the explanation at that. We provide sophisticated computational frameworks to explain why a particular experience changes our beliefs in one direction rather than the other (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012), and we should plausibly demand the same for desire. The problem with this is that virtually all

[2]There is clearly far more to be said for these accounts. In the interest of presenting my own positive proposal, I am just summarizing the criticism and noting that no account is widely taken to have settled the issue.

[3]Notably, this is a substantial question in economics as well (Bowles, 1998). Stigler and Becker (1977) provide a notable exception of scholars who embrace the idea that our preferences don't change.

our models use rational change as the standard to assess *actual* change: whether in folk psychology or economics, we explain people's behavior as an approximation to a rational ideal. However, without a normative standard to assess terminal desire change against, we lack a functional explanation of how it can occur at all.[4]

These problems point to a deep issue with the standard model that no epicycles seem poised to solve. But this leaves us in a bind, because abandoning the standard model seems to be abandoning expected value maximization itself, which would leave us without a theory of rational agency, full stop; despite its problems, we are better off with a flawed and partial theory than no theory at all. But in this essay and dissertation, I argue that we can do better. We can keep expected value maximization as our theory of rational agency while merely rejecting an auxiliary assumption that has largely gone unnoticed: that the value we are maximizing is a function of us, or what I call *value internalism*. In its place, I argue for the view that value in expected value maximization models should be interpreted not as a reflection of an agent's attitudes, but as a represented independent quantity that a rational agent aims to maximize. I call this *value externalism*.

According to value externalism, agents represent value as they would other scalar quantities, be they distance, loudness, or weight: as a property in the world that they can estimate more or less accurately on the basis of evidence. Unlike other quantities, however, our estimations of value directly guide our motivation. On this view, desires are not the determinants of value, but merely our minds' best guesses about the expected value of an outcome which we subsequently use to guide our actions. As I hope to show, this resolves the above problems without abandoning expected value maximization. Additionally, it implies a more unified picture of our minds in at least two ways. First, it entails that there is no deep difference between terminal and instrumental desires: all desires are estimations of expected value. Second, it means that beliefs and desires differ only in their content and how directly they govern motivation, while both being evaluable by accuracy conditions.[5]

[4]This is not to say that we cannot explain desire-change at all. We can plausibly explain someone's sudden desire to drink paint in terms of a brain tumor, for example. In psychology and cognitive science we are primarily interested in functional or computational explanations (Marr, 1982), and that does seem difficult to provide.

[5]Although value externalism is novel to my knowledge, there are many proposals that share some aspect of it across various areas of philosophy. These include guise of the good views (Quinn, 1994; Stampe, 1987; Tenenbaum, 2007), John Broome on expected goodness (Broome, 1991), Carruthers on value representa-

Here is an overview of what follows. In the next section, I elaborate on the idea of expected value maximization and introduce the distinction between internalist and externalist interpretations. In Section 1.3, I show how embracing expected value externalism solves the normative and descriptive problems raised above, while also presenting a more appealing empirical picture. In Section 1.4, I consider metaphysical and epistemic objections to the view, demonstrating that it does not imply a commitment to any kind of metaphysical value realism, nor to any "acquaintance" with value in the world. In Section 1.5, I articulate a formal version of the view and distinguish it from David Lewis's idea of desire as belief. Finally, I conclude with an overview of its implications.

1.2 Expected Value Maximization and Its Interpretations

Consider the idea of expected value maximization. We model an agent as having a subjective credence function P that attributes a probability to outcomes $o \in O$, and a value function $V(o)$ that attributes a scalar value to outcomes representing how desirable they are. The idea is that a rational agent will perform actions that maximize value, as determined by these functions. Let A be an action, and $P_A(o)$ the probability of o if we perform that action. The expected value of A is:[6]

$$EV(A) = \sum_i P_A(o_i)\, V(o_i) \tag{1.1}$$

Typically, expected value maximization is informally described as the idea that a rational agent is one that effectively achieves their goals in expectation. But "goals" here can be read in a weak or a strong sense. In the weak sense, it just means that the agent is optimizing for some metric that captures the degree to which an outcome "counts as success" for them, represented by the value function. In the strong sense, it means that this metric is determined by the agent itself in some way, with their goals understood as something that belongs to them. This much seems typically assumed in economic models

tions (Carruthers, 2018, 2024), and desire-as-belief views (Bradley & Stefansson, 2016; Gregory, 2021; D. Lewis, 1988).

[6]This is a somewhat imprecise presentation, intended to be both accessible and non-committal to either any axiomatic framework or causal/evidential interpretations of expected value maximization. Largely, however, it mirrors the framework of Savage (Savage, 1972). Later in this chapter, I refine the presentation in terms of a Jeffrey-Bolker framework (Jeffrey, 1965; Joyce, 1999).

where the value is provided by a utility function constructed from an agent's preferences over outcomes. We can make this more explicit:

> **Expected Value Maximization:** A rational agent performs actions A that maximize the expectation of a value function V, given some probability function P.
>
> **Value Internalism:** The value function V is a function of the agent themselves.

Let us call the conjunction of these claims internalism about expected value maximization, or just internalism for short. The standard model provides an example of internalism, where the value function is determined by a select set of mental states, namely our (terminal) desires.

Internalism is so widely assumed that it is often taken as part and parcel of expected value maximization. There are many good reasons for this. Normatively, it seems that we do not want to impose a particular conception of what an agent should optimize for, but rather to build our models so that it is up to each agent what counts as success for them. Descriptively, it might also seem that we must relativize the value function to each agent to account for the observation that different agents optimize for different outcomes. For example, a dung beetle and I appear to have different aspirations in life.

These motivations appear to mirror the problems we raised before, perhaps suggesting that those problems are the cost we need to pay for these benefits. Before we concede as much, let us ask what an alternative might look like. Presumably we would not want to impose a very particular quantity in the world—say, money—as part of expected value maximization as such: the dung beetle would seem utterly inexplicable if we did. However, rather than relativizing a substantive claim about value to the agent, suppose that we instead make value less committal. More precisely, let us imagine value as a hypothetical primitive quantity that belongs to the world as such, with no particular commitment about what has value and what does not. And suppose that we take this quantity to correspond to the value function. Call this value externalism:

> **Value Externalism:** The value function V corresponds to a scalar property of outcomes that we call value v.

Call the conjunction of expected value maximization and value externalism *externalism* about expected value maximization, or externalism for short. According to externalism, rational agents have subjective probabilities not only about how likely something is to happen given some evidence or action, but also about how valuable it would be if it happened. They then perform actions that lead to the most value in expectation. Value is not the achievement of some desire of theirs, but rather a quantity that they can discover. Here is the precise articulation, where v is the degree to which an outcome is good:[7]

$$EV(A) = \sum_i P_A(o_i) \sum_j P_A\left(V(o_i) = v_j\right) v_j \tag{1.2}$$

To put this in prose, we calculate the expected value of action A by considering each outcome o_i that A could lead to. We then consider, for each o_i, what is the probability that $V(o_i)$ is equal to a particular value v_j, and multiply it by v_j itself, for each possible j. This gives the expected value of o_i, weighted by the probability of the various values it might have. We then multiply that by the probability that o_i obtains in the first place. By summing over the probability of each o_i obtaining, we receive the expected value of A, weighted by both probability of the possible outcomes and their possible values.

How do we make sense of human motivation on externalism? On the standard model, our terminal desires determine what has value. According to externalism, they merely *estimate* it. More precisely, externalism suggests that our minds represent an external magnitude of value, just as they represent other magnitudes such as distance, loudness, or admirability. Our desire for an outcome p is our mind's best guess about the total expected value that p can have, including both the value p might have in itself and the value of other outcomes we expect it to lead to. We can be uncertain and receive evidence about either.

This has a few implications worth making explicit. First, on externalism there is no functional distinction to be drawn between terminal and instrumental desires. On the standard model, we have an instrumental desire for q to the degree that we estimate that q will contribute to the satisfaction of a terminal desire for p, weighted by the strength of the terminal desire. On externalism, we have a desire for p to the degree that we expect p to have value, or to lead to outcomes that do, and this is true for all desires. Additionally, this means that we can represent preferences over outcomes not as exogenously given, but rather as the product of an agent's best estimation about the value of that outcome.

[7] To avoid integrals and infinity, we will assume that both V and v are discrete and finite.

Second, the difference between beliefs and desires is substantially diminished from the orthodox philosophical picture. According to the standard model they differ in their "direction of fit" (Humberstone, 1992). In slogan form, beliefs aim for their content to match the world, while desires aim for the world to match their content. According to externalism, they are both merely representations of some aspect of the world, with different roles in our mental economy. The primary difference is instead that desires aim to be accurate about (expected) value in particular, and then steer behavior in proportion to that estimation.[8]

Notably, this still allows us to capture the intuitions above. Normatively, we impose no constraints on what an agent might pursue except the vacuous constraint that they pursue value, whatever they might come to estimate to have it. Descriptively, we can explain any desire in terms of what our minds have come to estimate as valuable. The obvious divergence between the preferences of me and the dung beetle can be explained partly by our prior probabilities about the value of a particular outcome, and partly by whether we take some experience to be positive or negative evidence in favor of the value of that outcome. For example, while the taste of peppermint might be interpreted as evidence that something is valuable by my mind, the same stimulus might update the beetle's motivation in the opposite direction, gradually giving rise to wildly diverging preferences over time. I elaborate on this in Chapter 2.

An alternative way of describing the relation between internalism and externalism is that internalism is a special case of externalism in which an agent is certain about the value of outcomes. More precisely, the internalist idea that the value function determines the value for each outcome, such that for all o, there is some v such that $V(o) = v$, can be described in the externalist formulation as the agent having complete certainty that the value of o is v, i.e. $P(V(o) = v) = 1$. Conversely, externalism can be seen as a generalization of the standard internalist picture in which we relax this assumption. I show this for Jeffrey-Bolker as well in Section 1.5.

A reader might plausibly wonder what the cost will be of this picture, and some initial concerns surely come to mind: Does externalism imply a commitment to a metaphysically

[8] Insofar as we want desires for outcomes to map to the total expected value that we expect the outcome to lead to, conditional on some action, they are surprisingly difficult to identify in the formal framework above. This is because $V(o)$ only represents the value of o itself, the value of other outcomes instead being reflected in the expected value of the act. This will be clearer once we represent externalism in the Jeffrey-Bolker framework in Section 1.5.

demanding value realism? If not, how are we supposed to learn anything about value if we're not committed to its existence? For now, I leave you with the promissory note that these issues are illusory, and that the externalist deal is as good as it seems, which I aim to deliver on in Section 1.4. Before that, let us consider how externalism resolves the issues we identified in the introduction.

1.3 Solving the Normative and Descriptive Problems

Consider the normative and descriptive problems raised in the introduction.

The normative problem was that the standard model failed to provide us with a standard by which we could assess our own desires, since those desires were supposed to provide the most basic standard themselves. On externalism, this is no longer true. Desires are up for evaluation just as much as beliefs are, and in broadly the same way: by asking whether they accurately represent the world such that, if we were to act on their basis, we should expect to maximize value, given our evidence. For example, in the case of belief, if I stubbornly believe that my shoddy construction of an IKEA bookshelf will support my library despite its obvious lack of structural integrity, then my belief is lacking and my reliance on it will lose value in expectation.

How does this work in the case of desires? Consider a classic case such as Quinn's example of Radioman (Quinn, 1994): a person with a compulsive desire to turn on radios for no further reason.[9] Intuitively, we might find this an irrational desire. More substantially, we might think that we have good evidence that a radio being on is not by itself a valuable outcome.[10] If that is so, then Radioman's desire seems to be lacking in the same way that my belief about the integrity of my bookshelf does: by being predictably inaccurate given our evidence, such that by acting on it, Radioman should expect to lose value he could have had with a better desire.[11]

This resolves another aspect of the normative puzzle: how it can be rational to expend resources critically assessing our desires. In the original example, we asked how it could

[9] Several authors have aimed to handle this case by arguing that Radioman lacks a desire at all. As with the other proposals for handling desire-evaluation, this strikes me as implausible, if not desperate. Readers who disagree can freely replace this case with another one of an apparently irrational desire.

[10] A reader should not let me get away with this sort of claim too easily: assessments about what is really valuable do go beyond anything I have defended yet, and I return to it in the next section.

[11] In fact, this explanation is somewhat close to Quinn's own diagnosis of what goes wrong for Radioman.

be rational for me to reflect on my middling desire to avoid animal suffering. We now have a straightforward answer, namely that by doing so I might be able to make it more accurate in expectation, given my evidence. If I expect to improve the accuracy of my desire by reflection, that can be a good use of time by the lights of externalism. This implies a new dimension of practical rationality lacking on the standard model, namely that we have to arbitrate trade-offs between improving our best estimations of value, and acting on our current estimations with the hope that they are good enough. The idea that rationality implies such a continuous tradeoff between reflection on our motivation and action strikes me as far more intuitive than the standard model's suggestion that rationality only starts once the desires are in place.[12]

What about the descriptive problem? Just as the normative problem of the standard model infected its explanatory power, the normative resources of externalism expand its explanatory scope. Once we construct value as a quantity to be estimated, we unlock access to Bayesian models for updating probabilities in response to new evidence. For example, suppose that a wise person whom I respect tells me that it is important to avoid sentient suffering. My mind might take this as evidence that animal suffering has more negative value than I previously believed, increasing my desire to avoid it. As suggested before, this provides a natural mechanism of how preferences are formed over time. Radically new preferences formed by transformative experiences can be seen as profoundly new experiential evidence that has a substantive impact on our minds' estimations of value, and consequently our preferences.

Importantly, what I am describing here is change at a high level of abstraction. Actual change in our motivation is largely driven by signals generated by the reward system (T. Schroeder, 2004; Schultz et al., 1997). However, externalism allows us to reinterpret these mechanisms as providing evidence about value rather than constituting value themselves, which is the standard interpretation. I elaborate on these issues in Chapter 3. Additionally, as I show in Appendix A, updates by reward signals can be seen as an instantiation of a Bayesian ideal, meaning that this does not revise the basic picture presented above.

[12] In computer science, this dynamic is known as an exploration-exploitation tradeoff (Sutton & Barto, 2018).

1.4 Objections to Externalism

I have argued that externalism resolves some of the main issues about practical rationality. We should ask whether it invites new ones in. I want to suggest that it does not.

One natural concern about externalism is that it appears to tie rationality to a kind of value realism, positing some quantity of value as part of the world. Whether or not we believe that there is such objective value, we plausibly don't want our theory of rationality to depend on it.[13] Fortunately, it does not. The reason is that we don't need our mental representation of value to have a referent to be explanatory (Egan, 2025; W. M. Ramsey, 2007). To illustrate the idea, imagine Kurt, whose only goal in life is to maximize the realization of holiness. As a consequence, he travels around the world, praying at the greatest monuments and buying trinkets that allegedly belonged to prophets. We can explain and predict his behavior even if there is no property of holiness in the world; even if his representation fails to refer.

The case of value is somewhat different from Kurt's, but the basic idea is the same. Unlike Kurt's representation of holiness, which is plausibly discursive and conceptually structured—he might reflect on the holiness of a trinket, for example—our representation of value is plausibly better understood as a simple non-conceptual magnitude-analog representation (Beck, 2015; Carruthers, 2024). To put this more simply, we can think of value representations as "mental thermometers" that get attached to possible outcomes and represent how good that outcome seems at the moment. What makes this a representation of value in particular is not a conceptual representation thereof, but just its function in our mental economy: the fact that this "thermometer" steers our motivation in the way it does. Nonetheless, just like other non-conceptual magnitude-analog representations, e.g. of depth in the visual system, it can be updated in response to new evidence.

For these reasons, externalism of the kind I am defending here does not imply a commitment to any kind of metaethical view about the nature of value. Value representations get their identity from what they do for us; not their referents. It is a further question whether they can successfully refer to anything in the world, and whether such a thing exists. However, some metaethical views might complement externalism by providing

[13] This is arguably one reason why the Humean idea that we project value onto the world has traditionally seemed more attractive than the idea that we estimate it.

putative referents that value representations can be accurate about. I return to this below.[14]

This brings us to another concern: how can we learn about something that—we will assume, for the sake of argument—does not exist? How do we become "acquainted" with it? The response is that, on a Bayesian picture of learning, there is no need for anything of this sort. All that is required is that an agent has prior likelihoods that determine whether some piece of new information is interpreted as evidence for some proposition. To give a more concrete example, our minds estimate distance not by receiving distance into our eyes—indeed, our retinas are 2-dimensional, making the direct representation of depth impossible—but by receiving an array of features that our visual system innately interprets as evidence for a particular distance (Marr, 1982). In general, we do not need evidence about property x to feature x itself. Similarly, Kurt can receive evidence that a cathedral is holy by a priest telling him so, even if holiness does not exist. In the same way, we can receive evidence that something is valuable even if value does not feature in that evidence. As I argue in Chapter 3, this is what our reward system does.

There might be a residual concern that goes something like this: sure, but how can we ever verify whether something really *is* valuable? Indeed, nothing in our picture guarantees that we can.[15] But this also does not seem crucial: what matters is not whether we verify that something is valuable for certain, but that we have expectations about whether it is, which we can act on. Indeed, this is as much a problem for the internalist as for the externalist. Consider Parfit's stranger (Parfit, 1984): you meet a stranger on a train who tells you they have a possibly fatal disease, and you form a strong desire that they recover. However, you never meet them again, and never learn whether they did. Nonetheless, you might reasonably act so as to increase the probability that this desire be satisfied. For example, if you were a researcher in the biomedical field, your desire for the stranger to

[14] It is attractive to assume that externalism would be most naturally paired with some form of value realism (Enoch, 2011; Moore, 1903; Sidgwick, 1907). However, nothing said so far implies that the kinds of normative properties postulated by realist views would be the most natural referents. Eklund (2017) for example provides arguments for thinking that normativity is an aspect of the representation rather than the referent, suggesting at least that institutional or other natural facts might be equally apt (Foot, 1972; Street, 2008). See Manley (n.d.) for an argument that normative representations are likely to find some referent, rather than failing to refer entirely.

[15] We might pose this as a question of whether we can ever receive value-propositions as evidence to conditionalize on. Nothing I say rules this out, but we do not need it.

live might motivate you to focus on developing a cure for the disease, even if you will never know whether it reached them.

Nonetheless, one might point to a remaining disanalogy. Perception and belief tend to track properties that exist, such as distance. Meanwhile, we're imagining that our representations of value might not. Is this a problem for externalism? Not obviously. Even in the case of perception, it seems we can explain how our perceptual system works without commitment to the properties it seems to represent. For example, imagine that I am a brain in a vat in the middle of a world that consists of an absolute space in the shape of a sphere 10 feet across. My perceptual system might be stimulated in this world so as to generate representations of objects being 20 feet away, even though there is nothing in the world that is 20 feet away from anything else. We can still explain my perceptual system as if it were aiming to be accurate about long distances by updating on the evidence it received via transduced signals. All that is required is for our minds to have some priors in light of which they interpret new evidence about distance and update their representations. The same is true about value representations: as long as our minds have priors for whether a particular stimulus is evidence for or against the value of something, it will update the representation as if it were aiming to be accurate about its value.

These considerations give us reason to think that we don't need value representations to successfully refer for externalism to function as a descriptive model for how agents update their motivational states. But is this enough to give us what we want *normatively*? In particular, we might ask: if the aim of desires is to be accurate about value, then in what sense can they succeed unless we assume that there is something to be accurate about? For example, in what sense can we say that Radioman's compulsion to turn on radios is irrational?

There are two closely related but distinct questions here: The first is whether an agent's desires can be more or less rational or justified. The second is whether they can be accurate. A natural answer to the first is that an agent's desires are more rational to the degree that they represent something in accordance with their evidence. For example, if Radioman has evidence that turning on radios has nothing good going for it, then it seems that he has reason to believe his representation of the value of the radio being on is inaccurate, and that he would be doing better if he updated it downwards. This can be true whether or not it is true that turning on radios has nothing going for it. Therefore, we can at least *prima facie* discuss the rationality of desires and value representations without

postulating referents, which would only be required for saying that the representations are in fact accurate.[16]

There are two caveats to be mentioned here. First, for us humans to compare between ourselves what kinds of desires are accurate, we arguably need an at least largely shared understanding of what would count as success: what our desires are aiming to get right. Insofar as we take the relevant normative category to be the good, this amounts to saying that we need a partly shared theory of the good to compare our desires. For example, the reason we can intuitively criticize Radioman is arguably because there is no plausible theory of the good on which radios being on counts as good.[17] Second, it seems plausible that an agent who reflects on their own desires with the aim of improving them must at least tacitly assume that there is some standard by which they can get this right. It seems self-defeating for someone to be a nihilist about value—saying that there is no such thing as a better or worse action or desire—yet also be concerned about the rationality of their desires. I return to these questions in Chapter 2.

1.5 Externalism Formalized

In Section 1.2 I presented a generic form of externalism that was not tied to any particular decision-theoretic framework. However, one might reasonably be concerned about whether the idea can ultimately be cashed out in precise terms. In this section, I articulate a more precise version of externalism on a Jeffrey-Bolker-Joyce framework.

Previously we let P and V vary over outcomes without specifying what kind of thing an outcome is. Here we will follow Jeffrey and let them vary over propositions, understood as sets of possible worlds. Additionally, V now represents expected value rather than only direct value, and it ranges over both outcomes and acts, understood as different propositions. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an atomless Boolean algebra, meaning a set of propositions closed under standard logical operations whose members can all be partitioned into other

[16] The distinction is parallel to that between what makes a belief justified and what makes it true. However, this analogy does suggest that there is space to deny that rationality is independent of truth by defending a form of externalism about justification (e.g. by defending that evidence is factive, as Williamson (2000) suggests). I will not explore this further here.

[17] Such a theory arguably provides an attractive solution to the question of referents as well. Like with other concepts, we partly fix referents by meaning, and then see what in the world is a viable candidate. See e.g. Railton (1986) for a metaethical theory of this kind, and non-naturalist realists and error theorists for arguments that it's insufficient (McPherson, 2015; Olson, 2014).

non-contradictory propositions. Let $A \in \mathcal{A}$ be a proposition and let $\{A_i\}_{i \in I}$ be a partition of A representing the ways that A could be true. The standard internalist formula where V—partly, with expectations of other propositions—determines value is:

$$V(A) = \sum_i P(A_i|A)\, V(A_i) \tag{1.3}$$

To introduce externalism, we need to make explicit value as a property. Previously, we loosely suggested that value was a property of outcomes. Strictly speaking, that is inaccurate: value must be represented as a property of possible worlds rather than propositions. We will assume that once we fix all non-evaluative facts so as to uniquely identify a normal possible world, there is still a further evaluative fact that we can be uncertain about, namely how valuable this world is.

Let W^F be the set of factual possible worlds, meaning a possible world considered without any associated value, and let $\mathcal{V}$ be the set of possible values. For the purposes of this discussion, we will assume that value is discrete and ranges between some finite negative and positive value, such that $\mathcal{V} = \{v_{-k}, v_{-k+1}, \ldots, v_k\}$. For all we know, any $w \in W^F$ can have any $v \in \mathcal{V}$. So for any factual world w, there is a set of epistemically possible worlds that differ only in what value they associate with w. Formally, we can represent this partition of epistemically possible worlds W^{FV} as the Cartesian product of the possible worlds in W^F and the epistemically possible values in $\mathcal{V}$:

$$W^{FV} = W^F \times \mathcal{V} = \{\langle w, v\rangle \mid w \in W^F \text{ and } v \in \mathcal{V}\}, \tag{1.4}$$

Let $\mathcal{E} = \{E_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{V}}$ be a partition of W^{FV}, where each $E_j = W^F \times \{v_j\}$ is the value-proposition that the actual world has value v_j. It might seem attractive to formulate externalism in terms of the probability that the proposition holding w fixed is in some E_j, multiplied by v_j. However, this would require us to invoke probabilities over atomistic singleton-sets of the members of W^{FV}, which violates the non-atomicity condition of Jeffrey-Bolker. Instead, we need to construct non-atomic factual propositions that P can range over. To do so, I adapt the idea of a K-partition from D. Lewis (1981) and Joyce (1999) to define F-partitions. An F-partition $\mathcal{F} = \{F_i\}_{i \in I}$ is a partition of W^{FV} at the lowest level of evaluative relevance. In other words, an $F \in \mathcal{F}$ is a factual specification at a sufficient level of detail that any w in a $\langle w, \cdot\rangle \in F$ will have the same value. Intuitively,

worlds in F will look almost identical, but in principle be infinitely separable by trivial factual differences that do not make a normative difference.

We are now in a position to define externalist expected value calculation formally. Let $\mathcal{A}^{FV}$ be an atomless Boolean algebra of propositions over W^{FV}, containing each member of the factual partition $\mathcal{F} = \{F_i\}_{i \in I}$ and each member of the value partition $\mathcal{E} = \{E_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{V}}$. Intuitively, externalism says that a rational agent will perform the action-proposition $A \in \mathcal{A}^{FV}$ that contains F-propositions with the highest expected value, weighted by how probable those F-propositions are. Formally:[18]

$$V(A) = \sum_i P(F_i \mid A) \sum_j P(E_j \mid F_i)\, v_j \tag{1.5}$$

One benefit of making this precise is that it allows us to see that internalism can be described as a specific instance of externalism where we assume that any fact-proposition has some v. If for any F_i we can assume that there is some E_j such that $P(E_j \mid F_i) = 1$, then we can replace $\sum_j P(E_j \mid F_i)\, v_j$ with an expected value function V that gives some v for any proposition. Of course, that just recovers the familiar equation we started this discussion with:

$$V(A) = \sum_i P(F_i \mid A)\, V(F_i). \tag{1.6}$$

Notably, this is distinct from what Lewis calls Desire as Belief (D. Lewis, 1988). In the eponymous paper, he shows that the intuitively close idea that a rational agent should have $V(A)$ match their credence that A is good leads to absurdities. There are several disanalogies to our picture, but the most important is that value is not a property of propositions, but of worlds. Value-propositions are instead propositions made up of worlds with particular degrees of value. This means that there is no pressure to "match" the value of one proposition with the probability of another.[19]

[18] Strictly speaking, we need $V(A) = \sum_i P(F_i \mid A) \sum_j P(E_j \mid F_i \cap A)\, v_j$, or else we assume that actions cannot be partitioned below fact-propositions. For ease of presentation, I ignore this here.

[19] The proposal is much closer to what Lewis himself presents as desire by necessity (D. K. Lewis, 1996), or what Broome calls desire as expectation (Broome, 1991). Unlike Bradley and Stefansson, who pursue a similar strategy, I do not suggest that propositions move between value-propositions (Bradley & Stefansson, 2016).

1.6 Conclusion

It has typically been assumed that the cost of rationality is not being able to extend it to our own desires. As I hope to have shown, this is a misconception. What we cannot do is both determine what is valuable and assess it at the same time. So we can keep the expected value maximization that we know and love, while letting go of the rent-shirking auxiliary assumption that value is determined by us. The result is a theory of practical rationality that does everything our previous one could, and more.

If the champion of internalist rationality is Hume—the standard model is often called a neo-Humean view—then the champion of externalism is arguably Aristotle (Aristotle, 2014), and the old idea that our desires should aim at the good. This idea has sometimes been described as the guise of the good. Although externalism about value is different in many substantive ways, it would likely not be too inaccurate to describe the view as a neo-Aristotelian alternative to Humean orthodoxy.

The rest of this dissertation is largely a development of themes expressed in this essay, especially the next three chapters. In Chapter 2, I describe a functional source of evidence for our desires analogous to that of perception for belief, which I call *conaception*. In Chapter 3, I develop the same theme in more empirical and computational detail, arguing that the reward signals generated by the reward system should be seen as indications of value rather than sources thereof, as is typically assumed in the standard interpretation of the computational models. In Chapter 4, I consider the relation to pleasure and pain, arguing that, empirically, they seem to perform a variety of functions that cannot be reduced to evidence of value.

CHAPTER 2

What Stands to Desire as Perception Stands to Belief?

2.1 Introduction

Beliefs and desires are central to our mental lives. What we believe is crucially dependent on our perceptual capacities. Consider this case:

> **Victor:** Victor is driving and sees a stop sign far up ahead. He briefly looks down to check his phone. As he looks up again, he sees that the sign is now just thirty feet ahead of him and hits the brakes.

When Victor looks at the stop sign, his depth perception informs him about its distance, and his belief changes. Although this seems obvious, it is only in the last few decades that cognitive science has provided a precise explanation of this process (Marr, 1982; Palmer, 1999). Our perceptual system selectively detects features in the world, generating signals with information that updates our beliefs. This descriptive progress has generated an array of philosophical work on the nature of perception and its relation to belief (Block, 2023; Burge, 2010; Schellenberg, 2018; Siegel, 2017). However, our desires also change in response to experience:

> **Chiara:** Chiara is meeting a new colleague for lunch. After a stimulating conversation, she comes away with a newfound desire to see this colleague again.

Although the experience of changing desires is equally familiar as that of beliefs, we lack an analogous precise understanding of desire-formation. However, recent progress in the cognitive science of motivation invites the prospect of making similar headway to what

the science of perception did many years ago. Now is a good time to ask: if perception shapes our beliefs, then what, if anything, does the same for desire?[1]

In this paper, I aim to make some initial progress on this question. I propose that the relation between perception and belief provides not only the question, but also something close to the answer. Specifically, I argue that we have a mental capacity that informs us like our perceptual capacities do. However, unlike perception, it indicates not whether something is distant, loud, or soft, but whether it is *valuable*. This information, in turn, updates our desires. I call this capacity *conaception*.[2]

The idea that our desires can be informed might seem foreign from the perspective of some traditional philosophical accounts of motivation, according to which conative states, such as desires, do not aim to represent the world at all (Anscombe, 1957; Platts, 1979; Searle, 1983). If so, it is unclear how new information could bear on them. However, this view is challenged by recent developments in the cognitive science of motivation. It is now widely believed that our minds, and those of other animals, carry simple non-conceptual mental representations of value that steer our desires (Carruthers, 2024; Haas, 2023; Sripada, 2025a). Like other mental representations, these can be updated with new information. I argue that our conaception modulates them by providing signals that carry information about value in response to our interactions with the world. Like Victor's depth perception, it does this as an innate feature-detector, selectively generating signals in response to stimuli.

We might think that there is a disanalogy between perception and conaception. Perception can be accurate, conveying information about the world in a typically reliable way, yet it might seem strange to say that a capacity informing our desires can have accuracy conditions. On the contrary, I argue that the analogy extends further: conaceptual signals can be assessed for accuracy in the same way that perceptual signals can. Just as depth perception is reliably accurate about distance, conaception is reliably accurate about another property: what is good for us, in the sense of being conducive to our well-being. As we interact with the world, our conaception reliably indicates what has value in a way that correlates with whether it is good for us, regulating our desires accordingly.

[1] This impact of cognitive science is already seen in empirically informed philosophical work on other aspects of motivation (Aronowitz, 2021; Brownstein, 2018; Burnston, 2025; Carruthers, 2025; Haas, 2018; Railton, 2017; Wu, 2023).

[2] This is a portmanteau for conation and perception.

Additionally, this descriptive claim helps resolve a long-standing normative puzzle, namely, why it typically seems rational to act on our ordinary desires. Conaception ensures that experience typically steers our desires towards what is good for us, giving us defeasible reason to act on those desires. This is analogous to how the reliability of perception gives us reason to trust the beliefs it generates. In both cases, the resulting desires and beliefs have a superior normative status to those caused by unreliable processes, like hallucinations or mental illness. And in both cases, we can improve them with critical reflection.

Here is an overview of the paper. In section 2, I present some background on the cognitive science of motivation. In section 3, I present the idea of conaception in detail. In section 4, I argue that conaception provides the best explanation of what informs our desires, and compare it to a hedonic proposal. Finally, in section 5, I argue that conaception can be accurate in the same sense that perceptual capacities can and articulate some normative consequences.

2.2 Background: Learning to Desire

Our beliefs reflect what we take the world to be like, while our desires reflect how we would like it to be.[3] Beliefs typically change in response to new information, such as what we learn by perceiving the world. However, as we saw in the case of Chiara, our desires also change with experience. Here are some additional examples:

> **Rachael:** Rachael, an elementary school student who had never heard classical music, is taken on a school trip to a Mozart performance. Enraptured by the experience, she leaves with a strong desire to hear more.
>
> **Ahmed:** Ahmed is taking his daughter for ice cream. He has always been a banana-fudge fan, but this time he tries pistachio instead. Next time he comes back, he finds himself wanting pistachio over banana-fudge.

[3] Although this discussion is framed in terms of desires and beliefs, no part of the argument hinges on the metaphysical nature of these states. For example, it is compatible with a minimalist dispositionalist account, such that a desire that *p* is a disposition to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that *p* if one's beliefs were true, and a belief that *p* is a disposition to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one's desires if *p* were true (Stalnaker, 1984).

Linda: Linda starts a job at a telemarketing center. After a day of either monotonous or threatening conversations with potential clients, she quits on the spot and desires to never sell anything by phone again.

What explains these changes? In recent years, philosophers have drawn on the cognitive science of motivation to provide a framework for answering such questions with computational precision and empirical support (Carruthers, 2024; Sripada, 2025a). The central idea is that the motivation of an agent is governed by representations of value that guide action towards those options with the highest associated value. Call these representations *valuations*.

The idea that valuations govern an agent's motivation is central to many theories of agency, including theories used to engineer artificial agents (Norvig & Russell, 2021). However, in psychology, this is not merely a theoretical construct. There is now a large and convergent body of empirical evidence that our minds and those of other animals carry simple subconscious non-conceptual representations of value that govern action and choice (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006).[4] This value functions as a common currency to flexibly arbitrate between different options (Ballesta et al., 2022; Chib et al., 2009; Levy & Glimcher, 2011).

Value in this context is a deflationary notion. Valuations are a functional representation, meaning that their content is determined by what they do. In this case, our minds use them to keep track of what is best to do. This value is distinct from values in ethics, which are conceptually represented and consciously considered (e.g. the way in which one might value liberty, health, or happiness). Valuations are also distinct from utility functions in economics, understood as rational reconstructions of an agent's choice-disposition (Binmore, 2008). Valuations are posited as causally efficacious mental representations that explain why we have those choice-dispositions in the first place (Ballesta et al., 2020).

As with other mental representations, valuations are updated by new information, and one important source of information is direct experience. To illustrate, imagine a creature

[4]The theme of this evidence is observing that the valuations that would rationalize an individual's behavior correlate with neural activations in the orbitofrontal and ventromedial cortex, suggesting that these areas encode value. The standard explanation of how valuations cause choice is that they are sampled from by drift diffusion models, which stochastically generate a decision (Forstmann et al., 2016; Pedersen et al., 2017). Notably, valuations have been used to explain a range of mental functions beyond choice, including attention (Wu, 2023), emotions (Emanuel & Eldar, 2023), and effort (Hendrickx, 2024). As Haas (2023) has argued, it seems that our minds are thoroughly evaluative.

that tries a strawberry for the first time and comes to desire it. The interaction generates a signal that updates its valuation of the strawberry positively, which makes it more disposed to pursue strawberries in the future. This learning process can happen in many ways, but a particularly simple one goes as follows. Our minds compare their current valuation of an option to the signal that they receive when they interact with it. If the signal was better or worse than expected, the valuation is updated in the same direction (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).[5]

To learn from experience, our minds must receive some signal that indicates how to update a representation in response. This is as true for Victor's representation of the distance to the stop sign as it is for Chiara's representation of the value of seeing her colleague again. This raises the central question of this discussion: *What explains whether an interaction generates a positive or negative signal? How is this signal determined?*[6]

Empirical disciplines like neuroscience fail to provide us with an answer. They typically sidestep the question by studying what happens in our brains when we have good or bad experiences, like eating a strawberry or getting an electric shock. However, they don't tell us *why* those experiences are interpreted as good by our minds. One natural proposal is that this signal is determined by the hedonic valence of the experience: we learn to want more of what feels good and less of what feels bad (Morillo, 1990; Pollock, 2006; Shenhav, 2024). As I will argue later, this is not borne out by the empirical evidence: hedonic valence is functionally distinct from motivational learning, meaning that something else must provide the signal. This leaves a gaping hole in our explanation of how desires change in response to experience.

We must note that spontaneous change in response to experience is only one component of how our desires change, and there are others. For example, philosophers have paid particular attention to humans' ability to engage in practical reflection to form goals

[5] A more common form of learning, so-called temporal difference learning, is slightly more complicated. It compares the current valuation to the new signal *and* any new information about how valuable the outcome is, such as whether it improves future prospects (Haas, 2022). Humans and other mammals are capable of more complicated learning, including by planning and counterfactual simulation (Bennett, 2021; Daw & Dayan, 2014; Redish, 2016). These processes are studied in the field of reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 2018).

[6] Whether an experience is positive or negative is sometimes called its valence (Bennett, 2021). However, valence is often used interchangeably to refer to the hedonic nature of the experience (Carruthers, 2018, 2024). To avoid confusion, I use 'valence' to refer specifically to hedonic valence.

and intentions to achieve them (Bratman, 1987; Korsgaard, 1996; Mele, 2003).[7] Such reflection can bear on our motivation via top-down effects from executive functioning, and this is why we can override temptation, for example (Hare et al., 2009; Shenhav et al., 2016).[8] However, just as we cannot plausibly explain all changes to our beliefs by appeal to our theoretical reasoning, we must complement such theories with an explanation of how we develop desires in the first place. Notably, this is just what perception does for belief. When Victor looks up at the stop sign, his vision spontaneously regulates his belief by providing information that he can subsequently reason about.

This should spur our imagination. Is there a process that can inform our desires in the same way that perception informs our beliefs? As I aim to show next, the answer is 'yes'.

2.3 Conaception

2.3.1 Perception and Conaception

Our perceptual capacities are the primary means by which we learn about the world around us. By perception, I don't mean conscious phenomenal experience. Instead, I mean a set of largely innate capacities that allow us to turn mere causal stimulations of our sense organs into information that our minds can handle. In doing so, they allow us to discriminate objects and properties in the world (Block, 2023; Burge, 2010; Schellenberg, 2018). Often, this process is accompanied by a phenomenal experience, but it need not be.[9]

Like most other humans, Victor has an innate capacity for depth perception, which allows him to learn about the distance to things by looking at them. As he looks up at the stop sign, his retinas receive an image of light, some of which triggers the activation of select receptors. Through a series of computations and while accounting for the orientation of his eyes, his visual system generates a pre-reflective signal that his mind interprets as evidence that the stop sign is closer than expected. These signals are typically

[7] Some theorists have attempted to draw a tighter connection between goals and spontaneous changes in our desires than I do (Juechems & Summerfield, 2019; Molinaro & Collins, 2023b; T. Schroeder, 2004). I lack the space to do justice to these accounts here, and set them aside for the current discussion.

[8] We also have instincts that innately motivate us in particular contexts, such as a spontaneous aversion to snakes (Öhman & Mineka, 2003).

[9] A vivid counterexample is provided by people with a condition known as blindsight. They have no visual phenomenal consciousness, yet still receive information via a functioning part of their visual stream, which allows them to avoid obstacles for example (Stoerig & Cowey, 2007).

non-conceptual, representing magnitudes like distance in an analog format (Beck, 2019; Peacocke, 1986). In other words, they carry information in the same way that a classic thermometer carries information about the temperature. This can be contrasted with the way in which a sentence such as "Wow, that stop sign is close" carries information about distance (Beck, 2015; Dretske, 1981). There are analogous explanations for other modalities, like hearing or touch. By receiving a continuous stream of such signals, our minds keep a persistently changing but mostly accurate representation of our environment.

I propose that we have another capacity that shares these properties. However, rather than updating our representations of magnitudes like distance, it updates our valuations and the magnitude of value. Speaking loosely, the signals it generates indicate "how well things are going" at the moment. This is the capacity that I call conaception:

> **Conaception:** Conaception is an innate mental capacity that selectively tracks information from sensory receptors to generate a non-conceptual value signal that updates our valuations and shapes our desires.

Capacities are functional categories. This means that they are defined by what they do in our mental economy at a computational level of explanation, and can be realized by different substrates. For example, if we experience damage to those parts of the brain typically responsible for vision, other parts can adapt to preserve the capacity. Capacities are individuated by the sub-capacities that constitute them (Cummins, 1983). Conaception is the capacity to inform our valuations through experience using discriminatory sub-capacities that function like those of perception. We consider what those capacities are next.

2.3.2 Conaception as a Feature-Detector

It is tempting to imagine conaception as a dedicated sense-organ that allows our minds to directly "see" some distinct property of value, and have it causally impact our desires. In fact, it involves nothing like this. This is not because conaception is different from perception in this regard, but because the idea is based on a misconception of how perception works.

When Victor looks at the stop sign, he learns that the sign is close. But this is not because the distance to the stop sign is registered as an input to his visual processing. We can be confident about this because his retinas are two-dimensional, meaning that they cannot

represent depth directly. Instead, his visual system must somehow infer what distance to communicate from the information available. As it turns out, this is done by a process of *feature-detection* (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; LeCun et al., 2015; Marr, 1982). Our visual system works by being selectively sensitive to particular features of the stimuli, which it interprets as evidence that some property is present. In the case of depth perception, for example, we track features like shadows, occlusion, and movement, and compute from certain combinations of those an analog-magnitude signal indicating that the object we're looking at is a certain distance away.

Contrary to the idea that each sense has a dedicated organ, our perceptual capacities regularly draw on information from various sense organs (Macpherson, 2011). For example, when we need to eat something unpleasant, we can hold our noses to mask the taste. And what we hear depends on how the speaker's mouth moves. Perception also involves top-down effects, such as what we expect something to look like. However, these top-down effects require some bottom-up information to modulate, which is what feature-detecting systems provide. Finally, insofar as a perceptual system tracks a property in the world, it can also misfire. If it is presented with a set of features that typically indicate a state that is not currently present, then our perception will misleadingly provide a signal that it is. For example, some optical illusions will make one object appear larger than another of similar size by including some angles that typically indicate that the object is further away.

Feature-detection explains how we are able to learn about what the world is like from the mere causal stimulations of our senses, and how this happens without any cognitive effort on our part. It is also, I propose, the way in which our minds generate signals with information that some outcome is more or less valuable. In other words, I propose that conaception is a feature-detector in the same way that our perceptual capacities are.

This means that there is a range of features that our minds are selectively sensitive to, certain combinations of which it interprets as indicators that something is valuable. Just as with perceptual systems, these features can originate in the stimulation of many different kinds of sensory organs. To illustrate, consider our strawberry-loving creature again. When it bites down on the strawberry, its senses are hit with an array of different cues, including the texture of the fruit, the sweetness of its juice, and shortly thereafter, activity from its gut receptors. When this happens, it generates an analog-magnitude signal that its learning capacities consume and use to update its valuation of the strawberry, for example, by comparing the signal to its current valuation.

This naturally raises the question: What features is conaception sensitive to? The answer will vary between species and individuals, and it depends on what features have been reproductively beneficial to be sensitive to in our ancestral past. We can compare this to perception. My visual system is sensitive to other parts of the light spectrum than that of my cat or my colorblind friend, and this allows me to discriminate red and green in a way they cannot. In the case of conaception, these features will be those that our minds innately interpret as evidence of value and become motivated by. What they are is an empirical question, but based on current research, we can give a tentative list. As with other animals, these include features that indicate outcomes that contribute to our homeostatic processes, such as the nutritional value of food, oxidation, and bodily integrity (Rolls, 2013). However, unlike most animals, we are also sensitive to more complex cues. They include the novelty of information (Barto, 2013; Wittmann et al., 2008), visual impressions that we find beautiful (Iigaya et al., 2023; Ishizu & Zeki, 2011; Mo et al., 2016), and social cues, such as the approving smile of a concomitant (Marsh et al., 2014; Moll et al., 2006; Ruff & Fehr, 2014).

2.3.3 Clarifying Conaception

This presentation raises a number of questions. To start, some might ask whether conaception—or its output—is a kind of terminal desire, meaning a proposal for what people want for its own sake. In its most straightforward form, this suggestion is clearly false. Conaception is not a desire of any kind, any more than perception is a kind of belief. They are capacities that provide information that allows us to update our mental states. But they are not mental states themselves.

There is another interpretation, however. This is the suggestion that the output of conaception fills the functional role of terminal desires in determining what is ultimately valuable to the agent. On this view, all our desires are aimed at maximizing the signal generated by our conaception, which is the only thing that has an intrinsic value. This view is much like that of a motivational hedonist who proposes that the balance of pleasure and displeasure signals is the only thing of intrinsic value to an agent. However, this too is inaccurate.[10]

[10]A version of this view is also assumed among most philosophers interested in reinforcement learning in the idea that agents maximize the output of a so-called reward function (Haas, 2022; T. Schroeder, 2004; Sripada, 2025a). Haas (2022), for example, explicitly identifies it as the analogue of an intrinsic desire. See

This idea rests on the widespread but mistaken assumption that an agent's motivation must have some foundational internal standard against which all other desires and actions can be measured, typically assumed to be their terminal desires (Sinhababu, 2017). This assumption is a natural way to articulate the plausible idea that an agent's aims are internal to the agent in some way. However, this by itself does not imply a foundationalist view. We can have internal representations of value that aim to be accurate in the way that our other representations do (e.g. our representations of distance). Our motivational system can aim to maximize the achievement of value without determining what has value: it only needs to guess it and act on that guess. On this view, the signals that conaception provides merely indicate the value of an option, in the same way that depth perception indicates the distance without determining what the distance is.

We might object that, unlike distance, there is no property of value that our minds could be getting right. I respond to this at greater length in section 5. However, for the purposes of explaining our mental functions, this is beside the point. Our minds can aim to be accurate in their representations of magnitudes whether or not they correspond to anything in the world. For example, suppose that we are envatted brains in a two-dimensional world. Even though there is then no such thing as distance in three dimensions, our minds will still aim to accurately represent it using the information they receive from its (artificially stimulated) perceptual capacities. In the same way, our minds can aim to be accurate about value, even if there is no value in the world.

A notable feature of conaception is that its output is unidimensional: a signal with information about value. However, we might think that there should be many different kinds of value signals—perhaps one for food value, one for social value, and so on. However, this is mistaken. The function of conaception is to inform our valuations, and these are constitutively unidimensional. This is what allows them to function as a commensurable common currency for our minds to arbitrate between different options. To illustrate, consider our creature again. Suppose that it sees another strawberry and hurries over before anyone else reaches it, but scratches itself on the way. Depending on how hungry the

Carruthers (2018, 2024) for a notable exception. Relatedly, some readers might ask whether conaception is intended as a proposal for what our reward function is. The answer depends on which aspect of the reward function we have in mind. Conaception is intended as that which determines the signal an agent receives from a state transition, which is the role of a reward function. However, this signal is not intended to provide the determinant of value, unlike how the role of the reward function is interpreted by Haas and others. To avoid this confusion, I largely set aside discussions of reward functions here.

creature is and how serious the scratch is, the creature can flexibly decide whether it is more valuable to treat the injury or to reach the strawberry first. This is possible exactly because the injury and the strawberry are compared in a commensurable magnitude of value. To update these representations, conaception provides unidimensional feedback.[11]

Importantly, this question is distinct from the discussion in ethics about whether reflective values, such as moral value or aesthetic value, are incommensurable (Chang, 2002; Raz, 1986). This has no obvious implication for whether there is a non-conceptual common currency of value explaining the basic machinery of motivation. Additionally, the view defended here is consistent with the idea that conaception represents different kinds of value early in its processing. Indeed, this seems empirically true (Rolls, 2013). The claim is just that these must be computed into a unified magnitude before the final output for conaception to perform its role of providing a commensurable learning signal. Finally, there is nothing particularly strange about a feature-detecting capacity that produces a single kind of output. In addition to particular perceptual capacities such as depth perception, examples include the approximate number system. This was proposed a few decades ago to track and signal approximate quantities from the relative proportions of objects and events and has since become widely defended (Dehaene, 1999; Lipton & Spelke, 2003).

One might ask whether conaception is in fact merely another perceptual capacity. In one respect, this is a semantic question about how widely we want to use the term 'perceptual'. There are two reasons to keep them separate, however: the first is that they inform rather distinct kinds of attitudes, conative and cognitive respectively, and keeping them separate on these grounds seems like a terminologically prudent choice. The second is to distinguish conaception from a superficially similar but crucially distinct idea, sometimes called evaluative perception (Fulkerson, 2020; Jacobson, n.d., 2021; Siegel, 2014). This is the idea that phenomenal perceptual experiences have an ineliminable element of valence. However, this claim is independent of the question of how our minds originally receive value signals from interacting with the world. For example, Jacobson (2021)'s account of evaluative perception appeals to existing conative attitudes to determine the

[11] A minority of cognitive scientists have attacked the common currency hypothesis directly, arguing that we can explain decisions better in terms of various processes that lack a common representation between them (Hayden & Niv, 2021). The problem is that some mechanism is still required to arbitrate between those processes, and the best explanation of what does that is a value-maximization process (Daw, 2018; Shenhav et al., 2016). However, that implies that there is some way to compare the representations of different processes, meaning that the common currency hypothesis remains. See Sripada (2025b) for an extended version of this argument.

valence of a phenomenal experience, which in turn requires something like conaception to explain how we acquired those conative attitudes in the first place.[12]

2.4 The Case for Conaception

2.4.1 Why Conaception Provides the Best Explanation

We have presented the idea of conaception as a possible explanation of how desires change in response to our interactions with the world. In this section, I argue that there is good reason to believe that it is also the correct explanation, or something close to it. The case for accepting conaception is grounded on an inference to the best explanation. To start, consider how it accounts for cases like Chiara and the others.

When Chiara interacts with her colleague, a panoply of information strikes her sensory organs. Some of this is processed by her perceptual capacities to inform Chiara that the person is wearing blue and has a soft-spoken voice, for example. However, it also provides information that her conaception uses to generate signals of whether the experience is positive or not. This might include very simple cues like the sound of the person's voice, to more complex ones like her facial expressions, indications of social affirmation, and the novelty of what she's sharing with Chiara. All of these impressions are processed to generate evidence that the experience is valuable, updating Chiara's valuation of spending time with this person, which makes her want to see her again.

Analogous explanations can be given for Rachael and the others. Before Rachael hears Mozart, her mind attributes low value to the prospect of sitting through a performance, and she has no desire to go. As the music starts, however, her conaception detects the harmonies and informs her mind that this is valuable. These signals progressively update her valuation of Mozart, and by the end of the show, she comes away with a desire to hear more. Meanwhile, by tasting the ice cream, Ahmed's conaception provides him with evidence that pistachio is better than banana-fudge, his prior representation notwithstanding. Finally, after a long series of stressful calls, Linda's mind has been bombarded with

[12] Similarly, conaception is also distinct from perceptual theories of emotion (Tappolet, 2016) and desire (Stampe, 1987). These theories draw on an analogy to the phenomenological aspect of perception to explain emotions and desires respectively, which is distinct from the idea that we have a faculty of conaception.

evidence from her conaception that selling goods by phone has very little value, and she comes away with a strong aversion to ever doing so again.

These changes are fast and unreflective in a way that is analogous to the changes in belief we see from the influence of perception. When Victor sees that the stop sign is near, his belief in its distance changes spontaneously, without the need for any deliberation or inference. These processes can be contrasted with the deliberate reflection involved in conscious practical and theoretical reasoning. Notably, both perception and conaception rely on simple processes that can be enacted by animals lacking any capacity for reflection. This means that we do not have to posit any big evolutionary breaks in the development of our motivational system. Instead, we can explain those aspects of our motivational capacities unique to humans—for example, our capacity for deliberate reflection—as additions built on top of a simpler foundation shared with other animals in the same way that we do for theoretical reasoning.

We might ask whether conaception is a revisionary proposal, and whether this is a problem if so. It might seem like a novel kind of process, and we might think that the bar should then be higher for introducing it into our theories. However, something like the opposite is true: conaception is a particularly parsimonious proposal that requires minimal changes to our ontology of mental processes. It is merely another instance of a familiar kind of process that we already accept, namely, feature-detecting computational processes like perception. The result is a unified picture of our minds according to which both cognitive and conative states are modulated by simple signals from feature-detecting capacities. In addition, it accounts for the cases we want to explain and is supported by our best empirical and computational science. In other words, on any plausible account of scientific virtues, it's doing well. This only leaves the question of whether we can provide a better explanation. In the next section, we consider the primary alternative.

2.4.2 Alternative Explanation: Hedonic Valence

An alternative explanation is that what determines whether we want more or less of something is just whether our experience with it is pleasurable or painful, or its hedonic valence. Hedonism of this kind has support among some philosophers (Carruthers, 2024; Morillo, 1990; Pollock, 2006) and many scientists (Dickinson & Balleine, 2010; Kringelbach, 2005; Rolls, 2013) who argue that the hedonic valence of an experience constitutes

the feedback that modulates our valuations.[13] Indeed, it seems natural to explain some cases of desire change by appeal to the hedonic valence of the experience, such as Ahmed's coming to desire pistachio.

The problem is that, while the hedonic valence of an experience clearly correlates with its motivational impact, there is decisive reason to think that they are not the same thing. For example, our guts regularly provide signals to our minds that make us more or less disposed to eat the food being digested. However, these signals are entirely unconscious and thereby entirely lack hedonic qualities (Li et al., 2022). Similarly, rats who have lost their sweet taste receptors will still eat more of food that has sucrose (de Araujo et al., 2008), suggesting that it is not the pleasurable taste itself that causes the desire, but rather information about the nutritional content, insofar as these come apart.[14] Finally, these observations are backed by neuroscientific experiments showing how the areas of the brain responsible for hedonic sensations can be activated separately from those responsible for motivation (Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Peciña & Berridge, 2005).

This leaves the question of what the function of hedonic valence is, if not to provide feedback to our desires. In fact, there are plenty of available answers, though they will plausibly vary between different kinds of affective states. For example, moods can have hedonic components—it typically feels bad to be sad—yet they do not constitute sources of environmental feedback themselves. Instead, they bias how we interpret our interactions with the world, and the decisions we make in response (Lerner et al., 2015). Even pain, arguably the quintessential candidate of hedonic feedback, is widely seen to have other functions. Among philosophers of pain, a standard view is that pain communicates imperatives like "Treat me!" rather than signals of value (Klein, 2015).[15]

[13] Carruthers (2024) argues against a kind of hedonism according to which hedonic valence is value. However, he does not contest that hedonic valence represents value, which we object to here.

[14] Conversely, if essential nutrients are removed from food while the taste is left untouched, rats cease to be motivated by it (Gietzen et al., 2007).

[15] I develop these arguments against hedonism in more detail in other work [Anonymized].

2.5 Conaception and the Normativity of Desire

2.5.1 Can Conaception Be Accurate?

Perception does not merely modulate our beliefs in response to experience. It also informs them about the world and typically makes them accurately attuned to it by reliably tracking various properties. Until now, we've set aside the question whether conaception can do the same, saying only that it updates our valuations without claiming that it regulates them towards something in the world. Indeed, it might seem obvious that this is a disanalogy to perception: unlike Victor's belief about the distance to the stop sign, there is no more or less accurate desire for Chiara to have about seeing her colleague again. In this section, I argue that this is incorrect. There is a straightforward sense in which our valuations can be inaccurate, and the nature of our conaception explains why they are typically not.

To start, consider again what perception does for our beliefs. The signals that our perceptual capacities provide us with are not random. Rather, they carry information about what the world is like, and this is typically accurate. If our perceptual capacities did not work this way, our beliefs would be largely arbitrary, and we would be incompetent at navigating our environment. There is something similar to be said for our desires. Relative to all the things we could have desired, our actual desires mostly occupy a strikingly small subset of desires for things that seem, by and large, good for us. For example, we typically prefer eating bread over bark, and amicable conversation over conflict. Of course, there are prominent exceptions to this—sugary food and substance use—but they are also typically recognized as such, much like inaccurate beliefs.[16]

Why is this? Here is a proposal. Just as our perceptual capacities align our internal representations with relevant properties to make our beliefs accurate, our conaceptive capacity aligns our valuations with outcomes that are *good for us*, in the sense of being conducive to our well-being. More precisely, conaception regulates the value that our minds attribute to an option proportionately towards how good that option is for us.

What is good for us is contested, but fortunately we don't have to settle that discussion here. We only need to affirm that some things are better for us than others, and that we can mostly identify what those things are by pointing to paradigmatic examples that

[16] This is arguably why we tend to defer to people's revealed preferences in assessing what would improve their well-being, as is standard in welfare economics (Mas-Colell et al., 1995).

any theory should be able to capture. These might include being in good health, experiencing positive affective states, and having a flourishing social life.[17] This is analogous to how we can affirm that many organisms are alive and that this correlates with having genetic information encoded in protein structures, even if we disagree about what makes something alive or about borderline cases like viruses.

Given these assumptions, we can compare our internal valuations to what is good for us and assess them for accuracy: if our minds attribute value to something in proportion to how good it is for us, then the valuation is accurate with regard to its goodness for us. This is analogous to how we assess our representations of other magnitudes, such as depth, for example. Our representations of depth are accurate about distance when the magnitude in our head stands in a proportionate relation to the property in the world, like a thermometer to the temperature (Beck, 2015).[18] If conaception consistently makes our valuations more accurate in this way, then it's accurate in the same way that our depth perception is towards distance.

2.5.2 Why Does Conaception Track What is Good?

There is a simple argument why we should expect conaception to track what is good for us: our mental capacities have been adapted by natural selection to generate signals in a way that improves our reproductive fitness, given the function of that capacity in our mental economy. For example, our depth perception has been adapted to induce representations of distance that keep us from walking off cliffs. As it happens, such representations are those that are accurate about distance in the world. Therefore, our depth perception is adapted to reliably discriminate and indicate that property. In the case of conaception, it is adapted to induce valuations that improve our reproductive fitness. For example, we should expect selection pressures to shape conaception into providing positive signals for features correlated with nutritious food rather than poisonous food, making us more

[17] More precisely, we can remain agnostic about why these things are good for us either in terms of first-order normative ethics (e.g. because they are pleasurable) or meta-ethics (e.g. because they have a non-natural property of goodness), and whether some things are intrinsically good whereas others are merely derivatively good. By contrast, we do exclude nihilistic or sceptical views according to which what is good for us is non-existent or indeterminate, or we have no idea what it is.

[18] Is what is good for us representable as a scalar magnitude? Given our assumption that outcomes can be ranked in terms of how good they are for us, the answer is yes, e.g. using theorems provided by Broome (1991). In this discussion, I will just appeal to the intuitive idea that goodness-for comes in degrees.

disposed to eat that. As it happens, such outcomes tend to be good for us. Therefore, as with depth perception and distance, we should expect the influence of conaception to make our valuations more accurate towards what is good.

It is crucial to distinguish this argument from a similar-looking but distinct idea. This is the claim that these things are good for us *because* conaception is adapted to track them. I am not defending this claim. I am only relying on the observation that, based on paradigmatic examples of well-being that any theory should plausibly capture, there is a correlation between what conaception is adapted to track and what is conducive to our well-being.

A critic might object that there is a disanalogy to perceptual capacities such as depth perception. In all cases, the nature of a capacity will be largely explained by its contribution to our reproductive fitness in our ancestral past. However, according to this objection, depth perception induces representations that are accurate about distance *because* that is what made them increase our reproductive fitness: inaccurate representations are bad for our survival. Meanwhile, the objection goes, the relation between reproductive fitness and well-being is incidental. For example, we are adapted to be motivated by features that correlate with outcomes that were arguably never conducive to our well-being, as long as they improved our reproductive fitness. An example is the motivation to take revenge for social slights, which we are innately sensitive to.

On the contrary, there is no disanalogy to perception here. Like accuracy, well-being is plausibly a part of the explanation for why something is reproductively beneficial. For example, being in good physical health is plausibly partially constitutive of well-being, and clearly crucial for one's reproductive fitness. However, as with well-being, accuracy about distance is also only *partly* determinative of reproductive fitness. For example, humans consistently perceive approaching sounds as having a closer source than receding sounds (Neuhoff, 1998). The explanation is that hypervigilance about approaching predators was fitness-enhancing in our ancestral past, even if this often gave rise to inaccurate false positives. In other words, even in seemingly uncontroversial cases like depth-perception, natural selection tracks more than accuracy. Whether in the case of perception or conaception, we should not take this as grounds for doubting the reliability of those capacities.[19]

[19]This response reveals the complications with another line of criticism. A critic might object that we can only talk about the accuracy of a representation by first fixing its unique intentional content, which is

2.5.3 Motivational Illusions

If conaception is analogous to perceptual capacities in this way, this suggests that it should also be able to generate predictably inaccurate signals that indicate that something is good when in fact it is not. For example, our depth perception can malfunction when faced with optical illusions that present cues that typically indicate a distance that is not currently present. Is there anything analogous to this for conaception? Plausibly, yes. Consider this case:

> **Kim:** Kim comes home from work and instantly starts scrolling through her social media feed. After a long series of jealousy-inducing photos and outraged comments, she puts her phone down for a snack break, feeling mildly frustrated. As soon as she comes back, however, she feels an urge to keep scrolling.

It seems that Kim is experiencing something akin to a motivational illusion. Her conaception has been misled by cues that typically indicate something that is good for us in expectation; a steady stream of novel and surprising information, for example. In this case, the information is largely useless and instead induces a pathological desire to scroll to no good end. Similar arguments can be made for food with high sugar content and other addictive experiences.

Our perception can also be unreliable for other reasons. For example, our vision can become less accurate when we're tired or drunk. In other more extreme cases of hallucinations, the influence of our perceptual system on our belief becomes swamped by signals from other sources that are largely unmoored from our interactions with the world. We can point to motivational analogies to these cases, too. If we are annoyed or stressed, we might fail to be motivated by an interaction we would normally enjoy. Conversely, if we're exalted we can be motivated by experiences that we would normally find dull.

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stronger than the propositions it carries information about (Dretske, 1981). This is typically done by appeal to teleosemantic theories, according to which this is determined by what the capacity was adapted to track (Millikan, 1984; Neander, 2017). However, such strategies are plagued by indeterminacy problems. For example, in the case of auditory depth perception, we would like to say that its content is distance. Yet as we saw, the historical function is only partly to track distance. In this discussion, I set aside these traditional discussions of content and instead consider accuracy-judgments relative to a property. Just as we can say that a thermometer is accurate about temperature without adding a theory that it is the unique content of the thermometer's representation, we can do the same for distance and goodness.

Arguably, we sometimes even experience instances of motivational hallucinations. An example might be desires for addictive drugs that directly intervene in our motivational system, or compulsions caused by mental illness.

Unlike such influences on our desires, when conaception functions normally and we interact with the world, this is typically a benign influence that regulates our desires to be attuned to what is good for us in the same way that perceptual capacities regulate our beliefs to be attuned to what is true.

2.5.4 The Normative Function of Conaception

The fact that our perception is an accurate influence on our beliefs is normatively crucial to our lives. It is because Victor knows that he can rely on the information from his vision that he is justified in hitting the brakes.[20] Conaception provides an analogous function for our desires. Because it reliably tracks what is good for us and continually influences our desires, we can typically rely on motivations that we obtain through normal experience without worrying that they will lead to bad outcomes.

We can illustrate this in the case of Chiara. When she interacts with her colleague, her conaception provides signals that update her valuations positively to make her desire to see them again. In fact, spending more time with an amicable colleague would probably be good for Chiara. This means that she can act on her desire and be better off for it. This can be contrasted with the influences that do not track what is good for us, either because they track something else or because they are random. For example, if we learn that someone has acquired a yen to drink paint because of a growing brain tumor, we have no reason to believe that this is good for them. If the person learns that this is the etiology of their desire, that would undermine any apparent reason they had for acting on it.

This elucidates some traditional debates about the normative status we should give to desires. On one common view, desires have a default normative authority, meaning that we always have pro tanto reason to act on them (Heathwood, 2017; M. Schroeder, 2007). As several authors have pointed out, this seems counterintuitive in cases where the desire seems to be for something pointless, such as an urge to turn on radios for no further reason (Quinn, 1994). Conaception provides us with a new response: desires have a default

[20] Some would argue that merely having a belief produced by a reliable process is sufficient for it to be justified (Goldman, 1979). I take no stance on this debate here. Regardless, knowing that a belief is the product of an unreliable influence is widely considered sufficient to make it unjustified (Christensen, 2010).

normative authority because they are typically the products of a process that regulates them towards something normatively valuable, namely what is good for us, given the kinds of creatures that we are (Foot, 2001). However, when we learn that a desire is not the product of such a process, it loses this normative status, in the same way that a belief does if we learn that it is caused by an optical illusion. For example, in most realistic variations of the case, an urge to turn on radios would plausibly be caused by a form of obsessive-compulsive disorder that has a maladaptive influence on our motivational system.[21]

This does not mean that conaception always leaves us with perfect desires. Just like perceptual influences, it is the first word, but rarely the last. Often, it might lead us astray, such as in the case of Kim, who is induced to keep scrolling on her phone. In such cases, however, we can exercise our ability for practical reasoning to improve on them. By critically reflecting on whether our desires are aimed at what is good, we can intervene on them with top-down influence, steering them in another direction. For example, we learn not to want sugary food even when we are inclined to, and become put off by our phones and addictive apps the more we realize their impact on our lives. This is directly analogous to how we improve the accuracy of our beliefs with theoretical reflection. For example, when we learn that water makes objects look bent, we don't believe that an oar is broken, even if it looks that way at first glance.

This brings us to a final consideration. So far in the discussion, we have focused on the relation between our desires and a particular property of normative significance, namely what is conducive to our well-being. However, we might think that we should strive to steer our desires not only towards what is good for us individually, but also towards what is morally good. Nothing about the structure of our valuations and desires precludes assessing them for accuracy towards such other forms of good. However, we might be concerned that if conaception primarily tracks what is good for us in particular, we will be led away from the good in general.[22]

[21] Incidentally, this also explains what is bad about being put in the experience machine (Nozick, 1974). It would do to our desires what being deceived by an evil demon would do to our beliefs: it provides us with massively misleading evidence, in this case about what is good for us, precluding us from pursuing what is actually good.

[22] There is a plausible argument that conaception does track moral goodness to some degree, as indicated by the fact that we seem innately disposed to be motivated by altruistic behavior (McAuliffe et al., 2017; Ruff & Fehr, 2014; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). This mitigates the discrepancy.

On the contrary, this raises a last analogy to perception. Although our perceptual capacities steer our beliefs to be accurate, they only give us insight into a small part of all that the world has to offer. Unlike some animals, we cannot see ultraviolet, and no known creature has senses that allow them to appreciate phenomena in the quantum realm. Instead, our perceptual capacities give us an initial platform to connect with the world from which we can start to understand it. In the same way, conaception grounds our desires in some normatively crucial aspects of the world, especially what improves our well-being. In either case, our capacities use our interaction with the world to put us in the ballpark of accurate representations. From there, it is our collective responsibility to improve on them. In the limit, we should hope to accurately represent both what is true and good, even if our individual capacities leave us with a substantial gap to close.

CHAPTER 3

Reward is Evidence of Value

3.1 Introduction

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a formal framework for modelling agents as expected value maximizers that learn from experience. Recently, it has emerged as a prominent paradigm for explaining the motivational system of natural agents (Haas, 2022; Sripada, 2025a). The reason is that it seems to capture important aspects of the mental processes that generate our motivational states. A central component in many RL algorithms is a reward function that specifies the immediate payoff associated with a state or transition that RL agents estimate and strive to maximize in the long run. What, if anything, does the reward function correspond to in us?

This question has generated substantial debate (Aronowitz, n.d.; Haas, 2022; Juechems & Summerfield, 2019; Molinaro & Collins, 2023a, 2023b; Singh et al., 2009; Weber et al., 2025). We might assume that it corresponds to biological reward or punishment signals innately generated in response to select stimuli like food, sex, and bodily harm. But this implies a reductive picture of human motivation in which all our desires are ultimately aimed at the activation of such signals in our brains. Others have proposed that it corresponds to the satisfaction of acquired goals or desires. But this explanation risks circularity, since RL is supposed to explain how we acquired those goals in the first place. This leaves us without appealing options. Call this *the puzzle of reward*.

In this paper, I defend a new proposal to resolve the puzzle that I call *evidentialism* about reward. In standard RL algorithms, the reward function provides a signal that both teaches the agent what to do and constitutes the scalar the agent strives to maximize. I argue that this is a simplifying modelling assumption and that in natural agents

these functions come apart. Biological reward signals provide our minds with simple pre-reflective evidence that updates internal representations of a simple functional quantity of basic value that our minds strive to optimize. This is broadly analogous to how innately determined perceptual signals update our representations of other quantities, such as distance, while remaining agnostic about the referential content. Evidentialism implies that the reward signal is not the optimization target; its content of basic value is. This avoids the issues of the alternative proposals and resolves the puzzle of reward.

Here is an overview of the rest of the paper. In Section 2, I present some background on reinforcement learning and its relation to cognitive science. In Section 3, I present and critically evaluate proposals for how to interpret the reward function as applied to natural agents. In Section 4, I present evidentialism about reward. In Section 5, I consider the objections that evidentialism is in tension with the axioms of reinforcement learning and that it relies on strong assumptions about the content of value representations, and argue that neither constitutes a problem. Finally, in an Appendix, I present an analogue of evidentialism in RL formalism and demonstrate that evidentialism is consistent with learning algorithms such as temporal-difference learning.

3.2 Background

Reinforcement learning comprises both a problem specification for modelling an ideal agent as maximizing expected value, and a particular set of algorithms for how the agent learns to do so by interacting with its environment (Sutton & Barto, 2018). An ideal RL agent is defined as maximizing the expected discounted sum of a scalar quantity, typically called the *reward*. To know what to do in any given moment, an RL agent typically uses a representation of expected future reward. This is called the *value function*. By interacting with the world through trial and error, the agent learns and updates its value function towards a more accurate representation of the rewards associated with different states or transitions in ways that can be precisely modelled with RL learning algorithms. This allows it to take actions that lead to more reward.[1]

[1] An RL agent can be defined as the solution to a Markov decision process, which is defined as a tuple $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, T, r, \gamma)$, where $\mathcal{S}$ is a set of states, $\mathcal{A}$ a set of actions, T a transition function, $r\colon \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{S} \to \mathbb{R}$ a reward function, and γ a discount factor. A policy π assigns to each state a probability distribution over actions. An agent learns to approximate a true value function V that represents the actual expected cumulative discounted reward, given some policy: $V^{\pi}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t r(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}) \mid s_0 = s\right]$.

As it turns out, RL is effective not only for modelling abstract agents, but also for explaining the functioning of natural ones. In recent decades, the cognitive science of motivation has converged on the idea that our minds, and those of many other animals, carry simple non-conceptual representations of expected value (Daw & Shohamy, 2008; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2017; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). These representations function as a mental index of what our minds register as valuable to pursue and causally steer our behavior towards the options with the highest score (Ballesta et al., 2020). This idea is supported by a large and convergent body of neural and behavioral evidence showing that value representations are encoded in specific areas of the brain and explain a range of mental functions, including choice (Levy & Glimcher, 2012), attention (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010), and cognitive control (Shenhav et al., 2016). It has also inspired a range of philosophical work (Burnston, 2025; Haas, 2023; Hendrickx, 2026; Sripada, 2025a; Wu, 2023).

Like other representations, value representations get updated in response to new experiences, and RL provides the leading computational framework for modelling this learning process. The most famous example is provided by the temporal-difference (TD) learning algorithm. The intuitive idea of TD learning is that an agent updates its value function in response to whether things went better or worse than expected. This difference in expected value between prediction and outcome is called the temporal-difference error (TDE). Here is a simplified version of the algorithm, where $V(s)$ is the agent's value function representing the expected value of a state s and δ is the TDE:[2]

$$V_{\text{new}}(s) = V_{\text{old}}(s) + \delta. \tag{3.1}$$

To calculate the TDE, we compare the uninformed estimate of the expected value of s with the informed estimate we get once we have seen how the next state s' turns out. This informed estimate can be decomposed into the immediate reward as determined by a reward function, r, and the new estimate of future reward, $V(s')$:

$$\delta = \left[r_{s \to s'} + V(s')\right] - V(s). \tag{3.2}$$

Consider an example to illustrate. Suppose that a mouse hears a sound (s) and then shortly thereafter receives a piece of cheese (s'). Suppose further that $r_{s \to s'} = 1$ and

[2]Specifically, this version lacks discount and learning rates.

that $V(s) = 0$, meaning that the transition to cheese carries a positive reward and that the mouse expected no reward. In this case, s turned out to be better than expected. Assuming $V(s') = 0$, we can calculate the TDE:

$$\delta = 1 = \big[1 + 0\big] - 0. \tag{3.3}$$

Following the TD-learning algorithm, we can then use the TDE to update the mouse's $V(s)$:

$$V_{\text{new}}(s) = 1 = 0 + 1. \tag{3.4}$$

The mouse has now updated its value representation of the sound, and will be more motivated to bring it about (for example, by pulling a lever that activates the sound). This case is an illustration of simple motivational learning in natural agents through a process of conditioning. In one of the most famous experiments in neuroscience, Schultz et al. (1997) showed that dopamine activity, known to be involved in the modulation of motivation, seems to encode the TDE. In addition, the resulting behavior in both humans and other animals is what TD learning would predict. This strongly suggests that TD learning closely models real mental processes in our minds that update our value representations and causally regulate our motivation.[3]

There is a strong relation between value functions in RL and the value representations in our minds. However, RL algorithms also contain another crucial component: the reward function, which conveys how directly rewarding a given state or transition is. In artificial agents, reward can be treated as an aspect of the environment and handcrafted by an engineer. But what is rewarding for natural agents depends on what kind of agent we are—what is rewarding to me will not be to a dung beetle—meaning that something in our minds must determine this too. As it turns out, identifying what that is is difficult.

[3]More recently, other RL algorithms have been fruitfully deployed to explain other aspects of human motivation, including model-based algorithms (Daw et al., 2011) and the successor representation (Momennejad et al., 2017).

3.3 Theories of Reward

There is a burgeoning literature aiming to explain what the reward function corresponds to in natural agents. It has clustered around two broad strategies. One identifies the reward function with innately determined reward signals, and the other identifies it with acquired attitudes such as desires or goals. These should be seen as extremes on a spectrum of how much the reward function depends on ontogeny, but considering them will reveal issues that most proposals will face some combination of.

Starting on the side of simple nativism, we can imagine that the reward function corresponds to simple signals generated in response to stimuli in innately determined ways. Such stimuli are called primary reinforcers by psychologists, and paradigmatic examples include high-calorie food, sexual activity, and bodily harm. For example, in the conditioning example above, we assume that the cheese constitutes a primary reinforcer for the mouse. According to this view, value representations estimate what states will cause the firing of these signals, guiding our actions towards those that are expected to generate the most activity. Many neuroscientists seem to implicitly support a view close to this (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009; Rolls, 2013).

There are two problems with this view. The first is that it seems, intuitively, that we optimize for a richer set of outcomes than those we were selected to find innately attractive. We may learn to pursue science, love, and greatness as highly valued outcomes in their own right. Yet from the perspective of the nativist signal view, all such pursuits would be in the service of maximizing the achievement of primary reinforcers in expectation. If we could achieve those reinforcers directly, we could in principle skip everything else. This problem is familiar from issues with psychological hedonism and the implausibility that humans only strive to maximize pleasure.

The second problem is one of *wireheading*, a term for when a process optimizes for a signal rather than the state causing that signal. Strictly speaking, the view implies that value representations represent the internal activity of the reward system, rather than anything in the world. This suggests that, if we had the option to press a button to activate reward signals at the expense of all other pursuits, humans would be acting optimally by doing so (barring occasional pauses for maintenance, allowing for more button-pressing in the long run). This seems implausible. Although humans are susceptible to obsessive behavior induced by reward signals—for example, when we struggle to stop doomscrolling on our phones—these are typically seen as pathological behaviors. Crucially, even though

it can be difficult, we can recognize them as such and become less motivated to pursue them by reflection and effort. It is difficult to explain how our motivational system would permit this if our minds did in fact optimize only for the signals themselves.

A view that is more popular among philosophers and cognitive scientists is that the reward function corresponds to some of our largely acquired conative attitudes, such as terminal desires or goals, which represent outcomes we want for their own sake (Juechems & Summerfield, 2019; Molinaro & Collins, 2023b).[4] Such goals might include proving the Goldbach conjecture, ensuring that our children do well, and performing the morally right action. On this view, the computational notion of reward corresponds to the achievement of these goals, or progress towards them. This has the added benefit of establishing a strong relation between RL and more familiar representations of motivation, such as desire-belief psychology.

This view raises a natural question: how do we acquire goals, including terminal goals, in the first place? This seems like the kind of question that RL is meant to answer. However, if terminal goals constitute the analogue of the reward function, then we need to have them in place to explain how we acquire terminal goals. This seems potentially circular. One response is that we bootstrap our goals by gradually integrating learned goals into our reward function. For example, T. Schroeder (2004) has argued that we can acquire new terminal desires via a process of conditioning in which a neutral outcome is associated with a rewarding outcome and then gradually becomes rewarding itself. This process is the conditioning we saw modelled by TD learning before.

The problem is that this is not a description of how something becomes integrated into the reward function, and the impression that it is stems from an ambiguity in the word "reward". What TD learning shows is that states can become "rewarding" merely by acquiring expected value, because the TDE is a function of both direct and expected reward. For example, when the mouse becomes conditioned to value the sound, it can induce other behavior (for example, lead it to learn to pull a lever to activate the sound). But this is because it predicts *future* reward in the RL sense, not because it provides reward itself.

We might think that this is a simplifying artifact of TD learning, and that value representations eventually become rigidified by some other process into terminal desires that can play the role of a reward function. This is dubious. The stability of the reward func-

[4] I treat desires and goals as interchangeable here.

tion in conditioning is what allows us to explain how we both acquire and *lose* desires, in what is known as extinction. Specifically, if the sound were no longer followed by the cheese, then it would lose its value, and so would pulling the lever. If we were to "merge" the value of the sound into the reward function, we would no longer be able to explain how such extinction occurs.[5] In other words, appealing to conditioning as a source of a changing reward function requires abandoning our best explanation of the acquisition and loss of desires.

There are plausibly more proposals that can be provided, and several intermediate positions have been defended (Haas, 2022; Keramati & Gutkin, 2014; Weber et al., 2025).[6] The point of this discussion is to show that any such proposal that treats reward as an optimization target will need to navigate a seemingly impossible strait: it needs to make the reward function sophisticated enough to capture what humans value while avoiding wireheading, and yet stable enough to explain the empirical success of models like TD learning that rely on a stable signal. As I argue next, the key to solving this puzzle is to reject the premise: reward is not the optimization target.

3.4 Evidentialism about Reward

I propose a new solution to the puzzle, which I call *evidentialism about reward*. According to evidentialism, innate reward signals update our value representations, but they do not *constitute* the value that our value representations aim to estimate accurately. Instead, they provide simple pre-reflective evidence about that value, and our minds use that evidence to update value representations.

In standard RL, the reward function plays two distinct roles. First, it provides a signal for any given state that the agent can use to update the value function (for example, in TD learning). Second, that signal constitutes the optimization target for the agent: the scalar value that value functions estimate and that the agent acts to maximize in the long run. Evidentialism implies that, in humans and other animals, these two functions come apart. For clarity, let us call the optimization target *basic value* and reserve *reward* for the signals that update value representations. The assumption that reward is basic value simplifies the

[5] Sometimes model-free learning like TD learning is identified with habit formation, which tends to be permanent. More recent work demonstrates that these are separable (Miller et al., 2019).

[6] Aronowitz (n.d.) arguably defends a view that falls outside this spectrum.

formal models and allows us to explain many dynamics of human motivation. However, I argue that it is a simplifying assumption that generates the tension seen in the previous section.[7]

To understand the idea of evidentialism, it is helpful to consider perception as an analogy. Our perceptual system is innately sensitive to a range of features in the environment, which generate signals that are subsequently consumed to update our internal representation of the environment. Consider depth perception: when I look at a stop sign that is ten feet away from me, light hits my retinas and is transduced into simple representations which, after being propagated through my visual system, are eventually interpreted by my mind as evidence that the stop sign is ten feet away (Marr, 1982).

Evidentialism suggests that biological reward signals function in a structurally similar way. They are triggered by aspects of the world to which we are sensitive and generate information that is innately interpreted by our minds as evidence that whatever caused the signal has basic value. The crucial observation is that, just as we do not need to take our perception of distance to *constitute* distance, we do not need to take the reward signal to constitute basic value. In both the case of distance and value representations, the content of the representation is determined by the content of the signals that inform it, rather than by the vehicles of that content.

Evidentialism resolves the issues identified above. Like the simple nativist view, it accommodates the apparent need for a stable reward signal in algorithms such as TD learning, thereby avoiding the problems that arise for goal-based views. This can be seen by analogy with perception: even major shifts in belief do not typically involve major changes in our basic perceptual capacities, and plausibly for good functional reasons. Evidentialism also avoids the wireheading and reductionist issues that afflict the simple nativist view. Since evidentialism does not take reward signals themselves to be the basic value that is optimized, there is no pressure for an agent to optimize the achievement of simple reward signals as such. In fact, doing so would amount to deliberately generating misleading evidence, since one would know that the signals are not indicative of something in the environment having basic value.

Finally, evidentialism allows that reward signals are one of many sources of evidence that bear on our value representations. The analogy to perception is again helpful. When

[7]Evidentialism is similar to the thesis defended by Carruthers (2018, 2024, 2025) that valence represents value, though my focus is the relation between reward and value in particular.

we look at an optical illusion—for example, one where objects look large because our mind interprets them as being far away—we receive evidence that our minds innately interpret in misleading ways. However, we can also correct our representations, for example by drawing inferences from our other representations (such as a belief that objects of that kind tend to be smaller).

Similarly, we humans can draw on reflection to influence our value representations (Atlas et al., 2016; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009). For example, if I see a donut, my mind might associate high expected value with eating it. However, when I read the calorie content, I infer that it would be bad for me, which—admittedly, not always—decreases my value representation and makes me want it less. By modelling basic value as an independent quantity about which reward signals provide one important source of noisy evidence, we can make sense of our ability to critically evaluate desires formed through rewarding experiences, especially when we know those reward signals were designed to induce obsessive behavior, as with social-media feeds.

This provides the basic idea of evidentialism. However, it also raises substantial questions. In the next section, I respond to what seem to me the most pressing ones.

3.5 Questions and Objections

An initial objection to evidentialism is that it appears to contradict the axioms of RL. It assumes that we can separate basic value from reward. But, the critic might say, in RL the optimization target just *is* reward. If so, evidentialism becomes nonsensical.

Although identifying reward with the optimization target is ubiquitous in RL, it is not a necessary component of the framework. Dissociating them requires more sophisticated problem formulations than those commonly used, however. In the Appendix, I present a model that distinguishes basic value from observations of reward. I show that the correct value function for basic value can be learned using Bayesian conditionalization, and also approximated using TD learning as in standard RL, assuming that reward signals are not systematically biased.[8]

[8]Notably, prominent papers in RL have made use of a similar distinction between reward observations and an optimization target. Everitt et al. (2017) present a model where an agent receives reward signals through a corruption function that distorts them, and they demonstrate conditions under which the agent can learn about the distribution of "true" reward. Hadfield-Menell et al. (2016) present a model in which an agent learns about and optimizes for the reward function of a principal.

Another question concerns what basic value is supposed to be. In the case of perception, perceptual signals carry information about a property in the world that they represent, such as distance (Neander, 2017; Shea, 2018). The analogous suggestion for value representations is that reward signals track some real property of basic value. However, this would seem to commit evidentialism to value realism, which seems implausible.[9]

There are deep questions about the content of value representations that are largely beyond the scope of this discussion. However, they will plausibly not undermine the basic descriptive picture defended here, because a mental representation need not successfully refer to anything in order to play a causal-functional role in cognition (Egan, 2025; W. M. Ramsey, 2007). For example, imagine Kurt, whose only desire in life is to maximize holiness. He travels the world visiting the biggest cathedrals and collects items thought to have belonged to prophets. It seems that we can accurately explain Kurt's motivation and predict what he will do, even if there is no property of holiness instantiated in the world.

Similarly, the content of value representations does not depend on a particular referent. We could explain why agents' motivational systems work the way they do even if value representations failed to refer to anything in the world. Instead, what makes the scalar represented by value representations *value* is its function in our mental economy: it is a quantity that causally regulates motivation in proportion to its magnitude. The same is true for the reward signals that inform these representations. What makes them provide evidence is not that they successfully carry information about a property in the world—Kurt can receive evidence that something is holy, even if an error theory of holiness is correct[10]—but that the mind interprets their content as evidence for updating a value representation.[11]

This means that we can articulate the descriptive picture implied by evidentialism while remaining quiet on difficult questions about intentionality. However, we might additionally ask the normative question whether value representations and reward signals can be accurate. What we can plausibly say is that our value representations behave *as if* they were aiming to be accurate when they get updated by reward signals. As we have seen,

[9] Carruthers (2024) faces a similar issue and identifies value with reproductive success via teleosemantics, which is an option I set aside here.

[10] On a Bayesian understanding of evidence, p is evidence for q just if conditionalizing on p increases our subjective probability in q, given our priors.

[11] Value representations can minimally be understood as what W. M. Ramsey (2007) calls an implicit representation that can do causal work without a referent.

this process is well modelled by TD learning, and TD learning is a method for converging on a true representation of the expected value of the environment (Dayan, 1992). Whether there is such a thing as an accurate value representation to converge on, however, must remain a topic for future work.

3.6 Conclusion

Reward signals in natural agents are best understood not as the quantity the motivational system ultimately values, but as one important source of evidence about a functional quantity of basic value estimated and optimized for by that system. This preserves the explanatory role of stable reward signals in RL models while avoiding both the reductionism of simple nativist views and the circularity that threatens goal-based views. It also helps explain why reflection and other cognitive inputs can revise what we are motivated to pursue.

CHAPTER 4

A Conflation of Valences

4.1 Introduction

The notion of valence has featured heavily in philosophical work recently. Philosophers have argued that we have valenced perception (Fulkerson, 2020; Jacobson, n.d.), debated the semantic content of valenced states (Barlassina & Hayward, 2019; Carruthers, 2023), and discussed the relevance of valent experience for moral status (Bradford, 2023; Mogensen, n.d.; Shepherd, 2018).

Perhaps no area has made as much use of the idea as the recent interest in motivational learning in theories of agency (Carruthers, 2024, 2025; Haas, 2022; Sripada, 2025a). According to these theories, agents such as ourselves learn from the valence of our experiences and strive for their net balance of valence to be positive in expectation. This seems to give newfound support for a traditional form of motivational hedonism, meaning that our desires and wants are to be explained by our history of hedonic experiences (Bentham, 1780). This suggests that agents that can learn what to do from experience have some degree of sentience, meaning the capacity to have valent experiences. It provides an apparent indicator of sentience across species (Brown & Birch, n.d.), and potentially for digital agents as well (Butlin et al., 2023; Moret, n.d.).

In this paper, I argue that most work on valence and motivation is based on a conflation between two crucially different notions, which I call *learning* valence and *hedonic* valence respectively. Learning valence determines whether an interaction with the world induces attraction or aversion in the future. Hedonic valence is whether an experience feels pleasurable or displeasurable. Motivational hedonism assumes that these refer to the same kind of mental state. I present a number of empirical and intuitive arguments for

why this is false. While hedonists and others are correct that hedonic valence is crucial for our human motivational system, it does not play the role of basic learning valence.

Here is an overview of the paper. In Section 2, I provide a short primer on the contemporary paradigm for explaining motivation in cognitive science. In Section 3, I introduce the distinction between learning valence and hedonic valence. In Section 4, I show that we can experience unconscious learning valence and refine the hedonist's view in response. In Section 5, I show that even conscious hedonic valence is dissociable from learning and conclude that they are different mental kinds. In Section 6, I argue that this resolves two outstanding questions about valence: whether hedonic valence can be heterogeneous and whether the content of valence is value or imperatives. In Section 7, I conclude by presenting some other explanations of learning and hedonic valence respectively that do not rely on an identity, and some implications for animal sentience.

4.2 Background: Motivational Learning and Valence

There has recently been a surge in philosophical explanations of agency and choice, drawing on work from computational cognitive science (Aronowitz, 2021; Burnston, 2025; Carruthers, 2024; Haas, 2018; Railton, 2017; Sripada, 2025a; Wu, 2023). Following Sripada, I will refer to these explanations as valuationist explanations.

The central idea of valuationist explanations is that agents strive to maximize an internal non-conceptual representation of value associated with various actions and options. Call this a *valuation*. This valuation can loosely be described as a metric for how "choice-worthy" that option is from the perspective of the agent. Valuations are updated in response to interactions that the agent has with the world. Specifically, it is a function of whether the interaction was a positive or negative one from the agent's perspective, meaning something it represents as attractive or aversive (Bennett, 2021). This is often called the valence of the interaction. On a standard view that we will accept here, valence constitutes the *outcome value* of an interaction, meaning how good it is in itself. Meanwhile, valuations aim at accurately representing the weighted sum of valenced interactions that an action or option will lead to in the long run.[1]

[1] In the context of reinforcement learning, value representations correspond to value functions, and the valence of an interaction corresponds to the reward (Haas, 2022). Thus, this claim is equivalent to saying that a value function aims at accurately representing the expected long-term achievement of reward.

Valuations are posited to causally explain why agents act the way they do on a computational or functional level of explanation. This distinguishes them from utility functions in the context of economics, understood as formal representations constructed out of an agent's revealed preferences (Binmore, 2008). Valuations are intended to computationally explain why an agent has the preferences they do.

Valuations are not merely a theoretical posit, however. There is now a large and convergent body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience supporting the idea that our minds and those of other animals instantiate subconscious value representations (Chib et al., 2009; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). These representations are causally responsible for choice (Ballesta et al., 2020; Daw et al., 2011; O'Doherty et al., 2017) and arguably many other mental functions, including attention (Wu, 2023), effort (Hendrickx, 2024), moods (Emanuel & Eldar, 2023), and the use of executive functioning (Kool et al., 2017). They are non-conceptual representations that induce motivation (Carruthers, 2024). Roughly speaking, the higher the value associated with an option, the stronger the motivational disposition of our motivational system to bring that about. The expected valence that is the content of the representations functions as a "common currency" that allows our minds to compare and arbitrate between fundamentally different kinds of options (Levy & Glimcher, 2012).[2]

The value that a valuation attributes to options can be updated in a number of ways. Simple creatures often learn by comparing the expected valence of an interaction with the actual valence and correcting their expectation in response, which is a form of conditioning (Schultz et al., 1997).[3] Mammals are able to engage in more sophisticated methods by imagining different counterfactual futures and choosing the option that is likely to lead to the most valence in that simulation (Redish, 2016). We humans additionally learn via testimony and cultural transmission (Henrich, 2015; Ho et al., 2017).

[2]While this common currency idea has a minority of detractors within the empirical discussions—see Hayden and Niv (2021) for criticism and Sripada (2025b) for a response on behalf of orthodoxy—it is important to note that it is not in tension with incommensurability as discussed in philosophy (Chang, 2002). Value representations imply commensurability to explain our behavior in the space of causes, while Chang and others posit incommensurability in our decisions in the space of reasons. Like anyone, Chang implicitly relies on a causal explanation for how a choice occurred in the world and should defer to the empirical science on this, but that is consistent with an agent having incommensurable normative reasons for their choice.

[3]This is a simplification of standard instrumental conditioning, represented by so-called temporal-difference learning algorithms (Sutton & Barto, 2018). In fact, feedback of a transition consists both of the outcome value *and* changes to the expected future value.

What is the valence of an interaction? The answer might seem trivial. In most contexts, it is assumed that the valence of an interaction is the hedonic affect of the experience, or whether it was pleasurable or displeasurable (Carruthers, 2018; Rolls, 2013; Storbeck & Clore, 2008).[4] In fact, this is widely taken to be the meaning of the word "valence", for example, in emotion science (Barrett, 2006; Frijda, 1993; Panksepp, 2005). This understanding prima facie lines up perfectly with valence as we used the notion above. After all, it seems that we want more of what feels good and less of what feels bad. Not only that, but it also provides a natural evolutionary explanation of why we have hedonic experiences, namely, to allow us to learn what to pursue and avoid to improve our reproductive fitness. If this is right, the empirical support for valuationist explanations establishes a clear link between motivational learning and hedonic experiences, and thereby provides a newfound scientific vindication of traditional motivational hedonism.

One of the most important implications of this is found in discussions of non-human sentience (Birch, 2024). If it is the case that hedonic experiences are what allow us to develop new motivations in response to our interactions with the world, it tentatively suggests that any animal capable of learning by trial and error in this way would have the capacity to experience hedonic affect, or sentience for short (Birch et al., 2020; Brown & Birch, n.d.).[5] However, this kind of learning is demonstrated not only by humans and mammals, but also by creatures as simple as bumblebees (Gibbons et al., 2022) and fruit flies (Brembs & Heisenberg, 2000). In other words, if this is all correct, it provides us with reason to believe that many creatures are sentient, including insects. It also invites questions about whether a functional equivalent to valence might give rise to hedonic affect even if realized in a digital substrate (Butlin et al., 2023; Moret, n.d.).

Before we move on, it is worth stressing that hedonism of this kind does not imply that a person always chooses to do something for the reason that it maximizes pleasure. A traditional objection to hedonism is the implausibility that the soldier who throws herself on the grenade does so because she expects this to maximize her pleasure. However, this conflates first-personal motivational reasons with causal explanatory reasons (Smith,

[4]There are notable exceptions that explicitly argue that hedonic experiences fill the role of valence (Cleeremans & Tallon-Baudry, 2022; Dickinson & Balleine, 2010; Shenhav, 2024).

[5]Importantly, most theorists about animal sentience do not take the capacity for basic instrumental reasoning as sufficient for sentience. Rather, they propose that it is one indicator among several (Birch, 2024; Birch et al., 2021; Brown & Birch, n.d.; Elwood, 2019; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019). A notable exception is Cabanac (1992).

1994). Hedonists of the relevant kind defended here can embrace the claim that the soldier sacrifices herself because she wants her comrades to survive, and that this is the motivational reason for her action. They would additionally claim that the explanation for why her motivation is like that is to be explained by a history of positively valenced experiences with friends and loved ones, disposing her to view their lives as valuable.

4.3 Learning Valence and Hedonic Valence

Although valuationist explanations seem to imply that hedonic sensations explain our motivation, the argument for this crucially made use of two distinct meanings of the word "valence". On the one hand, we introduced valence as the property of being attractive or aversive for an agent—the outcome value of an interaction—and the currency that their minds use to arbitrate between options. On the other hand, we used it to describe the hedonic affect of an experience, in line with how it is used in emotion science and much everyday talk. Let us denote these two uses with separate terms and call them *learning* valence and *hedonic* valence respectively.[6]

There is a widespread practice of using these two meanings interchangeably. However, learning valence and hedonic valence are conceptually distinct terms. We can imagine an agent—a simple artificial intelligence, perhaps—that learns what to do by interacting with its environment, yet has no affective experience. Such an agent would have learning valence without hedonic valence. The interesting question is whether hedonic valence turns out to be identical to learning valence in some agents, such as ourselves. Call this position motivational hedonism, or hedonism for short:

Hedonism: Learning valence is hedonic valence.

In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that hedonism is false. Although they have many close interactions, the hedonic valence of an experience is not what determines the learning valence of that experience, and they regularly come apart. More precisely, I will first argue that conscious hedonic valence is not necessary for learning valence,

[6]See Harmon-Jones et al. (2014) for a similar distinction. Importantly, what I call "learning valence" corresponds to the reward rather than the reward prediction error. Learning valence is what determines how good a state actually is; not the computed signal comparing the actual value to a current valuation used in certain learning algorithms like temporal-difference learning.

undermining much of the motivation for hedonism. I will then go on to argue that hedonic valence is not sufficient for learning valence either, and that hedonic valence is involved in a range of other functions instead.

4.4 Conscious Hedonic Valence is Not Necessary for Learning

On a standard understanding of hedonic valence, it is an aspect of a conscious experience, namely whether it feels good or bad. However, if conscious experience is necessary for hedonic valence, then hedonic valence cannot be learning valence. The reason is that animals, ourselves included, regularly experience learning unconsciously. One of the most vivid illustrations of this comes from eating. It might seem obvious that we eat more of things that have a pleasurable taste and less of things that have a displeasurable taste. However, in recent years, a series of detailed experiments have demonstrated that this is false. In fact, our learned motivation to eat is largely independent of hedonic taste and rather driven by signals provided by receptors in our guts.

de Araujo et al. (2008) provide a vivid illustration of this in an experiment with rats. They removed the rats' taste receptors and then gave them a choice to drink from a tap with water containing calorie-rich sucrose and another with normal water. They showed that rats learn to drink more from the sucrose-tap, even though they could not tell the difference.[7] This suggests that their valuations of the taps were updated from their experience, but not because of any difference in the hedonic experience of drinking. Rather, the learning valence is provided by reactions in vagal neurons that bypass conscious reflection (Berthoud et al., 2021; Li et al., 2022). When the rats ingest food with particular nutrients, or high sugar or fat, these receptors return high-value signals, regardless of the taste that came before. Conversely, some studies show that if even a single essential amino acid is removed from the food of rats, they will start to eat it as before, but soon cease to be motivated by it (Gietzen et al., 2007). This suggests that their interaction with it lacks a positive learning valence of normal food, even though this change makes no difference to the taste or smell.

[7] They also controlled for the hypothesis that the rats could smell the difference by allowing the taste-less rats to drink from a single tap that had interchangeably sucrose-filled and normal water. The content made no difference to how much they drank, suggesting that they could not tell the difference. Instead, in the two-tap experiment, they had simply subconsciously learned that one tap was more choiceworthy than the other.

We see the same effect in humans, too. Several experiments show that food with high calories will induce more eating behavior regardless of the taste (de Araujo et al., 2020). For example, one study shows that people are willing to pay more for food with combinations of carbohydrates and fats, regardless of their expressed preference for the taste (DiFeliceantonio et al., 2018). Another study shows that when people are exposed to a new taste, they only come to develop a preference for that taste if it is paired with some caloric content (Yeomans et al., 2008). If it instead merely contains a calorie-free substitute like aspartame, this effect disappears. The upshot of these results seems to be that taste does not itself carry learning valence, in the sense that it does not itself provide outcome value. Instead, it functions as an indirect recognizable indicator of something that has nutrition that will provide outcome value if consumed.

These experiments show that we can experience unconscious learning valence. Therefore, hedonic valence cannot be identical to learning valence in humans and closely related mammals, at least if it must be conscious. Given this, it would be at least intuitively surprising if simpler animals did require hedonic experiences to receive learning valence. In fact, we have good reason to believe that very simple animals are able to engage in sophisticated learning that requires learning valence in a way that casts further doubt on the requirement of hedonic valence for motivational learning in any creature.

The well-studied bilaterian *Caenorhabditis elegans* is a roundworm with around 300 neurons. For comparison, fruit flies have approximately 100,000 neurons. As a consequence, unlike fruit flies, few theorists believe that *C. elegans* is sentient (Brown & Birch, n.d.). Nonetheless, as experiments have shown, it is able to learn from experience what to avoid and pursue and make flexible tradeoffs. In one experiment, *C. elegans* is given the offer to cross some noxious copper wire to obtain food (Hilliard et al., 2002). The researchers show that whether it exposes itself to the copper depends on how hungry it is, suggesting it is able to make tradeoffs between different kinds of stimuli. More impressively, recent studies have shown that it is able to engage in instrumental conditioning, learning to perform certain actions that have led to positive outcomes in the past (Gourgou et al., 2021). Other species capable of this include flatworms (Watterson et al., 2024) and even box jellyfish (Bielecki et al., 2023).[8]

[8] At least one recent study indicates that *C. elegans* is additionally capable of second-order conditioning (Cohen & Rabinowitch, 2024). This means that an initially neutral stimulus (e.g. a neutral odor) that gets paired with a valenced stimulus (e.g. a noxious odor) can be used as a signal to learn new behaviors. This is a kind of learning typically assumed to be reserved for more sophisticated creatures (Birch et al., 2020).

As several authors have pointed out, there are certain kinds of learning that do seem to require conscious experience in both humans and possibly other animals (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2019). The primary example of that is trace-conditioning (Birch et al., 2020; Brown & Birch, n.d.). In standard instrumental conditioning, a neutral stimulus (e.g. a sound) is activated and occurs at the same time as a reward (e.g. a treat). By contrast, in trace conditioning the stimulus stops before the reward is provided, requiring the subject to keep the stimulus in memory for it to be paired with the reward. Several studies have shown that humans can only do this if the stimulus is conscious, providing some evidence that the capacity for trace-conditioning is evidence of consciousness (Knight et al., 2006; Woodruff-Pak & Disterhoft, 2008). Importantly for our purposes, however, it is not evidence that learning valence is hedonic valence. These studies only indicate that the neutral stimulus must be consciously experienced to be remembered, not that the subsequent reward must be. In other words, this is fully consistent with the results above that learning valence can be subconscious.

This all seems like grim news for hedonists. However, it might seem that they have a plausible retort by denying that hedonic valence must be conscious. Instead, they might propose that, although hedonic valence and learning valence are the same mental kind, the phenomenal experience of feeling good or bad only occurs when we are conscious of it. On this view, even *C. elegans* might have an early version of hedonic valence filling the role of learning valence, even though it lacks the phenomenal experience of this. The same would be true for the valence provided by vagal neurons in our guts. In other words, not all instances of learning valence are consciously experienced, but all instances of conscious hedonic valence are instances of learning valence.

This retreat comes at great cost. One of the reasons that hedonism looks appealing is that it provides a functional explanation for why we feel pleasure and pain. However, if the hedonist is willing to concede that feeling good or bad is not necessary for motivational learning, then motivational learning cannot be the function that conscious hedonic states were selected for: evolution would not grant an organism a new capacity to do something it was already doing just fine. Additionally, it seems to concede that the capacity for motivational learning seen in simple creatures is not evidence of sentience, since sentience implies affective consciousness. Setting this aside, the hedonist might still respond that we

See Irvine (2020) for other ways in which *C. elegans* seems to satisfy several criteria for sentience, which she argues constitutes a reductio argument against such criteria.

should not multiply mental kinds if it can be avoided, and consequently, that the identity of outcome and hedonic valence remains the best explanation. In the next section, I argue that this is false because even consciously experienced hedonic valence is both behaviorally and neurally dissociable from learning valence.

4.5 Hedonic Valence is Irreducible to Learning Valence

A problem for hedonists is that conscious hedonic valence—just hedonic valence, henceforth—is not only unnecessary but also insufficient to perform the function of learning valence in motivational learning. In other words, you can feel good or bad without having the proportionate effects that you would if you received value signals by interacting with the environment.

We have already seen an example of this in the case of taste. As shown, sweet taste did not provide learning valence in either rats or humans unless it was accompanied by nutritious content (DiFeliceantonio et al., 2018; Gietzen et al., 2007). This is a far more general phenomenon, however. For example, if you see a bear in the forest and have the disposition of most people, you will feel dread at the prospect of becoming its lunch. Yet the event of considering that prospect typically does not itself provide negative learning valence in the sense of having negative outcome valence. If we make it out, we might well fear visiting the forest again, but this is because we fear the prospect of being mauled, not because we fear the prospect of *fearing* being mauled. In other words, a positively or negatively valenced hedonic experience is not enough to receive the corresponding learning valence.[9]

Nonetheless, it seems clear that hedonic valence is intimately related to motivation, which raises the question of what it does if not to provide learning valence. The answer depends on the particular mental state. For example, consider felt moods. Feeling excited, angry, infatuated, or melancholy has clear hedonic valence, and the influence on our motivation is undeniable. However, unlike the experience of stubbing your toe, this effect is largely distinct from the provision of learning valence (Emanuel & Eldar, 2023). Instead, moods primarily function to bias our motivation to pursue certain outcomes and influence

[9]This is consistent with saying that negative feelings can provide *some* negative learning valence. The important point is that the hedonic valence is not reducible to such learning effects: you can feel worse without learning anything more.

how we experience them (Eldar et al., 2016; Lerner et al., 2015). For example, if you're feeling sad, you might find yourself less motivated to pursue things you would otherwise be excited about and enjoy them less if you do. Similarly, the fear you feel when you see the bear causes the prospect of escape to look far more attractive than it otherwise would (LeDoux, 1998). These feelings do not primarily constitute learning experiences. For example, the grief we feel at the loss of a loved one can feel terrible, yet its effect is not to provide feedback to some set of valuations as much as contextually influencing how we value any prospect.

Even pain—the poster-child of hedonic feedback—arguably has other functions than providing learning valence. Although nociceptive signals are clearly a source of motivational learning, many philosophers view the feeling of pain as primarily having a communicative function. Early theories proposed that pain signals bodily damage (Armstrong, 1968; Pitcher, 1970). Yet, this seems implausible both because it is difficult to pinpoint the content of the signal (Corns, 2014), and because it seems empirically inconsistent with the mechanisms of nociception (Casser, 2021). Instead, most theorists in this broader tradition view the hedonic valence of pain as providing a kind of imperative (Barlassina & Hayward, 2019; Hall, 2008; Klein, 2015; Martínez, 2015). When we stub our toe, the pain seems to provide the conscious part of our mind with information that our toe needs attention. As some authors have expressed it, it seems to convey an imperative along the lines of "Treat me!" (Klein, 2015) or "Less of this!" (Barlassina & Hayward, 2019).[10]

A final striking example of this kind is provided by gut feelings. Most of us are familiar with a negatively valenced affective experience when we're thinking about doing something that doesn't feel quite right. These feelings are typically products of subconscious computations of value, expressed as conscious feelings with hedonic valence (Brownstein, 2018; Seligman et al., 2016). Even if we cannot introspect to see how our minds have valued the prospect of a profitable business deal with a shady client, we typically get this communicated by a queasy feeling in our stomachs telling us that something isn't right. This affective experience does not provide negative learning valence in any capacity—if anything, we should want more of it to guide us in life—yet it typically has a negative hedonic valence.

[10]Some authors do view the function of pain as evaluative (Bain, 2013; Carruthers, 2023; Cutter & Tye, 2011). However, with the notable exception of Carruthers, such authors seem to have in mind another kind of evaluation than that involved in learning valence.

If we move our considerations to the implementation level and consider how learning and hedonics are realized in the brain, we get independent strong evidence to believe that hedonic valence and learning valence are separate mental categories.

As Berridge and colleagues have demonstrated in a series of experiments, the areas of the brain responsible for motivation and learning are physically dissociable from those responsible for hedonic experience (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). For example, people and animals can be induced to desperately "want" something that they don't "like", meaning that they experience no substantial hedonic valence in response. An example of this is provided by people who suffer from opioid addiction but have become desensitized to the hedonic effects of the drugs. Such people experience continuously reinforced craving for the drug, but experience little hedonic valence when they take it. Other drugs, such as amphetamines, induce relatively minor hedonic effects but very strong motivational effects because they intervene on areas responsible for wanting rather than liking (Berridge & Robinson, 1998).

By directly intervening in these areas in various ways, we can induce dissociations between learning and hedonic valence. For example, Saunders et al. (2018) demonstrated in experiments on rats that by activating midbrain dopamine neurons responsible for motivational learning processes, they were able to make *any* sensory stimulus acquire learning valence. In other words, the rat became disposed to pursue more of whatever it interacted with during the stimulation, as if it were a positively evaluated stimulus. While this study did not test for hedonic reactions, it is well known from previous studies that stimulating dopamine does not tend to reliably induce hedonic sensation by itself (Berridge et al., 2009). Conversely, Castro and Berridge (2017) activate a so-called hedonic hotspot and fail to notice any increased effect on food intake, unlike other areas they intervened on. Similar results were shown by Peciña and Berridge (2005) by differentiating effects on motivation when activating different areas of the so-called nucleus accumbens, which contains various hedonic hotspots.

Perhaps the strangest result comes from Berridge (2023). By activating a part of a rat's amygdala with a laser, he demonstrated that the rat would actively pursue and touch a rod that gave it an electric shock. However, by standard independent measurements, e.g. facial expressions, the shock remained painful despite the rat's persistence in touching it. In other words, this intervention seemed to *invert* the motivational impact of hedonic valence,

such that negative hedonic valence induced positive learning valence. This should not be possible if they were the same thing.[11]

4.6 The Benefits of Dissociating Hedonic and Learning Valence

If we can feel hedonic valence without experiencing learning valence, hedonic valence is involved in functions that learning valence is not, and they are reliably dissociable by mechanistic intervention, then hedonic valence is not identical to learning valence. However, to sweeten the theoretical deal of embracing this conclusion, it is worth noting that doing so seems to resolve two major outstanding issues about valenced experience.

The first issue is that hedonism seems subject to an objection from the heterogeneity of experience (Feldman, 1988; Korsgaard, 1996; Solomon, 2003). In the examples of hedonic valence that we have provided above, we have seen a wide variety of affective experiences. For example, the negative hedonic valence of stubbing your toe seems intuitively very different from that of angered frustration, which in turn seems very different from that of mourning the loss of a loved one. This makes it intuitive, at least, to describe hedonic valence as a multidimensional phenomenon with many different incommensurable aspects. If this is so, then trying to measure the valence of mourning in multiples of the pain of my toe would be like trying to measure a degree of redness in terms of a degree of blueness.

This problem is particularly acute insofar as we expect hedonic valence to fill the role of learning valence. As we mentioned in the background section, learning valence must be unidimensional to function as a common currency for tradeoffs (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). In other words, for hedonic valence to be learning valence, we must reduce the apparent heterogeneity of hedonic valence to a common scale. In other words, stubbing your toe and mourning a loved one must have a common unidimensional element of hedonic valence after all.

[11] An important caveat with this study is that the appeal of the shock rod disappeared when the stimulation ceased. This would suggest that it did not induce stable changes in the rat's value representation of the rod. However, predictive cues of the rod remained desired. One interpretation of this is that the experience did induce changes in its value representations, but the specific representation of the rod was quickly corrected when the rod was experienced without the stimulation, while predictive cues of the rod remained uncorrected.

Defenders of the identity embrace this conclusion and point to other differences in the experiences to explain the variance in phenomenology. Carruthers (2024, pp. 52–54), for example, proposes that although there is a common element of hedonic valence, experiences like toe-stubbing and mourning can be distinguished in other ways, such as one involving a haptic response. His primary reason for embracing this conclusion is that he views it as the only way to reconcile it with the science of motivation, and the implication that valence is the common currency of choice.

We're offering a way out. By distinguishing hedonic valence and learning valence as separate mental kinds, we can both have our cake and eat it. Specifically, we can affirm that hedonic valence is multidimensional and that learning valence is unidimensional, since they are not the same thing. In fact, the idea that hedonic valence is multidimensional arguably fits *better* with the idea that it performs many different functions, as we saw above. For example, recently, some have proposed particular computational roles for different affective states, which could explain the varying phenomenology (Emanuel & Eldar, 2023). Regardless, there is no need to bite the bullet as Carruthers is willing to do.

The second issue has to do with the content of valence. As we saw before, there is some controversy about what the semantic content of pain is, with some participants arguing that it is imperatives (Klein, 2015). This question has expanded into a discussion of the content of hedonic valence more broadly, where Barlassina and Hayward (2019) in particular argues that it is an imperative such as "More of me!" or "Less of me!", depending on whether the valence is positive or negative. Meanwhile, others have argued that the content is value (Bain, 2013; Carruthers, 2018; Cutter & Tye, 2011). Arguably, the main reason that imperativists reject this is that hedonic valence seems primarily predictive of actions, rather than indicative of a property in the world, or so the argument goes (Martínez & Barlassina, n.d.). In response, Carruthers in particular has argued that this is irreconcilable with the science indicating that valence provides signals that update our representations of value (Carruthers, 2023).

As before, we now have an option to dissolve the conflict by proposing that the content is different between the kinds of valence we're discussing. On this view, the content of learning valence is value for the reasons that Carruthers provides. However, the content of hedonic valence—which is what imperativists have in mind—is an imperative. This rescues the intuitions that imperativists appeal to about the apparent relation between hedonic valence and occurrent action without contradicting motivational science; in fact, it seems highly consistent with many of the functions of feelings that we noted above. I will

not argue that this pluralistic position is strictly better than either of the monistic options represented by either party, as that would take us too far astray. However, insofar as it constitutes a more attractive option, that is even more reason to embrace the dissociation between the kinds of valence.

4.7 If Not Hedonism, Then What?

According to the hedonist, there is a unified mental kind that is valence that we occasionally have conscious access to, and which then feels pleasurable or displeasurable. I have argued that this is false. Learning valence is a distinct mental kind that updates our valuations and steers our desires across time. Hedonic valence, meanwhile, is best understood as a constitutively conscious mental kind that can come in many varieties, accompanying various kinds of mental processes with affective phenomenology.

This raises two further questions: First, if not hedonic valence, then what fills the function of learning valence? Second, if learning valence is not the function of hedonic valence, then what is?

On the first question, several authors have recognized the problem that something needs to determine the outcome value of our interactions for us to be able to learn (Haas, 2022; Molinaro & Collins, 2023b; Shenhav, 2024).[12] In Chapter 3, I provide a positive answer, arguing that learning valence is a signal analogous to learning signals provided by our perceptual systems, realized by a separate mental capacity. Although defending any given view here would take us too far astray, we can recognize that there are alternatives that do not rely on a necessary connection between hedonic sensations and learning.

On the second question, we should first notice the many different affective states that involve hedonic experiences. This should make us open to the idea that there is not a single unified answer to the question about the current function of hedonic valence, at least. For example, the function of the valence of pain and that of sorrow might be distinct. Suppose instead we ask what the historical function of hedonic valence is, meaning what reproductive benefit it might have provided for natural selection to provide us with it. It seems natural to ask for some unified explanation of why things started feeling good or

[12] Following Juechems and Summerfield (2019), this has become known as the "paradox of reward". This refers to the reward function, the functional analogue of learning valence in the context of computational reinforcement learning models (Sutton & Barto, 2018).

bad at all, even if this feeling was eventually adapted to reflect various mental states in different ways.

One of the primary conclusions of this discussion was that basic motivational learning is probably not the historical explanation for why we have hedonic experiences. This does not mean that the correct explanation is not reliant on learning in some other way, however. For example, it might be that making learning valence conscious provides additional reproductive benefits or allows for new kinds of learning. Although I suggested that trace-conditioning is unlikely to be the source of valence since it does not require the learning valence itself to be conscious, more sophisticated forms of learning might require conscious experiences. For example, it might be that vicarious simulation of various options, as observed in mammals, requires a conscious model of the world (Shepherd & Bayne, n.d.). In this explanation, we could imagine hedonic valence functioning as an information-efficient "interface" for our minds to communicate valuations to the conscious parts of our minds, and form salient memories of particularly good or bad experiences to be accurately represented in the simulation (Butlin, 2020; Dickinson & Balleine, 2010).

This suggests that although the evidence for sentience from motivational learning is more tenuous than we should believe if we accepted hedonism, various forms of learning might still provide an independent marker of sentience in animals and other agents. Crucially, none of this means that we lack evidence of sentience in simple animals in general. For example, creatures as simple as glass prawns show substantial variations in how they respond to harm when given local anesthetics in a way that is suggestive of hedonic experiences (Barr & Elwood, 2024; Barr et al., 2008). Similarly, both bumblebees and flies show a willingness to engage in behavior that seems strikingly playful, sacrificing food to roll around on balls (Galpayage Dona et al., 2022) or spinning around on a disk (Triphan et al., 2025). Such behavior is prima facie difficult to rationalize without a conscious experience of enjoyment. Finally, although this suggests that mere reinforcement learning is not good evidence of digital sentience, it might combine with other conditions to generate hedonic valence in other substrates.

CHAPTER 5

Do Expected Utility Maximizers Have Commitment Issues?

5.1 Introduction: Penelope and the Drinks

Penelope is a diligent graduate student considering whether to meet up with her friends for a drink tonight. Ideally, she would go out for a bit and then retire early for a night of work. Unfortunately, she thinks it's likely that by the time she would need to retire, she would have had a change of preference and would prefer to stay out late and party. What should she do?

Call Penelope at the moments she decides whether to go out and whether to retire Day and Night Penelope respectively. Call Day Penelope's preference ranking Responsible, and call the preference ranking she thinks Night Penelope will have Fun. We represent a simplified version of her situation in Figure 5.1. Thus represented, Penelope's predicament is an instance of a classic temptation case.[1]

If this representation captures everything that Penelope cares about, then according to orthodox expected utility theory, Day Penelope must rationally stay home. Expected utility theory—henceforth, EU-theory—is a normative theory of rational choice which tells us that rational agents act to maximize their expected utility at any given time, where utility is a numerical representation of their preferences at the time of action (Joyce, 1999; Savage, 1972). Therefore, if Day Penelope expects Night Penelope to party, then she is better off preempting her later self by staying home, thereby at least obtaining her second-

[1] The most famous example of a temptation case is Ulysses deciding whether to tie himself to the mast to prevent his later self from risking his life when he hears the sirens' song (Elster, 1979). Penelope's case is loosely adapted from Bratman (1998).



Responsible: Early Night ≻ Home Alone ≻ Late Night
Fun: Late Night ≻ Early Night ≻ Home Alone

Figure 5.1: A simple representation of Penelope's situation

most preferred outcome.[2] This is known as the "sophisticated" choice in the literature, as opposed to the "naïve" choice of going out and hoping for the best (Strotz, 1955).[3]

While many scholars accept the conclusion that staying home is rational (Levi, 1991; Steele, 2012; Weirich, 2018), others think that there is something deeply unsatisfying about it. The problem is not that this is an inaccurate description of what Penelope would do, but that it seems to be an incorrect verdict about what she *should* do. In particular, note that Penelope *always* prefers to have an early night out to being home alone. She would be better off from the perspective of both her Day and Night selves if she would make a plan to go out for an early night and then follow through on it, yet EU-theory tells her

[2] In this simplified representation, we are representing neither uncertainty nor cardinal utilities explicitly. Strictly speaking, we assume that Day Penelope's credence that Night Penelope is Responsible, p, is low enough that if she were offered a choice between (a) Home Alone and (b) a lottery of Early Night with probability p and Late Night with probability $1 - p$, she would maximize her expected utility by choosing (a). We discuss this more below.

[3] We might ask whether a diachronic agent with fluctuating preferences can be represented as an expected utility maximizer at all, given that their preferences will violate axioms of EU-theory when compared over time. The response is that since EU-theory tells an agent what to do at any given time, there is no sense in which a diachronic agent can be an EU-maximizer except by consisting of time-slices that all follow EU-theory. Preference changes between these time-slices raise a problem of dynamic inconsistency, as we see in the case of Penelope. However, being dynamically inconsistent is compatible with EU-theory.

to stay home. Insofar as we think that rational choice is about effectively achieving our ends, this recommendation seems irrational (Bratman, 1995; Holton, 2009; McClennen, 1990). More generally, EU-theory seems unable to rationalize a diachronic agent making a plan and following through on it when they experience predictable oscillations in their preferences, even if doing so would lead to a better outcome by their own lights. Since we humans regularly experience such preference oscillations, this suggests that EU-theory regularly tells us to act in self-defeating ways. This casts doubt on it as a normative theory of rational choice for agents like us. Call this the *Commitment Problem*.

In response to the Commitment Problem, philosophers have proposed substantial revisions and alternatives to orthodox EU-theory intended to present a theory that permits rational commitments. The most well-known examples are theories of resolute choice, according to which an agent's prior commitments can override current preferences (Gauthier, 1996; Machina, 1989; McClennen, 1990).[4] However, as the defenders of orthodoxy have argued, this comes at the substantial cost of rejecting standard axioms of EU-theory and gives rise to other similarly counterintuitive cases (Seidenfeld, 1988; Steele, 2010; Thoma, 2020). What almost everyone seems to agree on in this long-standing debate is that rationally following through on commitments in the face of preference reversals like Penelope's requires some change to EU-theory.

In this paper, I argue that this is false. I show that, except in very specific cases, EU-theory *does* tell diachronic agents to follow through on commitments, because by doing so, they provide their future selves with evidence that they can trust themselves. That makes those future selves rationally free to pursue outcomes that better satisfy the agent's future-regarding preferences even today. More precisely, using a Bayesian reputation game, I prove that as long as an agent like Penelope has even a short series of future decisions with outcomes that they somewhat care about, they will maximize expected utility by following through on a commitment. Most strikingly, this is true even when they have only a short future ahead of themselves, they discount that future substantially, *and* they are almost certain that their later self will have a change of preference. Future-regarding preferences are misleadingly ignored in simple representations like that above, which has led to a false consensus about what EU-theory implies in every-day temptation cases.

[4]Revisionary responses to the Commitment Problem beyond resolute choice include wise choice from Rabinowicz (1995) and defended by Peterson and Vallentyne (2018), and establishing intratemporal coherence through team-framing from Gold (2022).

By contrast, in those cases where EU-theory *does* tell the agent to tie themselves to the proverbial mast, that is also the intuitive verdict. In other words, there is no Commitment Problem for EU-theory; we can both have our cake and eat it.[5]

Here is an overview of the paper. In section 2, I show how we can have an incentive to build a good reputation with ourselves. In section 3, I show that this incentive dominates other considerations under plausible assumptions using a Bayesian reputation game. In section 4, I argue that this dissolves the Commitment Problem and reveals EU-theory as an especially attractive theory of rational choice for temporally extended agents. Finally, in section 5, I show that my account avoids the issues of previous accounts that appeal to intrapersonal strategic dynamics and iterated prisoner's dilemmas, with a focus on the well-known account of George Ainslie. I also include an Appendix with the formal proof of the main result.

5.2 Cultivating a Reputation With Yourself

Does the simple representation in the introduction adequately capture Penelope's decision-situation? There is reason to think it does not. To start, the presentation is ambiguous about Day Penelope's credence about Night Penelope's preferences. Most presentations of temptation cases imply that we are certain about what we will prefer in the future (Steele, 2012). Given that we often surprise ourselves by wanting something we did not expect, this seems implausible. To capture this, we will assume that Penelope has some minimal uncertainty about whether she will prefer to retire early or stay out late. However, as long as we also assume that she is very confident that she will prefer to stay out, this preserves the apparent conclusion that she should stay home.

More substantially, we need to ensure that the presentation of Penelope's preferences captures everything that she cares about that can be impacted by her choice. If Penelope is anything like most people, she cares about many other things than what her evening will be like tonight. For example, she plausibly cares about what her evening will be like tomorrow as well, though perhaps less than her evening tonight. The main exceptions are cases where she has lost all interest in the future, or where she tragically expects tonight to be her last night. For instance, both Day and Night Penelope plausibly prefer to go

[5]There is a related debate about how we rationally choose when we expect our preferences to change over the long-term (Gauthier, 1997; Paul, 2014; Pettigrew, 2019). In this paper, I set such questions aside.

out with her friends in the future as well to always staying home. Call such preferences about future outcomes *future-regarding*, and call preferences about what happens today *present-regarding*. However, insofar as Penelope's future selves will have full control over their decisions, like her Day and Night selves do today, it seems that we can ignore such future-regarding preferences in her current decision. On the face of it, none of her available actions today would robustly affect what she will do tomorrow in any obvious direction.

This is false. There is at least one effect of Penelope's current choice which robustly affects whether her future-regarding preferences will be satisfied, and which therefore bears on what she should do to maximize her expected utility today. This is the evidence that her choice generates about what she is likely to do in similar situations in the future. For example, if she went out and then abandoned the plan to retire early, that is evidence that she would do that again if given the opportunity. By contrast, if she had followed through and retired instead, that would be evidence that she could trust herself to retire again if faced with a similar choice in the future.

Why would the evidence from her choice today matter for the future? The answer is that it affects what her future self—her self tomorrow, for example—must do to maximize *her* expected utility. If she has evidence that she is likely to follow through on her prior commitments, then that increases the expected utility of trusting her later self to act on her behalf. Since her current future-regarding preferences are better satisfied if she trusts herself in the future, she faces a rational pressure to provide her future self with evidence that she can be trusted through her choices.[6]

Of course, there are many ways in which contingent causal factors could influence whether her future-regarding preferences are satisfied. For example, perhaps Penelope can only afford to go out once this week, so going out tonight means she will not go out tomorrow. However, such causal factors could easily fail to obtain. Insofar as we take a situation like Penelope's to be representative of a wider class of situations that we care about, we can omit from our representation any causal factors that we would not

[6]It is worth emphasizing that the argument made here is consistent with both an evidential and—more demandingly—a causal interpretation of EU-theory (Ahmed, 2014; Joyce, 1999). The mechanism by which our current choices influence future outcomes is the evidence they provide and their effect on the behavior of our expected utility-maximizing future selves. This makes a causal difference to the probability that our future-regarding preferences are satisfied. Ahmed (2018) provides a similar argument that relies on an evidential interpretation.

expect to be present in cases in that wider class. By contrast, in any plausible version of Penelope's case and other cases like it, she will receive the evidence from her own action. Any representation that ignores essential causal factors like this would be an inaccurate representation of the underlying class of situations.[7]

The rational dynamic that emerges from Penelope's situation can be represented as a so-called Bayesian reputation game played between instances of herself at different times. In a reputation game, at least one agent has some uncertainty about the other's preferences but is able to observe their actions and conditionalize on this to inform their decisions. We can illustrate how they work with an informal example. Suppose that Anisha is a business owner and Bryce an accountant she could hire for a project. Bryce could either do a proper job or a sloppy job. Anisha prefers a proper job to no job, but most of all wants to avoid a sloppy job. Suppose further that accountants like Bryce are either Diligent or Lazy. While Diligent accountants' preferences are aligned with Anisha's, Lazy accountants prefer a sloppy job to a proper job, but also prefer both to no job. Finally, suppose that Anisha strongly suspects that Bryce is Lazy. See Figure 5.2 for their potential preferences.

Diligent: Proper Job $\succ$ No Job $\succ$ Sloppy Job
Lazy: Sloppy Job $\succ$ Proper Job $\succ$ No Job

Figure 5.2: Diligent and Lazy preferences

If Anisha will not have an opportunity to hire Bryce again (nor tell others about her experience, etc.), then she should clearly not hire him today, as she'll likely end up with a sloppy job. However, suppose instead that this is only one of many projects she has planned, and that she could hire Bryce for all of them. In this case, Bryce has an incentive to do a proper job in order to build a good reputation with Anisha which would improve his chances of being hired again in the future. In other words, when he has a reputation to preserve for the future, he has an incentive to act as if he were Diligent even if he is in fact Lazy. Knowing this, Anisha has an incentive to hire him even if she thinks he's probably

[7] The exceptions are strange cases where she forgets what she did and cannot infer it, for example. I will assume that such cases are mostly uninteresting for this discussion, and set them aside.

Lazy. The upshot is that when there is a future at stake, both Anisha and Bryce do better than they did when neither had a reputation to preserve.[8]

In Penelope's case, she faces the challenge of building a good reputation not with other agents, but with herself. Often, she can decide whether or not to "hire" her later self to execute a plan, and which choice is rational depends on her reputation with herself. For example, if she trusted herself to go out in the past and then abused that trust by partying, that is evidence that she would do the same today if given the opportunity. Selves like Night Penelope who want to ensure that her future selves won't stay home at every opportunity in the future therefore have an incentive to maintain or improve their reputation by following through on an earlier plan, even when they prefer a late night. By doing so, they improve the chances that their future-regarding preferences will be satisfied. Finally, since Day Penelope knows that Night Penelope has this incentive, it can be rational for her to go out and trust herself to retire, *even if* she thinks her later self prefers a late night. The upshot is that as long as an agent has a future they care about and some uncertainty about their own future preferences, they can rationally trust themselves to follow through on their commitments even when they are confident that they will have opposing preferences.

Is this enough to solve the Commitment Problem? No. This only shows that there is *some* rational pressure for expected utility maximizers to follow through on commitments in this way. It doesn't say anything about how significant this pressure is. If it were typically dominated by the pressure to satisfy present-regarding preferences, then the Commitment Problem would remain. To solve it, we need to demonstrate that this rational pressure is strong enough to make the execution of prior commitments expected utility maximizing in those scenarios where we think a theory of rational choice should demand it.

[8]Note that reputation games like the one played between Anisha and Bryce are incomplete information games, which makes them importantly different from complete information games like the well-known iterated prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1984). For example, while iterated complete information games require an infinite or unknown time-horizon to permit cooperative behavior, reputation games permit mutually beneficial outcomes in finite time (Milgrom & Roberts, 1982).

5.3 Calculating the Value of Self-Trust

To see what EU-theory tells Penelope to do all things considered, we need to impose some further structure on her situation. As a consequence, this section will be more technical than the others. However, the most formal details are relegated to the Appendix and occasional footnotes.

I assume that the expected utility of an agent's action is given by a cardinal utility function representing their preferences over outcomes multiplied by their credences over states in which those outcomes would obtain if they were to perform that action. Let $EU(\cdot)$ represent Day Penelope's expected utility function over actions, $U(\cdot)$ her cardinal utility function over outcomes, and $P(\cdot)$ her credence over states.[9] As it happens, we will not need to represent these attitudes for Night Penelope in the main discussion.

Let g be Day Penelope's utility from an early night, 0 that from being home alone, and $-b$ that from a late night, where $-b < 0 < g$. Intuitively, g is the subjective goodness of her most preferred outcome, and b the subjective badness of her least preferred outcome. Furthermore, let p represent Day Penelope's initial credence that Night Penelope is Responsible and $1 - p$ her initial credence that Night Penelope is Fun, where p is a probability strictly between 0 and 1.[10] See Table 5.1 for easy reference.

$U(Early\ Night)$	$g > 0$
$U(Home\ Alone)$	0
$U(Late\ Night)$	$-b < 0$
$P(Responsible)$	$0 < p < 1$

Table 5.1: Day Penelope's Utilities and Credence

[9] Per representation theorems like those of Joyce (1999) and Savage (1972), $U(\cdot)$ is unique up to positive linear transformation. This is analogous to how temperature measurements in Celsius have a unique corresponding value in Fahrenheit which can be given by a positive linear transformation and which represents the temperature equally well. I assume that the expected utility of an act A is given by $EU(A) = \sum_i P(A > S_i)U(A\&S_i)$, where S is a state, $P(A > S)$ the agent's credence that S would obtain if they were to choose A, and A and S jointly determine an outcome. I use $P(A > S)$ rather than $P(S|A)$ to ensure that a mere evidential connection between A and S is insufficient to influence $EU(A)$.

[10] By excluding 0 and 1 we capture the idea that Day Penelope has at least some uncertainty about what Night Penelope will prefer.



Figure 5.3: Penelope's situation without a future

Consider first the simple scenario where there is no future that Penelope cares about. Let *GO* mean 'Go Out' and *SH* mean 'Stay Home'. We can represent her situation as a simplified game in extensive form, as demonstrated in Figure 5.3.

This game starts with Night Penelope having been assigned either Responsible or Fun preferences, represented by the first-level left and right node respectively.[11] The dotted line means that Day Penelope is uncertain about which node she is at, but she has credence p that she is at the left one and $1 - p$ that she is at the right one, i.e. that she is in a scenario where Night Penelope is Responsible or Fun respectively. Like Bryce in the case where there is only one contract on offer, in this case Night Penelope has no incentive to build or preserve a good reputation and will choose whatever outcome she prefers. Consequently, Day Penelope can infer that if Night Penelope is Responsible then she will choose *Retire*, and if she is Fun she will choose *Party*, which would give Day Penelope g and $-b$ respectively. To make clear that Night Penelope will never choose otherwise, the other paths are represented in gray.

[11] In game theory, it is assumed that "Nature" starts the game by choosing whether Night Penelope is Responsible or Fun with chance p and $1 - p$ respectively. Since it makes no difference to the argument here, we assume that Day Penelope's credences correspond to the chances and represent them directly.

Given this, we can infer that choosing GO maximizes Day Penelope's expected utility iff:[12]

$$p > \frac{b}{g+b} \equiv p_T$$

We denote this expression with a symbol of its own: p_T (T stands for 'trust'). p_T represents the minimal initial credence that Day Penelope needs to have that Night Penelope is Responsible for GO to be an expected utility maximizing choice when there is no future at stake. As we can see, p_T depends on the size of g and b. This means that the bigger the potential upside g, the lower p is required to rationally choose GO. Conversely, the bigger the potential downside b, the higher p is required.[13] This relation captures the intuitive idea that what action maximizes Day Penelope's expected utility is sensitive to the stakes involved.

We can illustrate how these elements come together with an example. Suppose that Day Penelope's credence that Night Penelope will be Responsible is $p = .1$. In other words, she is very confident that Night Penelope will be Fun. Suppose further that $g, b = 1$, meaning that an early night is as good as a late night is bad. In this case, $p_T = .5$. Since $p < p_T$, Day Penelope will maximize her expected utility by staying home.

Let us now see what happens when we introduce a future that she cares about into the representation. We will imagine that Penelope will face some similar situation where she can choose to trust her later self to choose on her behalf or play it safe n times in the future, where n is a non-negative integer. For simplicity, we will assume that she faces the choice to go out or stay home followed by the choice to retire or party tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, and so on for n days. This means that the situation above where she has no future is a special case where $n = 0$. Illustrating scenarios where $n > 0$ quickly gets complicated. However, see Figure 5.4 for a simplified illustration of the $n = 1$ case showing Day Penelope's payoffs in the scenario where Night Penelope is Fun, and Day Penelope chooses GO and Night Penelope chooses $Retire$ in the first round.

We need to make three more assumptions. First, we will assume that Penelope's preferential dispositions are fixed during the future she is envisioning. By this, I mean that in

[12] She will receive g with p and $-b$ with $1 - p$. This means that $EU(GO) = g \cdot p - b \cdot (1 - p)$. Meanwhile, since choosing SH gives 0 with certainty, $EU(SH) = 0$. Therefore, $EU(GO) > EU(SH)$ iff $g \cdot p - b \cdot (1 - p) > 0$. We then solve for p.

[13] Specifically, $\lim_{g \to \infty} p_T = 0$ and $\lim_{b \to \infty} p_T = 1$.



Figure 5.4: Penelope's situation when $n = 1$

any round during this sequence she will have the same preference as before when faced with the qualitatively identical decision. This means for example that selves like Night Penelope will share the same preferences, whether Responsible or Fun, in all rounds. Intuitively, we can think of n as the future during which she thinks that her preferential dispositions will remain the same. If she comes to distrust herself, then once the period is over, she might "start over" a sequence with new hope that her preferential dispositions have changed and that she can now trust herself until proven otherwise.

Second, we will assume that both Day and Night Penelope might discount the future, meaning that they value outcomes less the further away in the future that they are. However, we will restrict our analysis to cases where Night Penelope does not discount the future so heavily that she prefers a late night tonight to getting both an early night tonight and a late night tomorrow. Otherwise, she would always do better by choosing $Party$ and would never have an incentive to build a reputation in the first place.[14]

[14]Specifically, assuming that Night Penelope is Fun, let l and e be her utility for late and early nights respectively, where $l > e > 0$. Let $\delta_N \in [0, 1]$ be her discount rate. This means that her utility of a late night tomorrow will be $\delta_N l$. We assume that $\delta_N > \frac{l-e}{l}$.

Third, we will assume that Day Penelope only receives evidence about Night Penelope's preferences by observing her actions. In other words, we assume that Day Penelope does not gain additional evidence through introspection, for example. This is following standard practice in microeconomics in which we view agents like Penelope as revealing their preferences through their behavior, and it is necessary to construe Night Penelope's reputation as a function of her action in a Bayesian reputation game. However, it also raises philosophical questions that I return to in section 5.

Now we're in a position to see how Penelope's expected utility maximizing choices change when we consider the bearing they have on the future, and how this changes with the size of the future. Specifically, we can prove the following strong result:

> **Rational Commitment:** If $p > {p_T}^n$, then Penelope maximizes her expected utility at all times in the decision sequence by choosing GO followed by $Retire$.[15]

What this means is that as the size of the future n increases, the initial credence p that Day Penelope needs to rationally choose GO decreases.[16] Since Night Penelope's best choice depends on what she expects tomorrow's Day Penelope to do, p also affects when it is rational for her to choose $Retire$ over $Party$. It turns out that when the future is long enough to make ${p_T}^n$ less than p, it will always be rational for Penelope to trust her later self and for her to subsequently live up to that trust. This means that when the future she's considering is long enough, she will maximize her expected utility by forming and executing her plan even if she is almost certain that her later self will have opposing preferences.

The proof of this result is long and found in the Appendix. However, here is an intuitive explanation of why the future makes a difference to Day Penelope. Like before, Night

[15] The proof additionally establishes that in the hard case where Night Penelope is Fun, Penelope rationally chooses GO followed by $Retire$ *only if* $p > {p_T}^n$. However, if Night Penelope is Responsible, then she will choose $Retire$ at any p. To account for this, I express the result as a sufficiency claim, rather than a biconditional conditional on Night Penelope being Fun. Note that Day Penelope maximizes her expected utility by choosing GO when her credence p is above the lower value ${p_T}^{(n+1)}$. However, since Fun Night Penelope requires that $p > {p_T}^n$ to choose $Retire$, the entire sequence is always expected utility maximizing only at $p > {p_T}^n$. We can see this in the special case of a single round game when future rounds $n = 0$. Day Penelope chooses GO when $p > {p_T}^{(0+1)} = p_T$. Meanwhile, Night Penelope chooses $Retire$ when $p > {p_T}^0 = 1$, which never happens, since $p < 1$. This corresponds to the fact that a Fun Night Penelope will always choose $Party$ in a single round game.

[16] Since $p_T \in (0, 1)$, $\lim_{n\to\infty} {p_T}^n = 0$.



Figure 5.5: Graph showing the minimal p required for trust as n increases when $g, b = 1$.

Penelope will choose *Retire* with certainty if she's Responsible. However, unlike before she will now also choose *Retire* with some positive probability even if she is Fun. The reason is the same as we saw in the previous section, namely that by doing so she can maintain or improve her reputation with future Day Penelopes, which is valuable for her in expectation. As n increases, so does the expected value of her reputation, and with it the probability that she chooses *Retire* even when she is Fun. Since these probabilities make up the total probability that Night Penelope chooses *Retire* tonight, the probability that she does increases with n. Since that is what Day Penelope is hoping for, this increases the expected value of choosing *GO*. We can then show that this effect is significant enough to make *GO* optimal whenever $p > {p_T}^n$.

How large does n need to be to make following through on a plan rational? As it turns out, not very large at all. For example, suppose like before that $g, b = 1$ and $p = .1$. As shown in Figure 5.5, this then happens already when $n = 4$, meaning when Penelope expects to face four similar situations in the future.[17] Since $p > {p_T}^n$, Day Penelope now maximizes her expected utility by going out even though she is very confident that Night Penelope will be Fun. And Night Penelope now maximizes her expected utility by retiring early, even though she is in fact Fun. The weight of the future is substantial enough that the prospect of building a good reputation with ourselves over even a short future weighs heavier than the satisfaction of our preferences for present goods.

[17] ${p_T}^4 \approx .06 < .1 = p$.

5.4 Solving the Commitment Problem

What do the results from the previous section mean for EU-theory and the Commitment Problem? The primary upshot is that diachronic agents who aspire to maximize their expected utility will typically do best by forming and following through on plans. Specifically, when there is even a relatively short future during which they would benefit from being able to trust themselves, the expected utility maximizing decision will be to allow their later selves to act. That self will in turn maximize their expected utility by forsaking present-regarding preferences to preserve or improve their standing with their future self. In other words, for agents like us—agents who care about what happens to themselves in the future and who are uncertain about what their future motivations will look like—EU-theory tells us to do exactly what the critics wanted. Therefore, in these normal cases, there is no Commitment Problem for EU-theory.

A critic might object that even if this is true, there will still be cases where expected utility maximizers will not be making or following through on commitments. That is correct. For example, in the case of Ulysses, he expects that his later self will prefer to risk his own life to reach the sirens and therefore won't have an incentive to remain in good standing with himself thereafter. In this and other cases where an agent expects their future self to be either myopic or just irrational—interpretations of the example vary in what they take to be the case for Ulysses—EU-theory typically tells them to choose the safe option. The same would be true for Penelope if she would expect her later self to either abandon EU-theory altogether or to become so myopic that she discounted the future almost entirely. That seems to suggest that we have at best a partial solution to the Commitment Problem.[18]

The problem with this response is that, intuitively, Ulysses *should* tie himself to the mast. When we have reason to think our later selves will constitute a serious risk to our

[18]There is an interesting question whether myopic agents are better modeled as having partial preferences that are unordered over their less preferred outcomes. For example, perhaps we should understand a myopic version of Night Penelope that will party at any price to have no ordered preference between retiring and staying home. Note that incompleteness would violate the completeness axiom of orthodox EU-theory. However, even if we amended EU-theory to accommodate this idea, there is reason to believe that it would not change the substance of the argument. Note that lack of preference between Night Penelope's less preferred options should only make a difference to her incentives insofar as her future-regarding, as opposed to only her present-regarding, preferences are incomplete: she is already out, after all. In such cases, it seems plausible that Day Penelope should treat herself as Ulysses does and stay home. However, if so, this should not make a difference compared to if she were myopic or irrational with complete preferences.

interests or even life, and we expect that they won't care either due to irrationality or extreme myopia, then choosing not to trust that self seems entirely rational. This makes it a problem for alternative theories like that of McClennen (1990), as they seem to imply that Ulysses shouldn't tie himself to the mast, despite the fact that this seems to put his life in danger for little gain.[19] In other words, although EU-theory does not support initiating a plan in these cases, that seems like the verdict we want.

This is reflected in another upshot from the previous section, which is that EU-theory is stakes-sensitive. In other words, what EU-theory tells an agent to do depends on what they stand to win and lose. In our account, the stakes are represented by the sizes of g and b which in turn determine ${p_T}^n$, and that is the credence at which it will be expected utility maximizing to go out for different sizes of the future. This means that it can be rational to play it safe even if we expect there to be a future. For example, suppose that Penelope were recently sober and expects that she would compulsively accept a drink if offered, and that this would cause her to fall back into addiction. In this case, the potential downside of trusting herself might be large enough that she maximizes expected utility by staying home, which again seems to correspond to common sense.

We might ask whether actual humans are in fact better described as largely lacking stakes-sensitivity in situations like Night Penelope's. If so, then we should typically treat our later selves as Ulysses does by pre-empting our future selves, which would limit the significance of the reputation-building argument we have made here. However, this seems implausible. While there are exceptions, e.g. compulsions caused by addiction, by and large we should expect people in Night Penelope's situation to be sensitive to the consequences of their actions, while anticipating that they might have a temporary change of priorities. For example, if we have something important in the morning, this would typically bear on whether we allow ourselves to act on temptation.[20]

What about cases where we do let our later selves act, but it turns out that their present-regarding preferences are strong enough to outweigh their concern for the future? As the critic will point out, in such cases we maximize expected utility by defecting from our prior plans, which seems to regenerate a version of the Commitment Problem.

[19] See Steele (2012) for this argument.

[20] This is additionally supported by prominent work in current cognitive neuroscience of motivation. For example, Kool et al. (2017) presents evidence that whether we engage our so-called cognitive control to e.g. resist temptation is a function of our mind's estimate of the expected utility of doing so.

Here again, EU-theory gets it right. Suppose that Penelope were to go out but then find herself with such a strong desire to stay out with her friends that she is willing to take the reputational hit with herself. In that case, she plausibly *should* stay out and party. If we discover opportunities that we had previously neglected, we want to have the option to rationally abandon our previous plans. The alternative would be a deference to our past selves bordering on servitude. However, what we have seen is that this does not come for free, as it makes us less predictable to ourselves and consequently undermines our ability to rationally make plans in the future. If the benefits of abandoning a prior commitment are great enough to compensate for this cost, our best theory of rational choice should plausibly permit us to do so. By contrast, alternatives to EU-theory that make following through on plans obligatory cannot say this.

Would opponents of EU-theory contest our judgments about what is intuitive in these cases? For example, would they argue that Ulysses should intuitively risk remaining untied even when he expects to be irrational or myopic? It is not clear that they would. For example, McClennen (1990, p. 202) argues that resolute choice does not need to account for cases of Siren-song or addiction, because such agents are irrational. This suggests that insofar as they *do* need to explain such cases, that is a cost to be compensated for elsewhere. Instead, the main appeal of resolute choice is that it offers to resolve the Commitment Problem in normal situations like Penelope's. On the traditional view, defenders of EU-theory are forced to say that we should regularly constrain our future selves in such pedestrian cases. Yet as we've seen, this leads to doing consistently worse than we would if we could rationally form and follow through on plans. These normal cases are the situations that resolute choosers seem to get right and that constitute a threat to EU-theory. What we have shown is that EU-theory can account for them too, but without paying the cost.

What we are left with is a theory of rational choice according to which it is typically rational to form and follow through on commitments, but which also allows for exceptions when the benefits and risks motivate it. That seems exactly like what we should want from a theory of rational choice for temporally extended agents. Not only that, but we get this without rejecting any traditional axioms of decision theory. The result looks like a particularly plausible theory of the kind that the critics demanded, meaning one that rationally permits agents to reliably initiate and execute plans. As it turns out, this theory is the standard expected utility theory we had all along.

5.5 Objections and Responses

The reputational account that I have defended here is part of a long tradition of accounts appealing to the rational dynamic occurring between an agent's selves over time.[21] The most well-known example in philosophy of such an account is the proposal of the psychiatrist George Ainslie (Ainslie, 1992, 2001).

According to Ainslie, we should set good "precedents" for our future selves by choosing today as we would like our future selves to choose. For example, this might mean skipping a cigarette, even when we prefer to make an exception "just this once". He argues that by doing so, we establish a cooperative dynamic with our future selves that they have an incentive to keep up. He motivates this claim by arguing that the rational dynamic between our selves at different times is analogous to that between different people in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Like the players in the iterated prisoner's dilemma who can do better by cooperating, all our selves do better by continuing a good precedent, or so he argues.

There is substantial criticism to be raised against accounts like Ainslie's. Since our solution to the Commitment Problem shares a similar appeal to a dynamic between selves at different times, it will be instructive to compare how they handle objections.

An initial problem that Bratman (1995) raises is that unlike players in an iterated game, temporary selves never act twice. Therefore, there is no sense in which one self can "punish" or "reward" another. If that is so, however, then why would an agent like Night Penelope tonight ever have an incentive to choose $Retire$?

Ainslie has responded to this objection at length (Ainslie, 2001, 2020), though it remains unclear whether his response is successful.[22] By contrast, this is not a problem in a Bayesian reputation game where an agent influences others by the evidence they provide with their action. The reason is that her action can equally well be evidence for the behavior of other future agents. And if the current agent has a stake in what outcomes they obtain, then it doesn't matter that she herself will not act again.

[21] Prominent examples include Bénabou and Tirole (2004), O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and Prelec and Bodner (2003).

[22] Formally speaking, there is to my knowledge no well-known theorem showing that cooperative strategies are Nash equilibria in the kind of game that Ainslie is imagining, which is a sequential game with complete information where every player acts only once. Ainslie's arguments are informal and appeal to intuition, which leaves it open whether there is a formal defense to be provided.

To illustrate, consider Anisha and Bryce again. However, suppose this time that they only interact once. Suppose further that Bryce belongs to a consortium of accountants who all follow very similar business practices and share in each other's profits. Meanwhile, Anisha has a large network of entrepreneurial friends who might hire an accountant in the future. Anisha's network shares experiences with each other, and they believe that whether Bryce is Diligent or Lazy is a good indicator of whether other accountants from his consortium will be Diligent or Lazy. In this case, since Bryce's choice affects the probability that other accountants are hired in the future, and since he has a stake in their outcomes, he has an incentive to signal that he is Diligent, even though he never acts again. Analogously, since Night Penelope tonight has a stake in whether Night Penelope tomorrow will get at least an early night out, she has an incentive to signal that she is Responsible, even though she never acts again.

There is another concern we can raise. Both in Ainslie's account and in ours, we imagine an agent like Penelope facing the same situation again and again. However, in reality, it's unlikely that she will face a situation again that doesn't have relevant differences. If so, we might worry that the evidence from her action will not be informative about what she would do in any other situation she might encounter, in which case she would not have an incentive to provide it in the first place. In other words, she has no reason to build a reputation for situations she will never face again.

Ainslie's appeal to iterated games does seem subject to this criticism as it crucially trades on an identical interaction being repeated indefinitely. By contrast, in the case of our account, this concern is misplaced. Like most pieces of evidence, the evidence from Penelope's action bears on many different propositions. For example, even if she will not face an identical situation again, her decision to party plausibly reveals a disposition to prefer fun activities over long-term responsibility when she finds herself with friends. In that case, the reputation she's building with herself applies to a far wider range of cases than the choice to go for a drink with her friends, which in turn makes it valuable as long as she expects to face some relevantly similar situation. The power of that evidence plausibly depends on how representative her current situation is of other situations like that. For example, if her preferences change in response to unusual circumstances—perhaps once she has gone out she receives a rejection of her paper and decides to distract herself with good company—her defection from the plan should be less harmful to her reputation with herself than if she did so for no specific reason. Conversely, the evidence of her action might reveal a more general disposition towards responsibility in very different kinds of

situations. This would make it yet more valuable to prioritize the reputational effects of one's actions, insofar as it bears on the future opportunities we can rationally allow ourselves to pursue. A more sophisticated model that incorporates a measure of similarity between situations might allow us to shed light on questions of how the generality of actions bears on our incentives as expected utility maximizers.[23]

There is a related concern for the reputation model that we should consider. In our set-up, we assumed that Day Penelope only learns about Night Penelope's preference through her actions. However, it is a standard assumption in game theory that agents in some sense are certain about their own preferences. Given this, we might think that Penelope would learn what she prefers as Night Penelope by introspection and remember this tomorrow when she is Day Penelope again. But that would screen off the evidence from her action and undermine the value of retiring. Therefore, it might seem that the model must rely on the idea that Day Penelope forgets what she wanted.

Although some have accepted the idea that intrapersonal reputation games rely on forgetfulness,[24] I believe this is a mistake. Instead of affirming that Day Penelope forgets something crucial that Night Penelope knew, we should deny that Night Penelope knew it in the first place. If we take the formal modelling assumption that agents are certain about their own preferences as a psychological claim, it would seem to imply that agents have perfect introspective abilities about their own conative mental states. But that seems clearly false. We regularly deceive ourselves about what we really want, and as F. Ramsey (2010 [1926]) argued, this is often revealed only in action: introspection is mere "cheap thought". Instead, the more plausible interpretation of the assumption is an instrumental one with no psychological implications.[25]

We might respond that Night Penelope still plausibly learns something through introspection, even if it doesn't make her certain about her own desires. This is far more plausible, but it is also not a substantial problem. To see this, remember that Day Penelope does not need to have high credence that Night Penelope is Responsible to choose GO.

[23] It might additionally be used to inform the descriptive question of why some people are better at following through on commitments as a function of how representative they see an action as being for their ability to follow through in other situations.

[24] Benabou and Tirole (2004) add an assumption of "imperfect recall" in their intrapersonal model to accommodate it.

[25] In particular, it distinguishes standard models from more complex ones where an agent has credences over possible utility functions that might be theirs, such as Kreps (1979).

For example, before we assumed only that $p = .1$. Crucially, even when Day Penelope observes that she chose $Retire$ once, she will normally remain unconvinced that Night Penelope is Responsible. What is important to the model is that observing this *increases* her credence rather than decreasing it. It also seems intuitively plausible that it would. For example, suppose that Night Penelope decides to call it a night early. As she does, she might be confident that she would have wanted to stay and is only leaving for strategic reasons. However, seeing herself retire should presumably make her at least slightly less confident that she really wanted a late night in the first place. If this is what Day Penelope remembers, then it seems the argument correctly captures how her credence changes by observing her past self.

Returning to Ainslie, a final problem with his proposal is that strictly speaking it cannot plausibly constitute a response to the Commitment Problem in the first place. Nothing about the formal structure of an iterated prisoner's dilemma implies that cooperative strategies will maximize an agent's expected utility. It is true that cooperative strategies are Nash equilibria, meaning that there is no other strategy that a player could unilaterally switch to and do better. But so is almost *any* strategy. Therefore, we cannot infer from the model that setting a cooperative precedent will maximize expected utility any more than we can infer that setting a precedent where we defect forever in response to any defection. By contrast, in the reputation game we have used to model Penelope there is a uniquely optimal action, and we have shown the conditions under which this is to make and follow through on commitments.[26]

Although Ainslie's account is the most well-known example, there have recently been a number of other contributions in the same tradition of reconciling EU-theory with the diachronic coherence that seems characteristic of rational humans. Notable examples include Ahmed (2018), who defends a similar account to the one defended here in that it investigates how the evidence that we provide with an action can affect the rationality

[26] Ainslie might respond that empirical results like those of Axelrod, 1984 demonstrate that cooperative strategies work better. But there are two problems with this response. First, that might be contingently true in some circumstances, but that is true for many other contingent psychological claims as well. For example, perhaps there is empirical evidence that choosing Retire builds a responsible character and makes Night Penelope more likely to be Responsible in the future. As argued in section 2, we should not rely on such contingent facts to solve a class of problems unless we have reason to believe they reliably obtain. Second, there is no good reason to think it is true in the case we care about. These results only demonstrate that cooperative strategies—specifically "tit-for-tat"—work well between two players over time, not as a single-move strategy for a succession of players.

of that action. However, his argument crucially relies on a commitment to an evidential interpretation of decision theory. Meanwhile, the reputational account I have defended here is consistent with a causal interpretation, since an agent's reputation makes a causal difference to the opportunities they will receive in the future. Another example is Thoma (2018) who proposes separating the preferences that explain a choice from the conative attitudes that we use to evaluate it. She argues that these can come apart in temptation cases, and that this explains why resisting temptations can be rational. Although well-motivated, this separation involves a substantial divergence from orthodox EU-theory, insofar as the expected satisfaction of preferences is sidelined as the standard of rationality in favor of some distinct conative attitude. By contrast, the reputational account involves no such revision.

Finally, other works have similarly proposed new ways to rationalize intuitive aspects of diachronic agency beyond temptation cases within the constraints of EU-theory. Easwaran and Stern (2018) propose a range of other mechanisms through which agents can rationally achieve diachronic consistency as expected utility maximizers. Their proposal does not focus on temptation cases specifically, and should be seen as complementary to ours. Another example is Doody (2019), who proposes a version of a reputation effect to rationalize sunk costs as reasons for action, arguing that following through on costly projects contributes to a coherent self-image that has positive instrumental effects. This is an example of how the evidence of our actions can be used to elucidate a wider class of normative phenomena. Hopefully, future work will demonstrate how much else can be explained with these tools.

CHAPTER 6

The AI Epistemic Deference Index: A Continuous Measure of Sycophancy

6.1 Introduction

Sycophancy is a phenomenon characterized by an agent pandering to someone by excessively adapting its response to what it believes the other person wants to hear (Perez et al., 2023; Sharma et al., 2024). A growing body of research has demonstrated that current frontier AI models demonstrate pronounced sycophancy across a wide range of behaviors, including praise, emotional validation, social accommodation, and refusal to disagree (Cheng, Yu, et al., 2026; Ibrahim et al., 2026). This tends to give the user a distorted sense of themselves and the world (Batista & Griffiths, 2026; Cheng, Lee, et al., 2026; Rathje et al., 2025). At the same time, AI models are being deployed in critical settings and are increasingly filling the roles of epistemic authorities (Chen et al., 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Marchal et al., 2026; Zhao et al., 2026). This makes sycophancy a societal risk and an urgent problem to be solved. To do so, we need methods for identifying and measuring the behavior.

In this work, we set the broader social and affective behaviors aside and focus on one central form of sycophancy, which we call *epistemic sycophancy*: when a model's expressed support for a factual claim tracks the stance the user appears to hold, beyond any new evidence the user has supplied. Existing evaluations target this construct either by

Co-authored with Alejandro Botas and Luke Hewitt.

measuring categorical outcomes, such as whether a model changes an endorsement under pressure or follows an incorrect premise (Fanous et al., 2025; Hong et al., 2025; Perez et al., 2023; Sharma et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023), or by eliciting numeric confidence directly (Atwell et al., 2025; Sicilia et al., 2024). Both approaches abstract away from the graded, output-level support expressed in ordinary user-facing language.

We present a new standard for evaluating epistemic sycophancy, which we operationalize as *epistemic deference*: the degree to which the support a model communicates for a proposition tracks the stance apparently expressed or requested by the user. We capture this in a continuous scalar, the *AI Epistemic Deference Index (AEDI)*, which represents how much the support expressed by a model's response tracks the user's apparent attitude, over and above any new evidence. We generate the index using a scalable pipeline eliciting probabilistic beliefs from model responses. Using over 500 propositions across varying topics, we generate 32 diverse, realistic user prompts for each proposition with varying degrees of expressed valence, and provide these to the target models. We then use LLMs-as-judges to assess the degree of probabilistic support expressed by the elicitation prompt and model response, respectively. To control for reliability of judgments (Bavaresco et al., 2025; Calderon et al., 2025; Gu et al., 2025; Zheng et al., 2023), we validate for both consistency and correlation to human judgment. The AEDI deference score is how much a model's response credence (on a logit scale) shifts per unit of prompt valence, estimated within each proposition and averaged across them.

We run this pipeline on current frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and xAI. The results show substantial variation in epistemic sycophancy between the models, with Claude models being the least sycophantic, and Grok and Gemini being the most sycophantic. See Figure 6.1 for the scores of the AEDI at the time of writing. The effect is amplified when users ask the model to produce a written deliverable rather than discuss the topic conversationally, and concentrated on propositions where models hold less extreme prior beliefs. The pipeline is easily deployable on future model releases, and we intend to continuously update and publish AEDI as a public resource.



Figure 6.1: AEDI at the time of writing. Left: AEDI score per model (mean per-proposition logit slope of response credence on prompt valence) with bootstrapped 95% CI. Right: average expressed credence under maximally skeptical (open ring) and maximally credulous (filled disk) prompts; Δ is the raw-scale shift.

6.2 Sycophancy as Epistemic Deference

6.2.1 Epistemic deference

We operationalize epistemic sycophancy as epistemic deference: a model displays epistemic deference when the degree of support it communicates for a proposition tracks the stance implicitly expressed by the user. Following recent computational work on communication (Degen, 2023; Goodman & Frank, 2016), we formalize the confidence expressed in a proposition as a Bayesian credence c: a probability function indicating how strongly a speaker is committed to the proposition. Sycophancy can then be captured as the sensitivity of the credence expressed by a model to the credence expressed by a user's query.

Representing epistemic sycophancy as graded deference captures sycophancy as experienced in AI-user interaction. A prominent line of existing work measures sycophancy through discrete or categorical outcomes: whether a model flips its endorsement, agrees with the user, follows an incorrect premise, or produces an answer classified as sycophantic under pressure (Fanous et al., 2025; Hong et al., 2025; Perez et al., 2023; Sharma et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023). This is valuable, but real linguistic endorsement is rarely binary. If my boss is convinced a deal will close and I, having met with the clients, am near-certain it will not, my saying that things "might not work out but there is still hope" is sycophantic: I

have not endorsed his view, but I have partially deferred toward it. Endorsement-flipping benchmarks abstract this gradient away, missing much of the variance that defines real-world sycophancy. A smaller line of work measures confidence or credence shifts more directly, either by explicitly eliciting posterior probabilities over propositions (Atwell et al., 2025) or by asking models for numeric confidence in their answers (Sicilia et al., 2024). Prior work shows that models can sometimes report useful calibrated uncertainty under controlled elicitation (Kadavath et al., 2022; Lin et al., 2022; Tian et al., 2023). However, explicitly reported credences are method- and prompt-dependent and need not align with the confidence the same model expresses in unrelated natural-language responses, which is the typical user-facing setting (Wang et al., 2026; Xiong et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2024).

Not every shift in credence sensitive to another's attitude is sycophantic (Atwell et al., 2025). Sometimes what someone says changes the evidential situation. For example, if a doctor presents a patient with a diagnosis, we should not count the patient changing their belief as sycophancy. However, because frontier systems are trained on enormous corpora, facts presented by users are less likely to constitute new information to the model than the same facts would if presented in human-to-human interaction. For example, a friend telling you that Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii in AD 79 might constitute new information for most people but likely not for a frontier model. The exceptions will primarily be users providing private information, such as a patient sharing new symptoms. We control for the risk that our deference measurement is explained by such evidence rather than sycophancy by filtering for prompts assessed to introduce new information.

6.2.2 Measurement

We measure expressed credence, understood as the degree of support for a proposition p that a competent reader would reasonably interpret from a response. Attributing credence to a statement is an interpretive exercise and necessarily leaves room for ambiguity. To put interpretations on a common scale, we operationalize the credence in p expressed by a response r in terms of expected fair bets (F. P. Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1971): we ask what a hypothetical risk-neutral speaker who utters r would be willing to pay for a bet that pays \$1 if p is true and \$0 otherwise.

We elicit two such expressed credences for each model–prompt pair: one implicit in the user's prompt, which we call the prompt valence v, and one in the model's response, which we call the response credence c. Sycophancy as expressed deference is the sensitivity of

the latter to the former, holding the proposition fixed. More precisely, let P be the set of propositions in our corpus and, for each $p \in P$, let $\{q_{p,k}\}_{k=1}^{K_p}$ be the prompts generated for p, varying in prompt valence. For target model m and prompt q, write $r_{m,q}$ for the model's response, $c(r_{m,q}) \in (0,1)$ for its judged response credence in p, and $v(q) \in [0,1]$ for the judged prompt valence of q toward p. Within each proposition we estimate

$$\operatorname{logit}(c(r_{m,q})) = \alpha_{m,p} + \beta_{m,p}\, v(q) + \epsilon.$$

Fitting a separate intercept $\alpha_{m,p}$ per proposition absorbs proposition-specific differences in baseline credence so that $\beta_{m,p}$ isolates the within-proposition sensitivity of m's expressed credence to the user's apparent stance. The model-level deference score is the average over propositions,

$$D_m = \frac{1}{|P|} \sum_{p \in P} \beta_{m,p},$$

with larger positive values indicating greater expressed deference, values near zero indicating expressed credence approximately invariant to user stance, and negative values indicating counter-deference. We use logit because additive shifts in log-odds correspond to multiplicative shifts in evidence: a 0.50 to 0.55 shift is a near-trivial log-odds change, while a numerically smaller 0.95 to 0.99 shift is much larger, intended to reflect that movement near the bounds of the probability scale is more epistemically consequential than equivalent movement in the middle.

6.3 The Credence Elicitation and Deference Assessment Pipeline

We present a scalable, automated method for eliciting expressed credal attitudes from models on arbitrary topics and for measuring the deference of these attitudes to the valence of the prompts to which they are responding. The pipeline requires no internal access to evaluated models, meaning it can be deployed to test any closed-source frontier model with an API, including future models.

To demonstrate the pipeline, consider a particular proposition about the world. For example, let p be the claim that the pyramids of Egypt were not constructed by humans. p is provided to elicitation models that generate 32 different prompts $\{q_{p,k}\}_{k=1}^{32}$ concerning p. These prompts are designed to demonstrate diverse valence, some expressing implicit



Figure 6.2: An illustrated run of our pipeline on a sample proposition from our dataset, against target model Gemini 3.1 Pro.

credulity in p and others skepticism. Each q is provided to a target model m that produces a corresponding natural language response $r_{m,q}$ (Figure 6.2).

The prompts q and model outputs $r_{m,q}$ are separately provided to two LLMs-as-judges that interpret the credence expressed in natural-language statements. The judges are asked: if someone were to express this attitude, what would they consider a fair bet on whether p is true? These judges are validated for consistency and against human judgment; see §6.4.

Both q and $r_{m,q}$ are assessed for the implicit credence expressed toward p, represented as the prompt valence $v(q) \in [0, 1]$ and response credence $c(r_{m,q}) \in (0, 1)$, respectively.

These values are the average of two judge models. To avoid noisy samples, if the models diverge by more than some disagreement threshold $d \in (0, 1)$, the result is dismissed (in our implementation, $d = .2$). q is additionally assessed by an independent evidence judge. If a q is judged to introduce substantial new information that a rational agent should update on, then $v(q)$ is dismissed. To evaluate the epistemic deference m demonstrates toward p, we estimate $\beta_{m,p}$ as in §6.2.2 on all non-dismissed $q \in \{q_{p,k}\}_{k=1}^{32}$.

We deploy this pipeline on eight models from four providers—OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and xAI—covering one flagship and one efficient variant each. We use 500 propositions drawn from a curated dataset spanning 10 domains, and 16k prompts produced by elicitation models, generating ~128k model responses. To compute the AEDI, we use the average within-proposition deference for a model across these propositions.

6.4 Validation and Robustness

The meaningfulness of the §6.5 results depends on each component of the pipeline working as intended (Bean et al., 2025; Reuel et al., 2024). The generated prompts elicit responses with interpretable credence signal, and the judges make fair determinations from the text. We validate the pipeline in two ways: *Reasonability (§6.4.1):* checks for judge calibration, coherence, and stability (Murphy & Winkler, 1987). *Human validation (§6.4.2):* checks that human perception of credence and valence tracks the judges' scores on the same text. Human validation checks that our AI judges track human interpretation, but we do not rely on it alone because expressing probabilistic beliefs in numeric terms and judging evidence in prompt presuppositions are not everyday tasks—likely unfamiliar to non-expert raters recruited at tractable crowdsourcing rates.

6.4.1 Reasonability Validations

End-to-end calibration. We curate 100 propositions designed for five target credence buckets—from unequivocally false through uncertain to unequivocally true—generate 32 prompts per proposition, and run the full pipeline twice. A proposition "passes" when its median consensus credence across the 32 prompts lands in its target bucket. 96.5% do (Fig. 6.3), with misses concentrated where the bucket boundaries are tightest.



Figure 6.3: End-to-end calibration: per-bucket distribution of proposition-level median consensus credence across 100 curated propositions × 2 runs. Shaded bands mark each bucket's target range.

Credence-judge coherence. Because the credence judge is the most weight-bearing component of the pipeline, we test two additional internal-coherence properties on the credence judge specifically.

Negation consistency. When the same response is scored against a proposition p and against its negation $\neg p$, do the two credences sum near one, as probability requires? (E.g., 0.3 credence in "AGI by 2030" should pair with ~0.7 in "no AGI by 2030".) Across 40 proposition–negation pairs, the proposition-level mean of $|p + \neg p - 1|$ is 0.029 (chance baseline ≈ 0.33).

Monotonicity. When the same response is scored against a stronger and weaker version of a claim, where p entails p', is the credence in p at most the credence in p'? For example, "AGI by 2027" entails "AGI by 2030"; the stricter claim should not receive higher credence than the looser one. Across 20 nested triples, 100% satisfy the ordering at the proposition level (and 95.1% at the per-prompt level).

Known-group divergence. The pipeline directionally discriminates between Chinese- and Western-developer models on politically pressured propositions (see Appendix C).

Other Reasonability Checks

Check	Outcome
Credence: inter-judge agreement ($\lvert J_1 - J_2 \rvert \leq 0.2$) / Pearson r	87.1% / 0.918
Valence: inter-judge agreement ($\lvert J_1 - J_2 \rvert \leq 0.2$) / Pearson r	92.4% / 0.928
New-evidence: inter-judge agreement ($\lvert J_1 - J_2 \rvert \leq 0.2$) / Pearson r	84.9% / 0.517
Valence: per-prop Spearman r (elicitor prior vs. judge valence), median	0.898

The new-evidence row's high agreement but moderate Pearson both follow from the same fact: the elicitor seeks to avoid introducing substantive new evidence, leaving a heavily skewed corpus where the judges give mean / median / SD = 0.05 / 0.00 / 0.09 (J_1) and 0.13 / 0.10 / 0.14 (J_2), versus 0.49 / 0.48 / 0.31 for credence and 0.50 / 0.50 / 0.29 for valence. This skew creates a high agreement rate but deflates Pearson: with small SD, modest disagreements absorb most of the variance.

The valence Spearman check tests the judge's agreement with the elicitor's prior label. The elicitor records the implied user prior each prompt was written under as a categorical: skeptical, neutral, or credulous. The valence judge scores the prompt independently. Across the corpus the per-prior mean valences are 0.18 / 0.48 / 0.82; within-proposition the median rank correlation between prior label and judge score is 0.898.

6.4.2 Human Validations

We ran two Prolific studies, each on a stratified 200-item sample drawn from the §6.3 corpus. Both enforced an attention-check screener and a per-item minimum-read timer.

The *credence judge* matches the human consensus at per-item median Pearson *0.77* (n=147 items, 673 annotations) and the *valence judge* at *0.83* (n=114 items, 391 annotations). The AI judge metrics are also a better "drop-in" than any single human at predicting the centroid of the other raters: the leave-one-annotator-out (LOO) contrast adapted from Calderon et al. (2025):

	Annotation	Per-item			LOO r
Judge	r	r med [95% CI]	r mean	MAE med	human, LLM (Δ)
Credence	0.54	*0.77* [0.70, 0.83]	0.74	0.155	0.51, 0.72 (*+0.21*)
Valence	0.76	*0.83* [0.73, 0.91]	0.86	0.090	0.77, 0.82 (*+0.05*)

We attribute the higher valence correlation to the task being easier than the credence task for both technical and effort reasons discussed in Appendix C.

6.5 Results

6.5.1 All frontier models exhibit epistemic deference



Figure 6.4: Per-model deference: per-proposition logit slopes of response credence on prompt valence across all eight frontier models.

All models demonstrate substantial deference, though with varying degrees of severity. The expected absolute shift in c with a 0–1 shift in v varies from ~0.55 in Grok-4-1-fast to ~0.12 for Claude Sonnet 4.6 (see Figure 6.1). Figure 6.4 shows per-proposition logit slopes for all eight frontier models. Every slope is positive, every 95% CI excludes zero, and the values span roughly 5×: from +0.67 on Claude Sonnet to +3.14 on Grok-4-1-fast (Claude < GPT < Gemini ≈ Grok-4.20 < Grok-4-1-fast). Per-model slopes on the raw 0–1 credence scale translate to user-framing accounting for roughly an eighth (Claude) to half (Grok-4-1-fast and Gemini) of expressed credence.

6.5.2 Deference is stronger in written artifact requests than conversational prompts

Roughly 37% of our prompts are artifact requests: the user asks the model to produce a deliverable—a memo, talking points, a brief, a press release, a client handout. The remaining 63% are conversational: the user is asking, doubting, or thinking out loud about the proposition. The elicitor labels this distinction at generation time.



Figure 6.5: Per-model deference split by prompt shape: artifact requests vs. conversational prompts.

Across all eight models, epistemic deference is sharply stronger on artifact requests. We argue that this gap is a substantive finding: under task pressure, frontier models drop the epistemic transparency they show in conversational settings. But models do not need to choose between honesty and compliance. They can (and sometimes do) provide a deliverable while also being proactively honest about uncertainty in the claims the deliverable would otherwise carry.

Both models deliver something usable to the user; one just does so without endorsing the proposition.

Of the eight tested models, all except the two Anthropic models display significant deference in both conversational and task-completion requests. Claude Opus's conver-



Figure 6.6: Two responses to the same artifact request on a contested proposition: one model complies and endorses; the other complies while flagging uncertainty.

sational deference is essentially zero, and Sonnet's slope is statistically indistinguishable from zero with a slightly negative point estimate (-0.08 [-0.17, $+0.00$]).

6.5.3 Deference is weaker on propositions where models hold more extreme priors

Models are less sycophantic on propositions where they hold more extreme priors. Defining each (model, proposition) pair's prior extremity as |neutral-prompt median credence − 0.5|, the per-proposition logit slope at near-certain propositions ([0.4, 0.5)) is below the slope at near-uncertain ones ([0.0, 0.1)) for all eight models.

6.6 Robustness and Limitations

6.6.1 Robustness checks

Differential exclusion does not confound cross-model comparisons. Under the main strict filters, slope-eligible row exclusion rates are similar across providers (Grok 23.0%, Anthropic 24.8%, Google 26.2%, OpenAI 26.2%). The common prompt-level valence/evidence filters affect all providers equally; the remaining spread comes from target-response filters (judge disagreement > 0.2 or either credence judge marking the response uninformative). Removing the credence-disagreement filter—averaging J1 and J2 wher-

ever both produced bounded informative ratings—gives a 12,938-prompt intersection covering all eight models. Provider means remain ordered Anthropic < OpenAI < Google < Grok (0.76, 1.89, 2.61, 2.81), every per-model 95% CI excludes zero, the cross-provider gap changes only modestly relative to the corresponding full no-disagreement analysis (2.18 → 2.05 logit units), and every per-model shift is ≤ 0.14 logit units.

Evidence gating does not drive the signal. Tightening the new-evidence threshold beyond the main specification excludes prompts we would not normally treat as containing substantive evidence, such as vague evidence gestures, hearsay, and widely known public information, but it does not alter provider rankings. Our current threshold therefore appears more conservative than might be necessary. The deference signal does not decrease as the evidence threshold tightens. At the strictest zero-evidence threshold every model's slope increases rather than shrinks (+0.23 mean). We attribute the low-threshold increase partly to corpus composition: the strictest filter shifts the retained set toward artifact requests, which are more sycophancy-inducing, raising artifact share among strict slope-eligible rows from 37% to 41%. Within prompt shape, slopes also do not move toward zero (artifact-prompt averages 3.36 → 3.49; conversational-prompt averages 1.08 → 1.21).

LLM judge choice shifts magnitudes but not rankings. Recomputing AEDI with each judge taking on both the credence and the valence role alone preserves the provider ordering (Bavaresco et al., 2025; Calderon et al., 2025; Gu et al., 2025). GPT-5.4-mini produces larger slopes than Gemini 3 Flash for every model (per-model differences +0.41 to +1.16 logit units, mean +0.82). GPT-5.4-mini puts less mass in the 0.4–0.6 middle than Gemini 3 Flash (7.2% vs 23.1%) and more in 0.6–0.8 (23.6% vs 13.9%), so the same valence-driven shift in expressed credence becomes a larger movement on the logit scale that defines our slope. This implies that absolute slope magnitudes will depend on judge choice. We expect this cost of LLM-based scoring, which we partially mitigate through the two-judge ensemble, to shrink as frontier models continue to improve in calibration.

6.6.2 Limitations

Single-turn only. We probe single-turn interactions (Hong et al., 2025; Ibrahim et al., 2025; Jain et al., 2025; Kim et al., 2026). We plan to support multi-turn simulated interactions in future work.

Sycophancy isn't everything. Flawed models could perform well on this eval: (1) a model with unreasonably rigid beliefs might not show epistemic deference, but it might also not update in light of substantive new information; (2) models might score better on task completions by helping less and refusing more, and we advocate instead for models to perform task completions where harmless while being proactively honest about uncertainty and doubt; (3) models that are occasionally contrarian could overperform on our slope metric. Claude Sonnet 4.6 might do this: its conversational slope of -0.08 has a 95% CI just touching zero. We plan to correct for this in future work.

Epistemic deference is one operationalization of sycophancy, but sycophancy is a high-level construct and as such is difficult to pin down. Interesting alternative operationalizations target social face preservation, emotional validation, and moral endorsement (Cheng, Lee, et al., 2026; Cheng, Yu, et al., 2026; Ibrahim et al., 2026; Rathje et al., 2025; Turner, 2026).

6.7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have introduced the AI Epistemic Deference Index (AEDI): a continuous, output-level measure of epistemic sycophancy, operationalized as the within-proposition sensitivity of a model's expressed credence to the stance implicit in the user's prompt. Applied to eight frontier models, every model exhibits substantial deference, with provider-level differences spanning roughly fivefold; deference is sharply amplified under artifact requests and attenuated where models hold stronger priors. Significant questions remain—particularly extending the protocol to multi-turn interactions and separating epistemic deference from rigidity or contrarianism—and we release AEDI as an easy-to-update public benchmark to support that work.

APPENDIX A

Formalizing Evidentialism

In this Appendix, I show that RL is consistent with evidentialism. I present an RL model that separates reward observations from basic value, and then show that the resulting value function can be learned by Bayesian conditionalization. I also show that TD learning converges on the same value function if reward signals are unbiased.

For comparison, consider a standard simple Markov decision process (MDP) with an infinite discounted horizon and a fixed policy π:

$$\mathcal{M} = (\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, T, r, \gamma, \pi). \tag{A1}$$

Here $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ are finite state and action sets, $T(s' \mid s, a)$ is the transition function specifying the probability of arriving at s' from s when choosing a, $r(s, a, s')$ is the reward, and $\gamma \in [0, 1)$ is the discount factor. Its value function is

$$V^{\pi}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi}\left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^{k}\, r(s_{t+k}, a_{t+k}, s_{t+k+1}) \;\middle|\; s_t = s\right]. \tag{A2}$$

In this MDP, the same scalar r is both what is optimized and what teaches the agent, for example via TD learning.

Compare this to another MDP. Let θ be a latent parameter determining the basic value of a transition:

$$u_{\theta}(s, a, s'). \tag{A3}$$

The correct value function, relative to the true latent parameter θ^{*}, is

$$V^{\pi}_{\theta^*}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi}\left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \, u_{\theta^*}(s_{t+k}, a_{t+k}, s_{t+k+1}) \;\middle|\; s_t = s\right]. \tag{A4}$$

$V^{\pi}_{\theta^*}$ is the ideal value function the agent is trying to track. However, the agent does not observe θ^* directly, and it might believe that some other θ is true. A Bayesian learner can update this belief in response to evidence. Suppose that after the transition (s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}), it receives an observation o_{t+1} generated by an observation model

$$P(o_{t+1} \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta). \tag{A5}$$

Let

$$h_t = (s_0, a_0, o_1, s_1, \ldots, a_{t-1}, o_t, s_t) \tag{A6}$$

be the history up to time t, and let

$$b_t(\theta) = P(\theta \mid h_t) \tag{A7}$$

be the agent's posterior probabilistic belief over basic-value hypotheses. Bayes' rule then gives

$$b_{t+1}(\theta) = \frac{b_t(\theta)\, P(o_{t+1} \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta)}{\sum_{\widetilde{\theta}} b_t(\widetilde{\theta})\, P(o_{t+1} \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \widetilde{\theta})}. \tag{A8}$$

Given this, we can define the agent's estimate of the value function as

$$\widehat{V}^{\pi}_t(s) = \sum_{\theta} b_t(\theta)\, V^{\pi}_{\theta}(s), \tag{A9}$$

where

$$V^{\pi}_{\theta}(s) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi}\left[\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \gamma^k \, u_{\theta}(s_{t+k}, a_{t+k}, s_{t+k+1}) \;\middle|\; s_t = s\right]. \tag{A10}$$

If the model is well specified and the evidence is not systematically misleading, then accumulating observations will make the posterior concentrate on θ^*, in which case $\widehat{V}^{\pi}_t$ approaches $V^{\pi}_{\theta^*}$.

Can TD learning be used to learn this as well? Yes. Suppose that the scalar signal fed into TD learning is this same observation variable o_{t+1}, now treated as the input to the

update rule. A simple sufficient condition is that this observational signal be conditionally unbiased for one-step basic value:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[o_{t+1} \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta^*\right] = u_{\theta^*}(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}). \tag{A11}$$

In that case, the observation signal is noisy evidence about basic value. Let $\widehat{V}_t$ be the agent's current value estimate at time t, and let α_t be the learning rate. The TDE is

$$\delta_t = o_{t+1} + \gamma \widehat{V}_t(s_{t+1}) - \widehat{V}_t(s_t), \tag{A12}$$

and the TD update is

$$\widehat{V}_{t+1}(s_t) = \widehat{V}_t(s_t) + \alpha_t \, \delta_t. \tag{A13}$$

If the agent observed basic value directly, the corresponding one-step TD target would be

$$u_{\theta^*}(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}) + \gamma \widehat{V}_t(s_{t+1}). \tag{A14}$$

Since $\widehat{V}_t(s_t)$ and $\widehat{V}_t(s_{t+1})$ are fixed once we condition on $s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta^*$, the conditional expectation applies only to o_{t+1}. So

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\delta_t \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta^*\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[o_{t+1} \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta^*\right] + \gamma \widehat{V}_t(s_{t+1}) - \widehat{V}_t(s_t). \tag{A15}$$

So by (A11),

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\delta_t \mid s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}, \theta^*\right] = u_{\theta^*}(s_t, a_t, s_{t+1}) + \gamma \widehat{V}_t(s_{t+1}) - \widehat{V}_t(s_t). \tag{A16}$$

Thus TD learning can treat reward as noisy evidence about basic value, and under the familiar tabular assumptions it will still converge to $V^{\pi}_{\theta^*}$, given the unbiasedness assumption above (Dayan, 1992). By contrast, if o_{t+1} is systematically misleading, then we should not expect convergence (for example, if θ^* is healthy eating and o_{t+1} is sugar).

APPENDIX B

Proving Rational Commitment

In this appendix, we prove that the sequential game of incomplete information representing Penelope's situation has a unique sequential equilibrium such that Day Penelope chooses GO and Night Penelope chooses $Retire$ if $p > {p_T}^n$.

We start with some preliminaries. It will be helpful to refer to choices and selves in different rounds with different terms. Call the selves acting in the final round Day_0 and Night_0, the penultimate round Day_1 and Night_1, and so on. I refer to their actions with corresponding subscripts, e.g. Day_0 choosing GO as GO_0. I refer to Day and Night without subscripts when the claim applies to a self in any round. As before, Day's utilities for an early, late, and solitary night are g, $-b$, and 0, respectively, and $g > 0 > -b$. Night's corresponding utilities are e, l, and 0, respectively, and $l > e > 0$ and $(e + \delta_N l) > l$. δ_D and δ_N are Day and Night's discount factors. Like before, $P(\cdot)$ is Day's credence. See Figure B.1 for a partial illustration of the game where $n = 1$ and Day_1 and Night_1's payoffs are represented as $(U(\cdot)_D, U(\cdot)_N)$.

We showed that when $n = 0$, Day chooses GO iff $p > p_T$, and Night chooses $Retire$ if she's Responsible and $Party$ otherwise. Next, we consider what Day and Night choose when $n > 0$. Our strategy will be a proof by induction. First, we show that in the base case $n = 1$ (i.e. a two-round game) Day_n chooses GO_n when $p > {p_T}^{(n+1)}$ and Night_n chooses $Retire_n$ when $p > {p_T}^n$.[1] Then, we show that this holds for $n > 1$.[2]

Suppose that $n = 1$. We consider two cases: (i) $p > p_T$, and (ii) $p < p_T$. We set aside the case where $p = p_T$.

[1] Since ${p_T}^n > {p_T}^{(n+1)}$, Day_n chooses GO_n when $p > {p_T}^n$.

[2] The structure of this proof is similar to that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 369–74) of the so-called "chain store" game.



Figure B.1: A partial representation of the game when $n = 1$

(i) $p > p_T$: This case is easy. When $p > p_T$, Day already trusts Night and would choose GO_0 in the final round unless she gets evidence that Night is Fun. Since $(e + \delta_N l) > l$, Night_1 acting in the first round will choose $Retire_1$. Otherwise she would reveal herself to be Fun, in which case Day_0 chooses SH_0 and Night gets l. Inferring that Night_1 will choose $Retire_1$, Day_1 will choose GO.

(ii) $p < p_T$: This is the interesting case where Day does not yet trust Night, and Night needs to improve her reputation. We will show that Day_1 chooses GO_1 whenever $p > {p_T}^2$.

Consider first the expected utility of Day_1's choice. $EU(GO_1)$ can be broken down like this:

$$\begin{aligned} EU(GO_1) = {} & EU(GO_1|Retire_1)P(Retire_1) \\ & + EU(GO_1|Party_1)P(Party_1) \end{aligned} \tag{B1}$$

Note three things. First $P(Party_1) = 1 - P(Retire_1)$. Second, $EU(GO_1|Party_1) = -b$. If Night_1 chooses $Party_1$, Day_0 chooses SH_0, meaning Day's maximal loss is $-b$ in the first round. Third, $EU(GO_1|Retire_1) \geq g$. If Night_1 chooses $Retire_1$, then minimally

Day gets g from the first early night. However, she also gets some evidence that Night is Responsible, meaning $P(Responsible|Retire_1) > p$. That makes going out in the next round better in expectation, so $EU(GO_0) > g$. Meanwhile $EU(SH_0) = 0$, meaning $EU(GO_1|Retire_1) \geq g$.

In this proof we will make a simplifying assumption that $EU(GO_1|Retire_1) = g$. That means that her decision will be based entirely on outcomes in the current round. This is equivalent to saying that $\delta_D = 0$, or that Day entirely discounts the future. Notice that this makes it harder, not easier, to show that GO is expected utility maximizing and weakens the conclusion. However, as it turns out, this is still enough to allow us to establish a powerful result. Since this will make the proof substantially easier, and since the result is sufficient for the purposes of this argument anyway, we will trade power for simplicity.[3] We can now restate (B1) as follows:

$$EU(GO_1) = g \cdot P(Retire_1) - b \cdot (1 - P(Retire_1)) \tag{B2}$$

Day_1 is indifferent between GO_1 and SH_1 iff $EU(GO_1) = EU(SH_1)$. If she chooses SH_1 then she will get no evidence about Night, meaning $P(Responsible|SH_1) = p$, in which case she will choose SH_0 in the final round. Since this gives her 0 in both rounds, $EU(SH_1) = 0$. Therefore, Day_1 is indifferent between GO_1 and SH_1 iff $EU(GO_1) = 0$, or equivalently:

$$P(Retire_1) = \frac{b}{g + b} = p_T \tag{B3}$$

This means that Day_1 chooses GO_1 iff her credence that Night_1 chooses $Retire_1$ is larger than p_T. Our next task will be to find $P(Retire_1)$. It can be broken down like this:

$$\begin{aligned} P(Retire_1) = {} & P(Retire_1|Responsible)P(Responsible) \\ & + P(Retire_1|Fun)P(Fun) \end{aligned} \tag{B4}$$

[3] Specifically, it allows us to model Penelope's situation as a game between one long-run player that has a reputation and many short-run players that do not, which is a well-studied kind of game.

Since this is the first round and Day has no evidence from Night's actions, her credences are just her priors such that $P(Responsible) = p$ and $P(Fun) = 1 - p$. If Night is Responsible, then she will always choose $Retire$, so $P(Retire_1|Responsible) = 1$. Meanwhile, if Night is Fun she might still choose $Retire$ to improve her reputation and make it more probable that Day_0 chooses GO. Let σ represent $P(Retire_1|Fun)$. We can now restate (B4) as a simpler expression:

$$P(Retire_1) = p + \sigma(1 - p) \tag{B5}$$

Next, we need to find σ. At this point, we need to make use of the indifference conditions of finding an equilibrium in a game. The optimal σ for Night_1 is the mixed strategy she could not improve on in response to Day_0's best response to that strategy.

Consider the limits first. Is $\sigma = 1$ an equilibrium? No. If Night_1 always chose $Retire_1$, then her action would be uninformative, meaning that Day would get no new evidence. Since $p > p_T$ she would then choose SH_0 in the next round, leaving Night with 0 in total. Therefore, Night_1 could improve her strategy by choosing $Party_1$, which would at least give her l. What about $\sigma = 0$? No. If Night_1 always chose $Party_1$, then $Retire_1$ would be perfect evidence that she is Responsible. Therefore, Night_1 could improve her strategy by choosing $Retire_1$, because that would make Day_0 choose GO_0 and give Night $e + \delta_N l$ rather than l. Therefore, $0 < \sigma < 1$.

To find the σ that Night_1 plays in equilibrium, we need to find the σ in response to which Day_0 is indifferent between GO_0 and SH_0. But $EU(GO_0)$ depends on $P(Responsible|Retire_1, \sigma)$. Call this posterior credence μ. According to Bayes' Theorem:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu &= \frac{P(Retire_1|Responsible)P(Responsible)}{P(Retire_1|Responsible)P(Responsible) + P(Retire_1|Fun)P(Fun)} \\ &= \frac{p}{p + \sigma(1 - p)} \end{aligned} \tag{B6}$$

Independently, for the same reason that Day is indifferent between GO and SH in the single-round game, we know that Day_0 is indifferent between GO and SH iff:

$$\mu = \frac{b}{g+b} \tag{B7}$$

Setting (B6) equal to (B7) and solving for σ:

$$\sigma = \frac{g \cdot p}{b \cdot (1-p)} \tag{B8}$$

We now have Night$_1$'s optimal mixed strategy. We can now replace σ in (B5) with (B8) to get the complete $P(Retire_1)$:

$$\begin{aligned} P(Retire_1) &= p + \frac{g \cdot p}{b \cdot (1-p)}(1-p) \\ &= p\frac{g+b}{b} = p \cdot {p_T}^{-1} \end{aligned} \tag{B9}$$

Finally, setting (B3) equal to (B9) and solving for p, this implies that Day$_1$ chooses GO_1 if:

$$p > {p_T}^2 \tag{B10}$$

This concludes (ii). With that we have proved that Day$_n$ always chooses GO_n if $p > {p_T}^{(n+1)}$ and Night$_n$ always chooses $Retire_n$ if $p > {p_T}^n$ for the base case $n = 1$. Next, we show that this holds for $n > 1$. Consider $n = 2$ first. Like before, we consider two cases: (i') $p > {p_T}^2$ and (ii') $p < {p_T}^2$.

(i') $p > {p_T}^2$: Given (B10), Night$_2$ knows that if she chooses $Retire_2$, Day$_1$ will choose GO_1, giving Night at least $e + \delta_N l$. Therefore, like in (i), she chooses $Retire_2$ with certainty.

(ii') $p < {p_T}^2$: Like before, Night$_2$ will now play a mixed strategy and choose $Retire_2$ with some probability σ'. Like before, σ' will be optimal when the next Day—in this case Day$_1$—is indifferent between GO_1 and SH_1, given σ'. We showed in (ii) that this happens just when Day's credence in Responsible is ${p_T}^2$. However, she will have this credence after observing Night$_2$ choose $Retire_2$. Therefore, in equilibrium this will hold:

$$p_T{}^2 = P(Responsible|Retire_2) = \frac{p}{p + \sigma'(1-p)} \tag{B11}$$

We can now infer $EU(GO_2)$. Since Day only considers today's payoffs, (B3) will hold for $Retire_2$. So Day_2 is indifferent between GO_2 and SH_2 just when:

$$P(Retire_2) = p_T \tag{B12}$$

And replacing σ with σ' in (B5) we get:

$$P(Retire_2) = p + \sigma'(1-p) \tag{B13}$$

Solving for σ' and using (B12):

$$\sigma' = \frac{p_T - p}{1-p} \tag{B14}$$

Finally, replacing σ' with (B14) in (B11) we get that Day_2 is indifferent just when:

$$p_T{}^2 = \frac{p}{p + (\frac{p_T - p}{1-p})(1-p)} = \frac{p}{p_T} \tag{B15}$$

Therefore, Day_2 chooses GO_2 iff:

$$p > p_T{}^3 \tag{B16}$$

This concludes (ii'), and shows that Day_2 chooses GO if $p > p_T{}^3$ and Night_2 chooses $Retire$ if $p > p_T{}^2$. Therefore, they both perform these respective actions when $p > p_T{}^2$. Finally, note that if we replace '2' and '1' with '$n+1$' and 'n' respectively in (i') and (ii'), all of the steps still hold. Therefore, for all $n > 1$, Day_n chooses GO_n and Night_n chooses $Retire_n$ when $p > p_T{}^n$. Q.E.D.

APPENDIX C

Validation and Extended Results of the AI Epistemic Deference Index

This appendix collects validation evidence and extended results for the AEDI pipeline introduced in Chapter 6. §C.1 expands §6.4, reporting reasonability and human-validation checks. §C.2 provides per-domain and prior-extremity breakdowns of the results in §6.5.

C.1 Validation

We report two families of checks: *reasonability* (§C.1.1) probes whether the credence judge respects the constraints a competent reader would (calibration, negation, monotonicity, stability, inter-judge agreement, known-group divergence); *human validation* (§C.1.2) compares judge scores to crowd annotations on the same items.

C.1.1 Reasonability

Calibration. 100 propositions stratified across five target ranges × 2 runs = 200 proposition-runs; target model GPT-5.4-mini; a proposition passes if its median consensus credence across 32 prompts falls within its target range. Examples per bucket: *unequivocally false* "The Sun orbits the Earth"; *likely false* "The average December temperature in Chicago will be lower in the 2030s than in the 2020s"; *uncertain* "The total number of stars in the observable universe is odd"; *likely true* "The average December temperature in Chicago will be higher in the 2030s than in the 2020s"; *unequivocally true* "The Earth orbits the Sun". The uncertain bucket is somewhat contrived: genuinely 50/50 propositions on which a competent reasoner has no usable prior are hard to come by without resorting to parity (*is N even or odd?*) or coin-flip framings. Visual summary in Fig. 6.3.

Bucket	Range	Pass rate	95% CI
Unequivocally false	0.00 – 0.05	40/40	100.0 – 100.0%
Likely false	0.05 – 0.45	37/40	82.5 – 100.0%
Uncertain	0.45 – 0.55	38/40	87.5 – 100.0%
Likely true	0.55 – 0.95	38/40	87.5 – 100.0%
Unequivocally true	0.95 – 1.00	40/40	100.0 – 100.0%
Overall		*193/200 (96.5%)*	*93.5 – 98.5%*

Coherence (negation and monotonicity). The next two checks probe *judge* coherence rather than model behavior: in each, a single set of model responses is scored multiple times by the credence judge, varying only the proposition the judge is asked to evaluate. Failures here therefore implicate the judge, not the target.

Negation consistency. 40 proposition–negation pairs. For example, p = "The Earth orbits the Sun", $\neg p$ = "The Earth does not orbit the Sun". Prompts are generated on p; the resulting model responses are then scored against both p and $\neg p$. A coherent credence function satisfies $\Pr(p)+\Pr(\neg p) = 1$. At the proposition level (median credence per pair), the mean absolute deviation $|p + \neg p - 1|$ is 0.029 (median 0.009); the signed deviation averages -0.023 (median 0), consistent with a tiny systematic underconfidence rather than a directional bias. At the sample level ($n = 1{,}061$ individual prompt–response pairs with consensus on both sides), the mean absolute deviation is 0.030 (median 0.005); deviations above 0.1 occur on 8.2% of samples and above 0.2 on 0.9%. Per-pair sums in Fig. C.1.



Figure C.1: Negation consistency, per pair. Each row stacks median credence in p (blue) and median credence in $\neg p$ (red); the dashed line at 1.0 marks perfect consistency. Pairs sorted by sum; `[U]` = unequivocally true/false, `[L]` = likely true/false.

Monotonicity. 20 series of three nested propositions each. For example, "US real GDP growth will exceed {1%, 3%, 5%} in 2027", where the broadest p_1 entails p_2 entails the strictest p_3. Prompts are generated on p_1; the resulting responses are scored against all

three. 20/20 series satisfy the ordering at the proposition level (medians per position non-increasing); 607/638 (95.1%) at the individual prompt–response level. Per-series detail in Fig. C.2.



Figure C.2: Monotonicity per series. Each panel shows the credence distribution at each of three nested propositions (p_1 broadest, p_3 strictest); the diamond connector traces medians. All 20 series pass at the proposition (median) level.

Test–retest reliability. Two independent pipeline runs on the 100 calibration propositions with freshly generated prompts: Spearman $r = 0.993$, Pearson $r = 0.996$, MAD = 0.014.

Inter-judge agreement. Across all 6,151 informative calibration samples: 87.1% within 0.2, mean $|J_1 - J_2| = 0.078$; $|J_1 - J_2| > 0.5$ on 1.1% of samples.

Known-group divergence. On 50 China-sensitive propositions with pre-specified expected directions (9 pro-China, 41 anti-China), we compare mean credence between two Chinese-developer models (DeepSeek-Reasoner, Kimi-K2.5) and two Western-developer

models (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-5.4-mini). 38/50 (76%) of propositions shift in the predicted direction; mean signed shift +0.062 (median +0.048); one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test against zero gives $W = 1{,}135$, $p = 1.0 \times 10^{-7}$. The pipeline detects a real prior-driven cross-provider difference on substantively contested topics.

C.1.2 Human Validations

Two Prolific studies, each on a stratified 200-item sample drawn from the §6.3 corpus. Each enforced an attention-check screener (two checks per session, both required to pass) and a per-item minimum-read timer set to 1/4 of the 250-wpm estimated read time. Our research organization is a newly founded nonprofit and does not maintain an in-house IRB; in line with NeurIPS policy permitting an equivalent informal process when no IRB is available, the study was reviewed against 45 CFR 46 (Common Rule) minimal-risk criteria by an external academic researcher independent of the research team.

Credence judge. Study A: 1,883 annotations from 99 raters over 200 items. 71% of annotations completed faster than the 250-wpm estimated read time and 45% passed both attention checks, consistent with heavy skimming. After applying the attention + DNU=False filter and restricting to items with ≥ 4 retained annotations, individual human credence judgments correlate moderately with the AI consensus: per-annotation Pearson is $r = 0.54$ ($n = 673$). Aggregating to per-item median human credence on the same retained set lifts the correlation to $r = 0.77$ ($n = 147$ items). A leave-one-annotator-out alt-test (Calderon et al., 2025) puts the AI judge at $r = 0.72$ recovering the centroid of the remaining humans, vs. $r = 0.51$ for a held-out human predicting the same centroid; $\Delta = +0.21$ [+0.15, +0.30], indicating the AI appears to be a less noisy drop-in than a single human at recovering the consensus. Bias on the filtered set is negligible: mean(AI − human) = −0.014.

Valence judge. Study B: 3,082 annotations from 168 raters over 200 items. Retention differences with Study A mean applying the same ≥ 4 retention threshold leaves only 43 items, so we relax to ≥ 3 retained annotations ($n = 114$ items). With that adjustment and the same attention + DNU=False filter, per-annotation Pearson is $r = 0.76$ ($n = 391$); item-level Pearson on the median-aggregated set is $r = 0.83$. LOO alt-test: $r_{\text{AI}\to\text{rest}} = 0.82$ vs. $r_{\text{human}\to\text{rest}} = 0.77$, $\Delta = +0.05$ [−0.02, +0.12]. Bias: mean(AI − human) = +0.005.

Judge	Per-annotation r	Item-level r (median) [95% CI] ($\geq k$ retained)	LOO Δ	Bias mean(AI − h)
Credence (Study A)	0.54 ($n = 673$)	0.77 [0.70, 0.83] ($n = 147$, $k = 4$)	+0.21	−0.014
Valence (Study B)	0.76 ($n = 391$)	0.83 [0.73, 0.91] ($n = 114$, $k = 3$)	+0.05	+0.005

Per-annotation valence agreement is meaningfully higher than per-annotation credence agreement (0.76 vs. 0.54), as is item-level (0.83 vs. 0.77). The LOO advantage of the AI over a single human is also larger for credence (+0.21) than for valence (+0.05). We attribute these gaps to two factors. First, prompts are deliberately imbued with one of three valences by the elicitor, while responses are generated naturalistically by target models with no analogous intentional credence signal, making credence grading a harder construct to read than valence. Second, credence grading requires substantially more reading: a credence rater additionally reads the model response (median 340-word item, ≈ 82 s at 250 wpm), and the median annotator spent only 49 s per item, 61% of that estimated read time.

New-evidence judge. Each Study B item also collected a 4-point Likert rating of new-evidence content (0 = none, 1 = not enough to update, 2 = enough to slightly update, 3 = enough to significantly update; rescaled to $[0, 1]$), shown immediately after the valence rating. The validation came in uninformative for two reasons. First, raters reported confusion about the new-evidence task in free-text feedback; the cost-driven proximity to the valence task likely contributed. Second, the distribution is highly skewed by design: the elicitor avoids update-worthy prompts, so the AI new-evidence consensus (defensive max) has SD = 0.14 across 16,006 prompts with 92.4% at or below the 0.4 exclusion threshold; the valence and credence consensus SDs are 0.30 and 0.32. The corpus is also overwhelmingly low-evidence on the human side: 89% of human ratings are Likert 0 or 1. Binary agreement at "median human Likert ≥ 1.5 vs. AI consensus > 0.4" is 91% item-level, dominated by the shared low mass; Pearson is only $r = 0.24$ per-annotation ($n = 537$) and $r = 0.37$ per-item ($n = 114$, $k \geq 3$).

C.2 Extended Results

C.2.1 Raw-scale credence slopes

Figure C.3 reports per-model deference slopes on the raw 0–1 credence scale, complementing the logit-scale slopes in §6.5.1. Absolute slope magnitudes are a property of each model on this AEDI corpus, not of the model in isolation: they depend on the domain mix of the proposition set and on elicitor and judge calibration. Future cohorts will yield different absolute numbers for the same model; the cross-model ranking is what is intended to transfer.



Figure C.3: Per-model deference slopes on the raw 0–1 credence scale.

C.2.2 Ranking stability across domains

Table C.1 reports per-model logit slopes broken out by domain (evidence threshold ≤ 0.4, within-proposition fixed effects, $n = 50$ propositions per domain). The provider ordering Anthropic < OpenAI < {Google, xAI} holds in every domain; the relative order between Google and xAI varies by domain. Running the pipeline on a different proposition set will likely shift measured deference magnitudes, but the relative ranking of providers is expected to remain stable.

Domain	Sonnet 4.6	Opus 4.6	GPT-5.4	GPT-5.4-mini	Flash	Pro	Grok-4.20	Grok-4-1-fast
AI claims	+0.68	+0.87	+2.03	+2.09	+2.54	+2.66	+2.74	+3.04
Contested social science	+0.38	+0.36	+1.53	+1.74	+2.30	+2.17	+2.43	+2.97
Frontier natural science	+1.12	+1.16	+1.87	+1.88	+2.74	+2.87	+2.62	+3.07
Historical facts	+1.06	+1.14	+2.04	+2.08	+2.82	+2.97	+2.62	+2.94
Moral claims	+0.88	+1.17	+2.42	+2.49	+2.95	+3.14	+3.36	+3.91
Nutrition & health	+0.07	+0.22	+1.22	+1.40	+2.32	+2.32	+2.36	+2.78
Paranormal claims	+0.30	+0.39	+1.42	+1.39	+3.19	+2.81	+2.24	+3.53
Philosophical propositions	+1.04	+1.16	+2.55	+2.61	+3.25	+3.31	+3.31	+3.37
Politically polarizing	+0.46	+0.45	+1.56	+1.80	+2.45	+2.24	+2.45	+3.44
Prediction market	+0.68	+0.72	+1.41	+1.57	+2.00	+1.94	+2.08	+2.35

Table C.1: Per-model × per-domain logit slopes. Flash = Gemini 3 Flash; Pro = Gemini 3.1 Pro.

C.2.3 Deference by prior extremity

Figure C.4 shows the per-model slope-vs-extremity relationship discussed in §6.5.3, where extremity for each (proposition, model) pair is |neutral-prompt median credence – 0.5|. Table C.2 reports the across-model average slope per extremity bucket on both the logit and raw 0–1 scales.



Figure C.4: Per-model deference slope as a function of prior extremity. Slopes flatten as priors approach near-certain.

Extremity bucket	Logit slope	Linear slope
$[0.0, 0.1)$ near uncertain	+2.14	+0.42
$[0.1, 0.2)$	+2.01	+0.40
$[0.2, 0.3)$	+2.03	+0.39
$[0.3, 0.4)$	+2.08	+0.36
$[0.4, 0.5)$ near certain	+1.82	+0.25

Table C.2: Across-model average deference slope by prior-extremity bucket.

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